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Abstract 
This study examines the workings of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), in order to 
assess the need and potential for new approaches to ensure access to protection for people seeking it 
in the EU, including joint processing and distribution of asylum seekers. Rather than advocating the 
addition of further complexity and coercion to the CEAS, the study proposes a focus on front-line 
reception and streamlined refugee status determination, in order to mitigate the asylum challenges 
facing Member States, and vindicate the rights of asylum seekers and refugees according to the EU 
acquis and international legal standards. Joint processing could contribute to front-line reception and 
processing capacity, but is no substitute for proper investment in national systems. The Dublin system 
as currently configured leads inexorably to increasing coercion and detention, and must thus be 
reconfigured to remove coercion as a principle and ensure consistency with human rights and other 
fundamental values of the EU. 
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Executive Summary 
 
1. Introduction 
This study examines the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in order to assess the relevance and 
utility of joint processing and distribution of asylum applicants. These are often conceived of as ‘burden-
sharing’ mechanisms. At the outset, we attempt to ‘unpack’ the notion of ‘burden’, by noting that the weight 
of the ‘burden’ of hosting asylum seekers and assessing their protection needs depends significantly on how 
coercive and complex asylum processes are. Before identifying ways to share the ‘burden’, it is thus desirable 
to reduce it by avoiding unnecessary coercion and complexity. Asylum seekers are inherently vulnerable, and 
in the absence of safe legal means of access to the EU, will usually be irregular entrants. Apparently intractable 
political differences across the EU on the ‘burden’ of hosting asylum seekers could be overcome if the gap 
between political rhetoric and reality is overcome, and front-line reception and processing capacity enhanced 
across all EU Member States. 
 
2. Evidence-led Policy-Making in the CEAS 
The international obligations of the Member States, as reaffirmed under EU law, demonstrate a continuous 
commitment to afford international protection to those requiring it. This commitment is not subject to any 
numerical limit on the persons for whom the Member States may be responsible. 
Asylum data is gathered by a number of sources, including UNHCR, EUROSTAT, EASO and FRONTEX. 
Evidence on asylum applications from four key temporal snapshots of the CEAS (1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014) 
indicates that the overall variation in total numbers of asylum seekers and their main countries of origin 
remains surprisingly low in the EU. This is striking as this period covers the significant enlargement of the 
EU. However, recognition rates for protection seekers reveal significant discrepancies between Member States 
in the ways in which they assess asylum claims, even for asylum seekers from the same countries of origin 
over the same periods.  
An evidence-based evaluation of the Dublin system is problematic, as statistics on Dublin transfers are 
relatively scarce beyond the data provided by annual EURODAC reports. According to available statistics, 
only an approximate 25% of outgoing requests have resulted in transfers during the period 2008-2012, meaning 
that Dublin transfers take place in only around 3% of asylum cases in the EU. Most applications are processed 
where asylum seekers actually apply for asylum, irrespective of the Dublin allocation criteria. 
 
3. Current and Proposed Joint Approaches to Allocation, Access to Procedures, First-Line 
Reception and Processing 
Various ideas have been developed around possible joint approaches to facilitating access to procedures and 
first-line reception of asylum seekers and alternative means of allocating responsibility for those potentially in 
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need of protection. In addition to individual Member State practices, thinking on alternative and joint 
approaches has taken place among Member States at EU level, within EU bodies and among international 
organisations, civil society and academia. In 2014, discussions around challenges in responding to large 
numbers of sea arrivals, notably in the context of the Mare Nostrum operation in the Mediterranean, have 
prompted reflection on the need for more effective operational responses on protection at maritime borders, 
involving Member States, EASO and other EU bodies, civil society and UNHCR. 
EASO, also in 2014, facilitated a series of pilot projects that tested certain elements of joint processing in 
relation to different aspects of the initial stage of the asylum review process. While at the time of this writing 
final reports have not been published and an independent evaluation not yet carried out, the pilots are reported 
to have been received in generally positive terms by participating Member States. 
In 2006-2010, a project known as Praesidium, carried out in Italy with the aim of ensuring provision of 
information and legal counselling to new arrivals by sea and identifying appropriate channels for access to the 
asylum procedure, involved cooperation between government, international and non-governmental 
organisations. While issues have been raised around its sustainability and support, its proactive, interactive 
and multi-actor approach merits further consideration. 
A 2013 European Commission “Study on the feasibility and legal and practical implications of establishing a 
mechanism for the joint processing of asylum applications on the territory of the EU” envisioned options for 
joint processing, ranging from the provision of joint teams to a Member State under pressure, to a fully-fledged, 
centralised EU processing mechanism.  
While the Dublin system remains the current legal framework for allocating responsibility for asylum claims 
where more than one Member State is involved, different proposals have been tabled over time, including 
those by the European Parliament, NGOs and academic representatives, for a ‘European distribution key’ 
along the lines of Germany’s distribution model for asylum seekers, which would be based on quantitative 
(GDP, population, territory size, unemployment rate) and qualitative (family and social ties, integration 
prospects) criteria to allocate responsibility for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of protection between 
Member States. In order to be developed further, such ideas would need to identify distribution criteria that 
gain general support and avoid the use of coercion. Mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions and 
transfer of protection, following their mention in the Commission’s March 2014 Communication, also attracted 
the interest of some Member States. An appropriate model and process for establishing mutual recognition, 
addressing several concerns about quality and potential pressures, could ensure greater freedom of movement 
for recognised refugees and represent progress towards the Treaty objective of a uniform status of asylum, 
valid throughout the Union. 
 
4. Legal Constraints on First-Line Reception RSD, Joint Processing Schemes, and 
Distribution Mechanisms  
All of the joint processing options that may be introduced remain governed by the EU acquis and international 
law regarding RSD, including asylum seeker and refugee rights and the standards of fairness and effective 
remedies set out in general principles and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
In addition, first-line reception arrangements must comply with the principle of non-refoulement, the right to 
family unity, and the needs and entitlements of particularly vulnerable applicants. To ensure fairness and 
effectiveness of rights, decisions must be taken within an adequate timescale and ensuring access, both in law 
and in practice, to appropriate procedures and related means and safeguards guaranteeing a real opportunity 
for asylum seekers to present and advance their claims. The right to legal assistance, representation, and 
translation must thus be provided according to EU and international legal standards with a view to ensuring 
that applications for international protection are subjected to full and thorough examination, including detailed 
consideration of all the relevant factors surrounding the particular case and the prevailing situation in the 
country of origin. Finally, effective remedies must be available to those whose claim has been rejected at first 
instance, in conformity with the standards set out in Article 13 ECHR and Article 47 EUCFR. 
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5. Designing Fair Procedures and Ensuring Effective Remedies: a Proactive, Interactive 
Approach 
A proactive, interactive approach to asylum procedures requires fairness to be assured from the outset, to 
ensure trust between asylum seekers and host states. Taking into account the peculiar position of all asylum 
seekers as a particularly vulnerable group, assessing specific vulnerability should not add further procedural 
complexity. Rather, we urge a preliminary vulnerability assessment, taking into account all possible sources 
of vulnerability, and moving swiftly on to substantive RSD. If an allocation mechanism is used, it must be 
non-coercive and based on an interview with the applicant.  In the absence of safe legal access to Europe, it is 
crucial that punitive approaches to irregular entry are avoided, in accordance with Article 31 CSR. Irregular 
entry should not affect the assessment of the asylum claim. Detention of asylum seekers should be a last resort, 
only to be contemplated on the basis of specific strong reasoning in the individual case and where alternatives 
to detention are not possible. In short, it is rarely if ever justified – alternatives must be put in place. Front-
loading holistic advice and legal support is crucial to establishing trust and quality first-instance decisions, 
thereby reducing appeals and judicial reviews. General legal information is no substitute for legal 
representation. Manifestly well-founded procedures are beneficial both to asylum seekers and host 
communities. Reform of the Temporary Protection Directive is needed, and the potential of further examining 
group determination procedures should be explored. Good institutional design requires a multi-actor approach 
to foster accountability and expertise. Joint processing arrangements could help improve asylum systems if 
they alleviate coercion and complexity. All depends on the detail and institutional context. Coercion in the 
allocation of responsibility is likely to exacerbate ‘burden’ rather than distributing it fairly. 
 
6. Possible Solutions: Giving Meaning to Solidarity and Fair Responsibility Sharing 
Ensuring greater compliance with EU and international legal standards in the reception and treatment of 
asylum seekers and RSD is an essential requirement for ensuring access to protection for those who are entitled 
to it in the EU. Proactive and interactive approaches to first-line reception and RSD must be developed and 
strengthened, involving actors including civil society and international organisations, as well as national 
authorities and EU bodies, to ensure that rights are respected and high-quality RSD decisions can be made.  
Focussing on arrangements for redistribution of asylum seekers, particularly involving coercion, creates the 
risk of diverting resources and attention from the central task of improving the operation of national systems 
and of developing approaches that might also fail to either prevent secondary movement or ensure respect for 
acquis standards. Rather, the Dublin system should be applied in a way that avoids the use of coercion, 
acknowledging the practical realities of movements across borders within the Schengen area, and enables the 
preferences of asylum seekers to be taken into account. ‘Dublin without coercion’ is a first step; wholesale 
reform would be preferable. 
Joint processing arrangements can provide a means to enhance the operation of national asylum systems, and 
the potential for further cooperation should be closely examined where it can further enhance efficiency and 
compliance with legal standards. 
Finally, mutual recognition is a step towards establishing a uniform status of asylum and should be pursued, 
along with effective implementation of existing legal arrangements that can facilitate free movement of 
refugees. 
 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
1. More ‘Dublin without coercion’ offers more sustainable and fair allocation of responsibility in 
line with fundamental rights. This could be achieved to a significant extent through more 
principled implementation of the recast Dublin Regulation, in line with its objectives, as well as 
of other asylum acquis instruments, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and other obligations under 
international and European human rights and refugee law. Wider use of Dublin’s family-related 
responsibility criteria and provisions on dependent persons and discretionary grounds (including 
as related to humanitarian elements, family or cultural considerations), requiring Member States 
to keep or bring together relatives and other people with relationships and other meaningful links 
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to a particular country, could contribute to this and lead to greater cooperation on the part of 
asylum seekers. The European Parliament should require the Commission to closely monitor 
Member State practices in this regard and promote the application of Dublin rules in line with 
fundamental rights. 
 
2. Member States are required, under the RCD, to provide reception conditions in line with the legally 
defined standards and of sufficient capacity. It must be possible for Member States to provide for 
regular levels of demand on an ongoing basis, and to build in flexibility and contingency or standby 
arrangements to adapt to fluctuations in numbers, given the inherently shifting and unpredictable 
nature of asylum flows. As noted in Chapter 2, while the number of asylum seekers increases and 
decreases from year to year, particularly at national level, longer-term figures are generally stable. 
Where there is a genuine situation of pressure, which is clearly beyond the capacity of the Member 
States to handle, there should be scope in the system for Member States to make arrangements to 
support each other and agree among themselves to provide for the needs of individual or specific 
groups of asylum seekers. The European Parliament should require the Commission to reinforce 
its efforts to ensure that Member States have in place at all times first-line reception arrangements 
of both quantity and quality as required by the Directive to receive and provide for asylum seekers. 
 
3. Furthermore, Member States must take account of the rights, needs and preferences of asylum 
seekers when determining responsibility for asylum claims. The recast Dublin Regulation’s 
requirement for a personal interview affords an opportunity for Member States to take note of a 
particular asylum seeker’s preference to have his or her claim assessed in a particular Member 
State, together with his or her reasons, and explore the matter with the other Member State(s) 
concerned. The European Parliament, in cooperation with relevant actors, including EASO, the 
Commission, and the UNHCR, should be informed and be able to follow up on the application of 
Dublin rules in line with the MA and K rulings. 
 
4. In 2015, the European Commission is expected to conduct a review of the Dublin Regulation. 
‘Dublin without coercion’ offers a better way to implement the Dublin system right now. Deep 
reform would be appropriate at that stage, to ensure that fundamental rights are respected, and to 
prohibit excessive. The European Parliament should be an active player in this process, requiring 
the Commission to provide all necessary data to that effect.  
 
5. The key to fair and equitable distribution of asylum seekers across the EU is getting right the 
institutional design of the CEAS at both EU and national level. Such an institutional design must 
be based on the front-loading of the system, a proactive, interactive approach to fairness, and the 
establishment across the EU of successful asylum reception and RSD. The institutions must be 
flexible and robust to deal with variations in demand, and must be multi-actor; state authorities 
must work harmoniously with civil society actors, non-governmental organisations, etc., to ensure 
that asylum seekers have confidence in the asylum system and in particular the first-line reception 
conditions available to them. The European Parliament, in cooperation with the Commission and 
EASO, should promote multi-actor dialogues to foster cooperation at the different levels of 
government and administration of the CEAS. 
 
6. Coercion against asylum seekers must be excluded from any distribution system if that system is 
to be fair and equitable. It is the use of coercion and institutions of coercion against them, as 
asylum seekers often correctly perceive it, which has contaminated the RSD systems of far too 
many Member States. This coercion undermines trust, which not only creates disaffection and 
despair, but also undermines effective RSD. The European Parliament should request that the 
Commission and Member States examine as a matter of urgency the justifications and specific 
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application of coercion to asylum seekers in the EU, so as to provide for alternatives in line with 
the Charter of fundamental rights and international protection standards. 
 
7. The swift determination of asylum claims requires proper and effective first-line reception and a 
multi-actor institutional framework. Where asylum applications are hastily refused on the basis of 
inadequate information, that refusal will often be difficult to correct. In far too many cases appeals 
and review cannot correct poor first instance decisions. One of the most significant reasons state 
authorities take poor decisions at first instance is because first-line reception is inadequate or 
unavailable, so asylum seekers are unable to navigate the process. The frequency of subsequent 
applications, in turn, is to a large extent due to the failure of authorities to enable asylum seekers 
to properly engage with the asylum process from the outset, as condemned by courts of highest 
instance, including the ECtHR and the CJEU. This is not a fair and just procedure and contrasts 
fundamentally with basic principles of good administration. The European Parliament should 
demand that the CEAS requirements of good administration and a fair procedure be carried out 
fully and comply with the RCD and the EUCFR.  
 
8. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has pointed out that asylum seekers, by legal 
definition, are vulnerable. They are not entitled to work, to reside, except in a temporary capacity, 
or to engage in the normal activities of people living in a state. They live in conditions of 
uncertainty and anxiety. This vulnerability creates positive obligations for the EU and the Member 
States and must not be instrumentalised by national policies to demonise asylum seekers and their 
claims to international protection. The European Parliament should require the Commission to 
investigate ways to mitigate the vulnerability of asylum seekers through a proper and complete 
implementation of the CEAS requirements, in accordance with the recast RCD and APD. 
 
9. Resources and priority should focus on ensuring that all Member States are equipped, encouraged, 
supported and, where necessary, compelled to fulfil their obligations to provide adequate reception 
conditions and fair and effective claim determinations. A proactive and interactive approach 
should be encouraged to ensure high-quality, accurate decisions as swiftly as practicable at first 
instance. To this end, among other measures, national asylum authorities are encouraged to invest 
in institutional capacity, training (based on and potentially extending beyond their acquis 
obligations) and quality assurance activities. Practical cooperation, including as facilitated by 
EASO, should also aim at ensuring excellence in asylum decision-making, and EU financial 
support should also target relevant areas of need at national level. The European Parliament 
should, via targeted dialogues with Member States, EASO and other relevant actors, and through 
its budgetary powers if necessary, make sure that sufficient resources are invested by the EU and 
the Member States to ensure the CEAS is effective and complies with fundamental rights and 
refugee law standards. 
 
10. Targeted support to Member States’ capacity may be needed in certain situations, where arrivals 
create particular strain, or where ongoing gaps or weaknesses may need to be addressed. The range 
of tools available from the EASO, including permanent, special and emergency support, should 
be fully utilised by Member States, with the encouragement of other Member States and 
institutions where necessary. Early Warning and Preparedness arrangements, under Article 33 of 
the Dublin Regulation and under the EASO Regulation, should be employed as necessary to ensure 
that problems do not develop into situations of crisis or systemic deficiency in which asylum 
seekers’ rights are violated. For this purpose, the European Parliament should actively engage in 
any Early Warning and Preparedness arrangements that may be adopted in cooperation with the 
Commission, EASO, and other relevant actors.  
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11. Elements identified in redistribution arrangements that have been proposed to date could 
potentially be considered in assessing the need for appropriate measures to address capacity 
problems. These include territorial size, population, economic strength, reception capacity and 
others, including as related to the level of development of the asylum and reception systems – 
while also ensuring that Member States have strong incentives to invest in and operate well-
functioning systems. Such concepts should and cannot take the place of committed national efforts 
to consistently strengthen the operation of their systems, including through proactive and 
interactive approaches and bringing to bear the skills of multiple actors where appropriate. The 
European Parliament, in cooperation with the Commission, EASO, the UNHCR and other 
stakeholders, should monitor evolution in the development and maintenance by Member States of 
their reception systems in line with the relevant EU and international standards and foster mutual 
support via appropriate solidarity tools of those facing particular pressures. The European 
Parliament may also propose the introduction of structural changes or mechanisms to redistribute 
responsibility in accordance with specific difficulties and capacities of the Member States 
concerned. 
 
12. Multi-actor involvement in first-line reception includes not only state actors but also non-
governmental organisations, supranational actors and civil society actors. In order to limit 
secondary movement of asylum seekers and to ensure that there is a full and comprehensive 
examination of every asylum application made in the EU, the confidence not only of the national 
authorities but also, critically, of the asylum seekers must be earned. Far too many national asylum 
bodies are associated with or nested in ministries responsible for police and criminal justice. Far 
too often, authorities responsible for dealing with asylum seekers have powers of arrest and 
coercion. This is not conducive to earning the trust of asylum seekers. The European Parliament 
should request that the Commission examine and report on the involvement of Member State 
coercive institutions in asylum procedures at national level in order to seek to diminish this role 
and attendant practices. 
 
13. To avoid further complexity and coercion, in case joint processing schemes are introduced and 
further pursued, we invite those concerned to follow a progressive approach, starting with the 
simplest form of ‘supported’ processing initiatives and building on them as and when they have 
proven to be effective in delivering fairness and enhancing compliance with pre-existing first-line 
reception and RSD obligations. The European Parliament should support this understanding and 
engage in a dialogue with the Commission, EASO, and related actors, to promote it. 
 
14. The new AMIF, for the seven years from 2014 through 2020, will spend a total of EUR 3.137 
billion on asylum, migration and integration of third-country nationals in the EU. It should be 
recalled that the ERF provided generous funding to many Member States, including those with the 
worst record of reception conditions (EUR 630 million over the period 2008-2013), but with 
results that were not always tangible. The European Parliament should request the Court of 
Auditors to examine the use of ERF funds for first-line reception specifically in those Member 
States where the greatest shortcomings have been identified. The European Parliament needs to 
make sure that ERF and AMIF money is effectively spent on required first-line reception 
capacities. The Schengen Evaluation System recently approved by the European Parliament may 
be a model for monitoring which could be considered for this purpose. 
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1. Introduction – Unpacking the ‘burden’ 
This study examines the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in order to outline the shortcomings of 
the current system, which impede effective access to protection in the EU, and lead to political impasses which 
undermine solidarity in dealing with asylum in the EU. The Dublin System1 is currently a large part of the 
problem, but, it is suggested, with some re-working, could become part of the solution if it were implemented 
without coercing asylum seekers.  
1.1 Safe access from outside the EU – what this study is NOT about 
Various non-entrée policies make safe, legal access to asylum in the EU impossible for most refugees.2 These 
range from visa policies to illegal pushbacks, as has been widely noted in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis.3 
Many mechanisms could be developed to allow asylum seekers safe and legal access to the EU from countries 
of origin or transit, including in particular forms of Protected Entry Procedures (PEPs).4 A roadmap already 
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1 The Dublin System is comprised by Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or stateless 
person (recast) (Dublin III Regulation) [2013] OJ L180/31 and Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ […] (recast) (EURODAC Regulation) [2013] OJ 
L180/1. 
2 For a recent survey, see J. Hathaway and T. Gammeltoft-Hansen (2014), “Non-refoulement in a world of cooperative 
deterrence”, Univ. of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-016. 
3 UNHCR (2014), “Syrian Refugees in Europe: What Europe Can Do to Ensure Protection and Solidarity”, Geneva, 11 
July 2014. Available from: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/53b69f574.html>. 
4 European Commission (2014), An open and secure Europe: making it happen, COM(2014) 154, 11 March 2014, 
Brussels, develops the idea of Protected Entry Procedures (PEP), defined by Noll as “an overarching concept for 
arrangements allowing a non national to approach the potential host state outside its territory with a claim for asylum or 
other form of international protection and to be granted an entry permit in case of a positive response to that claim, be it 
preliminary or final”, in G. Noll et al (2002), “Study on the feasibility of processing asylum claims outside the EU”, The 
Danish Centre for Human Rights, European Commission, p. 3. 
2  GUILD, COSTELLO, GARLICK, MORENO-LAX & MOUZOURAKIS 
 
exists to develop these procedures, starting with a more flexible use of the present European Visa Code, which 
allows the issuance of Humanitarian Visas with limited territorial validity under derogation from normal entry 
requirements, and the development of further EU rules on the issuance of Protection Visas.5 It is arguable that 
the Visa Code actually requires the issuance of such Humanitarian Visas, if EU Member States are to meet 
their international and EU obligations effectively and in good faith.6 
The European Parliament is well aware of the lack of safe, legal routes for refugees to seek protection in 
Europe. For instance, in its Resolution on Syrian refugees on 3 October 2013, the Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee of the European Parliament passed a resolution on the Syria refugee crisis.7 
Beyond recommending continued humanitarian assistance to assist Syria’s neighbouring countries in handling 
refugee flows, the LIBE Committee called on Member States to guarantee Syrian refugees safe entry into the 
EU and access to fair asylum procedures. The Committee also urged the Commission to consider the 
application of the Temporary Protection Directive “if and when conditions demand it”. The Parliament’s call 
for a greater protection response on the part of the Union was reiterated in its “Resolution on the situation in 
Syria”, adopted on 6 February 2014.8 
This study is not addressing access from outside the EU but rather the situation of those who reach the territory 
of EU Member States to seek protection. Accordingly, its starting premise is that these protection seekers will 
usually be irregular entrants. Nor does this study consider how the EU should meet its solidaristic obligations 
to states hosting most of the world’s refugees, such as providing aid and assistance, resettlement opportunities 
and onward migration opportunities.    
Rather, given our focus on spontaneous arrivals, much of this study aims to highlight and urge a decisive move 
away from the perverse practices in asylum procedures and reception which in many cases have been 
normalised across Europe and even spread further afield.9 Asylum procedures in Europe have become 
excessively coercive and complex, to the detriment of both asylum seekers and Member States. Before moving 
to examine new mechanisms for joint processing and distribution, it should be clear what the current 
shortcomings are. 
There is no point in adding extra layers of complexity, in the name of efficiency or burden-sharing. 
1.2 A burden of our creation 
Both joint processing and distribution mechanisms have multiple possible aims. Both are often cited as burden-
sharing mechanisms, as a way of sharing administrative burdens or the burden of hosting asylum seekers in 
general. Before these mechanisms are examined, however, the notion of ‘burden’ needs careful attention.     
In most of the work to date on ‘burden sharing’ it is assumed that the ‘burden’ of hosting an asylum seeker 
and processing his or her claim are stable. However, the concept of ‘burden’ should not be taken as an 
unquestioned consequence of an asylum seeker’s presence. The ‘burden’ depends significantly on the policies 
and practises of the host state.  
By identifying the key shortcomings in asylum processes at present, we unpack the burden. The aim is to 
ensure that before identifying ways to share the burden, it should be reduced by avoiding unnecessary coercion 
and complexity. 
                                                   
5 C. Hein and M. Damato (2012), Exploring avenues for protected entry in Europe, Italian Council for Refugees, Milan. 
6 This is based on the wording of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) [2009] OJ L243/1, and the application by analogy of 
the recent CJEU judgment in the Case C-84/12 Koushkaki, 19 December 2013. See further V. Moreno-Lax (2008), 
“Must EU Borders have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of Visas and Carrier Sanctions with Member States’ 
Obligations to Provide International Protection to Refugees”, European Journal of Migration and Law 10: 315; Iben 
Jensen, U. (2014), “Humanitarian Visas: Option or Obligation?”, Study for the European Parliament, Directorate-
General Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs, PE 509.986 September 2014, Brussels. 
7 European Parliament, “EU and Member State measures to tackle the flow of refugees as a result of the conflict in 
Syria”, LIBE/7/14063, 2013/2851(RSP), 3 October 2013, Brussels. 
8 European Parliament, “Resolution on the situation in Syria”, 2014/2531(RSP), 6 February 2014, Strasbourg. 
9 H. Lambert et al.. (eds.) (2013), The Global Reach of European Refugee Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
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a. The costs of coercion 
i. Ethical commitment – humanity 
This study is based on a principled ethical commitment to avoiding undue coercion, as a basic liberty-
protective principle of the rule of law and human rights, and a founding value of the EU according to Article 
2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).10 When we discuss the rights of non-citizens, there is a risk of 
losing sight of the fact that it is a discussion of human beings, with the same human rights and basic dignity 
as anyone else. Asylum seekers in particular have a right to seek and enjoy asylum,11 or, in EU law, a right to 
asylum,12 and have a right to remain in the EU to do so. Even those who are irregularly present and liable to 
removal are human beings, rights bearers. Their human rights should not be violated, nor should they be treated 
as mere objects of state power. This value should be embodied in a principled commitment to avoiding 
unnecessary coercion. This principle is not legally or ethically innovative: it pertains to elementary 
considerations of freedom and humanity and underlies human rights commitments such as the requirement to 
use detention sparingly, and procedural rights such as the right to be heard and the right to effective judicial 
protection. It is expressed in the principle of proportionality, in particular. However, this basic value can be 
overshadowed when asylum seekers are considered as a ‘burden’ to be dealt with.   
When public authorities coerce people without justification, they violate their autonomy and harm them. 
Throughout this study we refer to evidence of human rights violations perpetrated against asylum seekers and 
refugees in the name of migration control. The Dublin system in particular seems to have become an instrument 
of coercion, with massive human costs that serve little public purpose.13 
That those who come to Europe seeking protection are all too often litigants before human rights bodies and 
courts should give us pause: All too often, they win their cases, thus establishing that their deprivation of 
liberty, detention conditions, deportations, deprivation of family contact, enforced destitution, and asylum 
process have violated their human rights. It must be recalled that ‘asylum’ should be a protective process, not 
a punitive, coercive, inhuman or degrading one. 
In making explicit the principled commitment to avoiding unnecessary coercion, we do not endorse the notion 
that asylum seekers should have ‘free choice’ as to their country of destination in all instances. But rather, the 
law, properly interpreted, requires that they should be heard as regards the reasons for their choice of 
destination and that, if there are strong reasons such as kin or connections, access to that country of asylum 
should be facilitated. An appropriate reading of the Dublin III Regulation supports this view that asylum 
seekers’ agency, reasoning and voice have a role to play, as is set out in Chapter 4. 
We would prefer to see Dublin abandoned or substantially reformed, but if that is not politically feasible, it 
should be implemented in a way that complies with the fundamental rights of asylum seekers and refugees, 
and minimises coercion:  ‘Dublin without coercion’ is possible under the current system, and it is contended, 
legally required to avoid human rights violations and politically sensible to minimise the costs of complexity 
and coercion.14 Moreover, as the CJEU has acknowledged, at least as regards unaccompanied children, 
ensuring prompt allocation of responsibility should also be seen as an effective way to both vindicate the rights 
of asylum seekers and ensure an efficient asylum system.15 
ii. The costs of coercion 
The second reason for highlighting the importance of avoiding unnecessary coercion is to avoid unnecessary 
costs.   
                                                   
10 Treaty on European Union (TEU) [2010] OJ C83/1. 
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 14(1).  
12 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR), Article 18. 
13 ECRE (2013), Dublin II Regulation: Lives on Hold, February 2013, Brussels. Available from: 
<http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/56-ecre-actions/317-dublin-ii-regulation-lives-on-hold.html>; JRS 
(2013), Protection Interrupted: The Dublin Regulation’s Impact on Asylum Seekers’ Protection, June, Brussels. 
Available from: 
<http://www.jrseurope.org/DIASP%20Publications/Protection%20Interrupted_JRS%20Europe_June%202013.pdf>. 
14 This is the title of a forthcoming article by Costello, C. and Maiani, F. 
15 Case C-648/11 MA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 3 CMLR 49, para 54. 
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Much of the material on burden-sharing tends to assume that each asylum seeker is a fixed burden. However, 
asylum policies determine how long the asylum process takes, whether asylum seekers may work, in what 
sorts of accommodation they reside. The more coercive the process, the more costly it will be. Evidence related 
to detention backs this up,16 but there is no comprehensive data on the costs of running the asylum system 
across the EU. As one of the interviewees participating in this study’s research put it,  
“[D]ata on the costs of asylum systems are very important. Especially for Dublin, such data are 
nowhere to be found. So we need more data to appreciate how much asylum costs Member 
States. A cost/benefit evidence base still lacks in the Union.”17 
More sophisticated work on burden-sharing acknowledges that if asylum systems are unnecessarily coercive 
or complicated, costs increase. Thielemann et al., for instance, explain that the costs related to the reception 
and processing of asylum seekers are closely linked to the use of coercive measures against protection seekers:  
 “[a]s soon as the system requires asylum seekers to remain in a  country against their 
will, costs escalate (e.g. of detention, determination of MS responsible and transfer)”.18 
In particular, they note that costs of running the UK asylum system, among others, are high due to extensive 
use of detention.19 This is a crucial premise of this study: Even if it is agreed that the ‘burden’ of hosting 
asylum seekers is unevenly spread across EU Member States, transferring asylum seekers itself is a costly 
process likely to exacerbate the ‘burden’ rather than distribute it fairly. The options of sharing resources, 
financial and bureaucratic, are therefore usually preferable.  
Opting for coercion in the geographical distribution of asylum seekers and refugees may be costly for Member 
States in the longer term as well. Policies of enforced dispersal outside main urban areas, adopted in Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, have had negative impact on refugees’ 
economic activity.20 The Swedish example is illuminating. Under a policy introduced in 1985, for instance, 
Sweden dispersed resettled refugees throughout the country, often to remote locations. A study conducted by 
Aslund and Rooth found that welfare dependency and non-employment increased as a result, particularly for 
those dispersed to remote areas with poor employment prospects.21 
Coercion will be costly not only in the direct sense, as we see with detention in particular. Coercion is also 
costly in that it undermines asylum seekers cooperative predisposition, which in turn undermines trust in the 
host state authorities. This in turn leads to disaffection and absconding, and undermines the integrity of the 
asylum process.22 One of the central insights from the literature on why individuals obey the law (admittedly 
mainly concerned with interactions between citizens and the state) is the centrality of procedural justice, in 
particular perceptions of fair treatment.23 
                                                   
16 A. Edwards (2011), “Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of the Person and ‘Alternatives to Detention’ 
of Asylum seekers, Refugees, Stateless Persons and Other Migrants”, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research 
Series. Available from: <http://www.unhcr.org/4dc949c49.html>; R. Sampson et al. (2011), “There are Alternatives: A 
Handbook for Preventing Unnecessary Immigration Detention”, International Detention Coalition. Available from: 
<http://idcoalition.org/cap/handbook/>; JRS (2011), “From Deprivation to Liberty. Alternatives to Detention in 
Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom”, December. Available from: 
<http://www.jrseurope.org/JRSEuropeFromDeprivationToLiberty20122011.pdf>. 
17 Interview with a Member of the European Parliament, 9 September 2014 (interviewer’s unofficial translation from 
French). 
18 E. Thielemann et al. (2010), “What System of Burden-Sharing between Member States for the Reception of Asylum 
Seekers?”, European Parliament, Directorate-General Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, PE 419.620, 22 January 2010, Brussels, 146. 
19 Thielemann et al. (n. 18), 107. 
20 T. J. Hatton (2013), “Refugee and Asylum Migration”, 453-468 in Constant, A. F. and Zimmermann, K. F. (eds), 
International Handbook on the Economics of Migration, Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing, 465. 
21 O. Aslund and D.-O. Rooth (2007), “Do When and Where Matter? Initial Labour Market Conditions and Immigrant 
Earnings”, Economic Journal 117: 422-448. 
22 C. Costello and E. Kaytaz (2013), “Building Empirical Research into Alternatives to Detention: Perceptions of 
Asylum seekers and Refugees in Toronto and Geneva”, PPLA/2013/02, June, 15-16. 
23 T. R. Tyler (2006), Why People Obey the Law: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Compliance, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press. 
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b. The costs of complexity 
The other source of the asylum ‘burden’ is excessive complexity, which in turn leads to delay, unnecessary 
appeals and judicial reviews. The original Asylum Procedures Directive24 permitted a range of diverse 
procedures and bodies to determine asylum claims. In implementation, unsurprisingly, further procedural 
variation and proliferation emerged.25 The recast Asylum Procedures Directive (APD)26 makes some highly 
significant improvements in some respects, but it is far from a simple set of commitments. In particular, border 
and ‘safe third country’ (STC) and European STC procedures remain in place, as do the ‘safe country of origin’ 
(SCO) provisions. In many instances, accelerated procedures or those that aim to dispose of claims without 
proper examination will be subject to appeals and/or judicial reviews. Of late, the ECtHR has deemed that 
accelerated procedures in both France and Spain are failing to provide effective protection against violations 
of Article 3 ECHR.27 Cases before the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) are always but the 
tip of the iceberg, with many rights violations being resolved at the domestic level or even failing to make it 
to any court. Indeed, the repeated recourse to Rule 39 of the ECHR to stop Dublin deportations is a 
manifestation of failures at the domestic level, lack of effective protection in particular.28 
Chapter 6 sets out some principles of institutional design to help avoid unnecessary complexity. At this stage 
it is simply noted that any assessment of the costs of the asylum ‘burden’ must take into account how 
complexity, like coercion, creates costs. 
c. An unequal burden? 
Reviewing the recent history of the debate on burden-sharing reveals that the most significant inequality is 
between the wealthy states of the Global North and the poor of the Global South. Refugees are overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the Global South. The current Syrian refugee crisis reflects this familiar pattern, with the vast 
majority of those displaced being in the region around Syria, and less than 4% in the EU.29 While this study is 
not concerned with global or regional burden-sharing per se, it must always be borne in mind.  
The various intra-EU burden-sharing proposals relating to ‘distribution key’ ideas surveyed in Chapter 3 are 
thus concerned with a much less pressing form of burden-sharing than global burden-sharing. Some of these 
take different criteria relevant to determining the reception capacity of each state, and then, based on the 
numbers of asylum seekers hosted, make determinations of whether particular states are over- or under-
burdened. These approaches are illuminating but have their limitations in that they do not effectively capture 
how asylum policy, in particular its coercive aspects, contributes to the costs of hosting asylum seekers and 
determining their claims. 
In the political debate within Europe, there are divergent, entrenched positions. Rather than identify particular 
individual states’ short-term concerns, this analysis attempts merely to capture and address the source of 
disagreement. In particular, there is a persistent gulf between the perception and the reality of asylum caseloads 
across the EU. For ease of explanation, we refer to ‘Southern’ and ‘Northern’ states, mindful that this is an 
over-simplification. Southern European states perceive themselves to be on the front line of first reception, yet 
Northern states process more asylum claims, both in absolute numbers and, in some cases, relative to their 
                                                   
24 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status [2005] OJ L326/13. 
25 European Commission (2010), Report on the Application of Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, COM(2010) 465, 8 September 
2010, Brussels; UNHCR (2010), “Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for 
Law and Practice”, March. Available from: <http://www.unhcr.org/4c7b71039.html>. 
26 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) (Asylum Procedures Directive) [2013] OJ L180/60. 
27 IM v France (2012), Application no. 9152/09, European Court of Human Rights, 2 May; AC v Spain (2014), 
Application no. 6528/11, European Court of Human Rights, 22 April. 
28 ECRE (2009), “ECtHR Interim Measures (Rule 39) to Stop Dublin Transfers”. Available from: 
<http://cmr.jur.ru.nl/cmr/docs/ecre.rule39.pdf>. 
29 UNHCR (n. 3). 
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populations.30 This gulf between political perception and reality has led to a schism in the views of what the 
‘problem’ is in Europe. For Northern states, the problem is that Southern states do not run effective asylum 
systems, so people come North seeking protection, letting Southern states avoid their international 
responsibilities. For Southern states, the problem is that they are allocated responsibility because of an accident 
of geography, and want to be able to transfer responsibility and people northwards.      
Both perceptions are partly correct in that they are of different things: Southern states are correct that the 
Dublin System arbitrarily distributes asylum burdens; but Northern states are correct that they are 
overburdened, as Dublin does not work and most asylum claims are processed by the states where asylum 
seekers first claim asylum rather than those through which they enter the EU for the first time, as Chapter 2 
illustrates. In this context, what sort of ‘burden-sharing’ proposals could meet with approval when 
governments do not share an understanding of the ‘problem’? 
Our suggestion is that rather than a ‘burden-sharing’ response, what is needed are two separate responses to 
address the distinct challenges. Some EU states certainly need to do a better job at running their asylum systems 
in terms of both reception conditions and refugee status determination (RSD). In addition, mechanisms should 
be put in place to ensure that first-line reception is supported across the EU. Allocation mechanisms should 
not be coercive, thereby reducing costs and clandestine migration across the EU. 
This study accordingly aims to help narrow the distance between political perception and reality: What 
Southern states seek does not amount to a huge change from actual practice, in which most asylum seekers 
exercise a considerable degree of agency over their country of destination.31 However, at present, the costs are 
huge and born by the asylum seekers, who pay smugglers (a term used here to encompass smugglers’ 
facilitators, agents, passeurs) exorbitant amounts not only to reach the EU, but then to reach their destination 
countries within Europe. A better allocation mechanism would break asylum seekers’ dependency on 
smugglers, and instead put in a place a cooperative mechanism for the allocation of responsibility for the 
asylum seeker. ‘Dublin without coercion’ is the first step in that direction. 
The position of Northern states also reflects an empirical reality in that at present there is strong evidence that 
Southern states breach their EU commitments in different ways: they fail to register and process asylum claims, 
breach their duties in terms of reception conditions, unlawfully detain and expose asylum seekers to poor living 
conditions. Our proposed allocation mechanism would aim, to the extent possible, to take smugglers out of the 
equation and allow asylum seekers to use their own considerable resources and energies to recuperate, make 
their claims as best as possible, which they are legally obligated to do under both the Qualification Directive 
(QD)32 and APD, and start new lives in Europe if their claims are recognised, or otherwise explore alternative 
regularisation possibilities, voluntary return or some other outcome. 
1.3 Understanding the population 
a. Legal vulnerability 
As is set out in Chapter 4, there are clear legal duties to assess and respond to the vulnerabilities of asylum 
seekers under Dublin III and the recast APD33 and RCD.34 These instruments incorporate different notions of 
                                                   
30 For a recent overview of asylum applications in the EU, see EUROSTAT (2014), Asylum Applicants and First 
Instance Decisions on Asylum Applications: 2013, KS-QA-14-003-EN-N, Brussels. 
31 This point was stressed to the EP in 2009: see F. Maiani and V. Vevstad (2009), “Reflection Note on the Evaluation 
of the Dublin System and the Dublin III Proposal”, European Parliament, Directorate-General Internal Policies, Policy 
Department C, Citizens Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, PE 410.690, 
March, Brussels. 
32 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) 
(Qualification Directive) [2011] OJ L337/9. 
33 APD, Recital 29: an applicant “may be in need of special procedural guarantees due, inter alia, to their age, gender, 
sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, serious illness, mental disorders or as a consequence of torture, rape other 
serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence”.  
34 RCD, Article 21: Member States must “take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, 
unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, victims 
of human trafficking, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who have been 
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vulnerable applicants or applicants with special needs. Nonetheless, they reflect a general understanding that 
before asylum procedures may begin, a process must identify the asylum seekers’ needs. This notion that some 
asylum seekers have particular vulnerabilities, in that they have particular experiences or features that entail 
additional needs, should not obscure the fact that all asylum seekers are legally vulnerable, as the ECtHR noted 
in MSS v Belgium and Greece. The Court spoke of the “vulnerability inherent in his situation as an asylum 
seeker”.35 Asylum seekers are interpreted  
 “as such, [members] of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need 
of special protection in the form of basic reception facilities”.36 
In the eyes of the ECtHR, asylum seekers are a vulnerable category for legal reasons: they lack effective rights 
to work, their right to stay in the territory is by definition precarious, and their status requires determination. 
As the host state places them in this particular vulnerable status, it has positive duties toward them to take 
measure to ensure their living conditions are not inhumane and degrading.   
This legal notion of ‘vulnerability’ is appropriate in determining states’ legal duties. However, it should not 
overshadow other substantive understandings of vulnerability, particularly given the health and psycho-social 
needs of asylum seekers. The state has particular obligations to all asylum seekers, as the states’ migration 
control prerogatives place them in a legally vulnerable position. That this population also includes many 
individuals with particular health and psychosocial needs should be borne in mind when determining how to 
meet these duties. But the particular, additional needs of some individuals should not obscure the vulnerability 
of all as a category. 
b. Irregular entrants  
As noted above, there are many ways the EU and its Member States could more effectively ensure legal access 
for asylum seekers to their territory.   
In the absence of these policies, it is likely that most asylum seekers will be irregular entrants. Those who enter 
irregularly may do so on false papers, or clandestinely without papers. Or they may be advised by smugglers 
to destroy their identity documents. This impairs access to asylum in several ways.     
It should be borne in mind that this population will often include many people who have had recourse to 
smugglers, or ‘agents’ as asylum seekers usually call them, in their journey. Smuggling takes a wide variety 
of forms, sometimes benign and motivated by humanitarian concern, other times motivated by profit, and more 
exploitative in nature, and often exposing migrants to great dangers.37 It should of course be borne in mind 
that while smugglers bear responsibility for exposing migrants to risks during their journeys, states, too, bear 
moral and, arguably, legal responsibility, for it is their border control practices which contribute to this 
dangerous environment.38 In extreme cases, smuggling transactions can transform into trafficking: where the 
migration process renders the migrant more vulnerable and the agent can control the migrant through violence 
or other forms of coercion.      
Those who arrive in the EU seeking protection thus should be acknowledged as including refugees (who by 
definition have a well-founded fear of persecution or face real risk of serious harm) often due to past 
persecution or serious harm in their country of origin.  The recognition rates of asylum seekers in the EU, as 
Chapter 2 demonstrates, are relatively stable overall, as is the overall number of asylum claims annually. 
Moreover, the mixed flows of migrants and refugees also include victims of smuggling and even trafficking. 
While these two phenomena (smuggling and trafficking) should not be conflated, it is important to recognise 
that migration controls create a vulnerability that may be exploited. 
                                                   
subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, such as victims of female 
genital mutilation”. 
35 MSS v Belgium and Greece (2011), 53 EHRR 2, para 233. 
36 MSS v Belgium and Greece, para 251; Hassan v Netherlands and Italy, App. No. 40524/10, para 179. 
37 T. Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011), Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration 
Control, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
38 T. Spijkerboer (2009), “The Human Costs of Border Control”, European Journal of Migration and Law 9: 127-139. 
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1.4 Structure 
From these starting premises, this study examines the EU legal and policy instruments with the aim of 
identifying why there are such failures in terms of reception and processing asylum claims across the EU. 
These issues will be examined from the perspective of bringing the CEAS more in line with the EU legal 
principles of fairness, solidarity, effective remedies and proportionality.  
 
The study proceeds as follows: 
(1) assessing the available evidence on the operation of the CEAS and demand for international 
protection in the EU, as well as the relevance/use of asylum data by policy-makers (Section 2); 
(2) examining the current legal framework, practice and proposals to date on allocation of 
responsibility and joint approaches to access to procedures, first-line reception, and processing of 
asylum seekers (Section 3);  
(3) understanding the legal constraints and requirements of first-line reception, RSD, joint processing 
and distribution mechanisms (Section 4);  
(4) developing a proactive, interactive approach to fair procedures and effective remedies as regards 
first-line reception, joint processing and distribution mechanisms (Section 5); 
(5) outlining possible solutions aimed at giving more effective meaning to solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility (Section 6); and 
(6) providing a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament and other relevant policy-
makers (Section 7). 
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2. Evidence-Led Policy-Making in the CEAS 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Member States are committed to providing international protection and ready to widen their obligations to 
people in need of protection (viz the UN Convention against Enforced Disappearances); 
 Looking at four key years of the CEAS – 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 – the overall variations in numbers 
of asylum seekers is surprisingly low, in spite of the EU’s successive enlargements; in addition, the main 
countries of origin of asylum seekers have not varied dramatically; 
 The EU’s geographical expansion has not translated into a parallel EU-wide increase in reception capacity 
by the addition of new Member States. On the contrary, the stability of figures for the four key years 
suggests a net reduction in reception places over time, across the EU. 
 Recognition rates for those seeking international protection, however, reveal very significant differences 
even where countries of origin and profiles of asylum seekers are the same; 
 The data equally implies that the impact of the Dublin system is limited as regards the distribution of 
responsibility among Member States, which contrasts sharply with the financial and human costs of Dublin 
transfers; 
 As the data indicates a fairly stable framework, it should be possible to address first reception for asylum 
seekers through a correct implementation of the CEAS, in line with fundamental rights and international 
protection standards. 
 
This chapter examines evidence concerning (a) the operation of the CEAS and (b) the demands upon it. The 
objective of the chapter is to focus on existing knowledge about the demand for first reception by persons 
seeking international protection in the EU. We focus, in particular, on knowledge created by the UNHCR, EU 
sources with particular reference to EUROSTAT, FRONTEX and EASO. In order to imagine, in a manner 
both creative and realistic, new approaches and alternative avenues and means of access to asylum procedures 
for people seeking international protection, the first step must be to understand the nature of that demand. Who 
seeks international protection in the EU and its Member States, and what happens to those requests? How do 
the numbers of requests relate to Member State resources? New policy initiatives need to be based on concrete, 
comprehensive and accurate data and should be led by evidence about the subject. While evidence of political 
claims and sensitivities is important, the starting place must be evidence about the facts on the ground: who, 
how many, where, when. Only then can there be an objective assessment of the political claims. So as a first 
step in this analysis, the best available knowledge about asylum demands in the EU is set out. 
2.1 Numbers or ethics? 
It is important to remember that the EU and its Member States’ obligations to provide international protection 
for those in need are unrelated to the quantity of demand. There is no numerical limit on the EU and its Member 
States’ duty to provide refuge for those qualifying under the Refugee Convention. Everyone who seeks 
protection in the EU and meets the definition of a refugee is entitled to protection.39 Similarly, there is no 
numerical limit on the EU and its Member States’ duty to provide international protection to persons at risk of 
torture under the 1984 UN Convention against Torture (CAT).40 All Member States have ratified that 
convention and accept that when someone fulfils the criteria of being at risk of torture if refouled, that person 
(and everyone else who fulfils the definition) is entitled to protection, including residence. No numerical limit 
applies either to the duty not to send a person to any country where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that she would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance, contained in the UN Convention 
                                                   
39 Subject to the exclusion provisions contained in Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. 
40 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 
New York (Convention against Torture), UN Treaty Series Vol. 1465, p. 85. There is no exclusion provision in this 
treaty. 
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against Enforced Disappearance 2006.41 This most recent addition to the international protection regime has 
been signed by all but five Member States42 and ratified already by eight. Even in 2006, more than seven years 
after the EU was given competence to create the CEAS, the Member States were signing up to new protection 
obligations that have no numerical limit. Why is this important? All too often we hear in the political discussion 
that there are too many asylum seekers and Member States are not able to fulfil their obligations. Indeed, this 
study is premised on some of these concerns. Yet, at the same time, Member States have been continuously 
widening the scope of the class of persons entitled to international protection, including on their territory. The 
duty to provide international protection does not only come from the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol. But in 1984 the Member States began signing and ratifying the CAT, which introduced the duty to 
provide international protection to a wide group of persons (anyone at risk of torture) and excluded entirely 
the possibility of refusing such protection because of the unsavoury actions of the individual. All Member 
States have ratified the CAT. Again in 2006, the Member States widened the category of persons to whom 
they owe a duty of international protection to include those at risk of enforced disappearance irrespective of 
their actions or character. These are not the actions of states that consider themselves overburdened by 
protection seekers. These are the actions of responsible members of the international community, which take 
very seriously the duty to provide international protection to those at risk of unacceptable action by other states 
(such as persecution, torture or enforced disappearance). No attempt was made by any of the Member States 
on either the ratification of the CAT or the signature and/or ratification of the Convention against Enforced 
Disappearance to place a numerical limit on the number of persons for whom it might be responsible.  
Numbers are important, but EU Member States, by their actions, have demonstrated that they consider the 
ethics of human rights more important. People are entitled, under refugee and human rights law, to 
international protection, including in the territory of the Member States. There is no evidence that the Member 
States are seeking to resile from their international legal duty to provide protection. Indeed, when a new 
category of persons not clearly incorporated into the existing canon of international law emerges, such as those 
at risk of enforced disappearance, the Member States take on new obligations to provide them with protection. 
The reputation of the EU and its Member States within the international community as states committed to 
international human rights is extremely important not least as the Member States have not avoided the 
challenge of committing themselves to new protection duties. The challenge is to provide the protection to 
which Member States have freely committed themselves. In this chapter, statistics are examined, as they are 
critical to the subject of first-line reception, but it must be recalled that international protection is 
fundamentally about international refugee and human rights obligations, and not about numbers. 
2.2 Sources of data 
There are numerous sources of information about demands on the asylum systems of EU Member States, 
though only some of them have specific authority. UNHCR has produced its Statistical Yearbooks since 2001 
and statistical annexes since 1994. This is a particularly rich source of data on asylum, which are collected 
from states and produced by UNHCR to provide information about refugees. EUROSTAT is a much more 
recent participant in the creation of knowledge about asylum following the adoption of a 2007 Regulation 
requiring Member States to provide it with relevant data.43 FRONTEX began publishing data on asylum in its 
Risk Analyses from 2010. These sources provide a rich basis for analysis of demand for international 
protection in the EU and its Member States, though the data are not always consistent.44 
In order to understand the data on demand and outcomes, we will take four snapshot pictures of asylum 
demand, one for each of the following years: 1999 – the date of the transfer of competence for asylum from 
                                                   
41 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 20 December 2006, New 
York (Convention against Enforced Disappearance), UN Treaty Series Vol. 2715, Doc A/61/448, Article 16(1): “No 
State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’), surrender or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance.” 
42 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and the UK. 
43 Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community 
statistics on migration and international protection repealing Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of 
statistics on foreign workers [2007] OJ L199/23. 
44 As national sources in every case are Member State institutions, the variations in statistical information at the 
international level only reflects the divergence in national administrative or statistical practice. 
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national to EU level under the Amsterdam Treaty, which marks the starting point of the CEAS project; 2004 
– the end of the first five-year period during which the first phase of the CEAS was completed and the initial 
objectives of the 1999 Tampere Conclusions of the European Council were evaluated; 2009 – the end of the 
first ten years of the CEAS project and the date of entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which conferred 
legally binding force, and status equivalent to that of the Treaties, upon the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The importance of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights for asylum in the EU is most clearly highlighted in 
Article 18 – the right to asylum – and Article 19(2) on non-refoulement. But, as judgments of the CJEU have 
indicated, other provisions of the Charter are highly relevant. The final year to be examined is 2014 – the year 
following the completion of the second phase of the CEAS and the current position regarding demand for 
international protection.  
For each of these four years, publications are produced that reflect the statistical information of the preceding 
12 months and thus the evidence on the basis of which policy may have been formulated; the overall numbers 
of asylum seekers in the EU, with a breakdown of the main destination states within the EU, are presented. 
This provides an overview of where asylum seekers have been seeking asylum at the times of key decision-
making in the EU and the similarities and changes over time. This data is complemented by information 
regarding the countries of origin of asylum seekers at the same four points in time and their distribution across 
the key recipient Member States for each period. Outcomes on asylum applications are also included. This 
tranche of data will provide a general picture of asylum demand in the EU at each of the four main points in 
the development of the CEAS. 
2.3 Four critical dates: 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 
This section examines the variations in first reception demand and outcomes in the main recipient Member 
States at each of the four dates. This will facilitate some initial conclusions about demand over time and the 
way in which those Member States where the majority of the demand has been received have dealt with the 
requests. We will focus on variations over time, in order to understand what is dynamic and what is stable 
regarding demand for international protection. As the objective is to examine the first reception pressures on 
the Member States at key times of creation and reform of the CEAS, only information on asylum seekers and 
refugees in those countries that were Member States at the relevant time is considered, for only these Member 
States have been entitled to negotiate and adopt in the Council the CEAS measures.  
The source of information on asylum seekers and refugees for 1999 is the UNHCR 1999 Statistical Overview 
of refugees and others of concern to UNHCR.45 Table IV.1. shows statistics on all cases, pending cases, cases 
submitted during the year and recognition rates. There the focus is only on the cases submitted during the year 
to avoid the problem of delayed decision-making. Similarly, while the outcomes are only those for the cases 
determined in that year (rather than the cases submitted, as the two are often quite different depending on how 
long it takes officials to reach decisions), this figure provides a basis for comparison and an understanding of 
the facts on the ground at the time when critical decisions on the CEAS were taken. UNHCR divides the EU 
into Eastern, Northern and Southern Europe, each group including both some Member States and some non-
Member States.  
In 1999, there were 15 Member States.46 According to UNHCR data, the picture was the following: 
Table 1. Asylum applications and recognition rates in the European Union in 1999 
 1999 
 
 
Country Cases submitted during the 
year 
Percentage (%) recognised 
(refugee and other statuses) 
Austria 20,100 56 
Belgium 35,780 40.7 
                                                   
45 UNHCR (2000), “Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR: 1999 Statistical Overview”, Geneva, July. Available 
from: <http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bc834.html>. 
46 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, UK. 
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Denmark 6,470 51.8 
Finland 3,110 27.2 
France 30,910 19.3 
Germany 95,110 13.3 
Greece 1,530 26.3 
Ireland 3,370 (not including repeat 
applications) 
35.0 
Italy 33,360 72.5 
Luxembourg 2,910 [not available] 
Netherlands 39,300 15.6 
Portugal 270 24.4 
Spain 8,410 11.7 
Sweden 11,230 34.4 
UK 71,150 72.5 
Total 363,010 35.76 
Source: Authors’ own compilation, based on UNHCR (2000) “Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR: 1999 
Statistical Overview”. 
 
The ten main countries of origin of asylum seekers in the EU that year were: 
- Yugoslavia (Former Republic – including all the former components that by 1999 were independent 
states) 
- Iraq 
- Afghanistan 
- Turkey 
- Somalia 
- Sri Lanka 
- Iran 
- Russian Federation 
- China 
- Armenia 
The distribution across Member States of asylum seekers from the top ten countries was rather heterogeneous. 
For instance, in Austria, the first and second places were Yugoslavia and Iran, while for France the two top 
countries of origin were China and Yugoslavia. For Spain the largest single country of origin was Algeria; for 
Portugal it was Sierra Leone. Clearly, the events leading to the NATO bombing of Serbia and Kosovo were 
among the most important political factors, which had substantial consequences for asylum seekers from the 
former Yugoslavia coming to the EU.  
The next critical date for this examination is 2004,47 the end of the first phase of the CEAS and the year when 
the adoption of the legislative measures of the CEAS had to be achieved (though in fact some measures were 
adopted in the following year). So while Table 1 tells us what the reception pressures were at the time of 
shifting asylum to EU competence, this second table informs of the conditions at the end of the first legislative 
phase. For its part, 2004 was also a transition year, when on 1 May, 10 new Member States acceded to the EU. 
But, as the majority of the CEAS measures were negotiated by the 15 Member States, we will focus only on 
                                                   
47 UNHCR (2005), “UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2004”, Geneva, 21 August 2005. Available from: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/44e96c842.html>. 
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these and include the 10 new Member States in our consideration of the 2009 statistics, by which time these 
states would also have transposed the CEAS acquis and be applying it. 
Table 2. Asylum applications and recognition rates in the European Union in 2004 
 2004 
 
 
Country Cases submitted during the 
year 
Percentage (%) recognised 
(refugee and other) 
Austria 24,634 55 
Belgium 22,604 (all procedures) 18 
Denmark 2,031 12.5 
Finland 3,861 52 
France 110,252 (excluding repeat 
applications) 
11.5 
Germany 122,830 (excluding repeat 
applications) 
6 (available only for new 
applications) 
Greece 7,294 1 (first instance only) 
Ireland 7,410 10 
Italy 9,722 35 
Luxembourg 1,577 31 
Netherlands 12,338 32.5 
Portugal 113 16 
Spain 5,535 18 
Sweden 23,161 9 
UK 86,123 16.5 
Total 439,485 21.2 
Source: Authors’ own compilation, based on UNHCR (2005), “UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2004”. 
 
The ten main countries of origin of asylum seekers in Europe (here the UNHCR figures include the EU 25) 
that year were: 
- Russian Federation 
- Serbia and Montenegro 
- Turkey 
- China 
- Nigeria 
- India 
- DRC 
- Iran 
- Iraq 
- Pakistan 
The distribution of asylum seekers continued to be rather heterogeneous. For example, Austria’s top five 
countries of origin for 2004 were the DRC, Russian Federation, Serbia/Montenegro and Slovakia and Guinea. 
In Denmark the top five were Serbia/Montenegro, Afghanistan, Iraq, Russian Federation and Somalia. In 
Germany the top five were Turkey, Serbia/Montenegro, Russian Federation, Vietnam and Iran. In Spain the 
top five countries of origin were Nigeria, Algeria, Colombia, Mali and Guinea.  
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By 2003-2004 the key political events affecting refugee flight were the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq. While these two countries were ranked first and second, respectively, as countries of origin in 1999, by 
2003-2004 Afghanistan had dropped (temporarily) out of the top ten and Iraq had fallen to ninth place. The 
1999 armed conflict in Chechnya had reduced in intensity by 2003-2004, though in 2003 there was a 
controversial referendum on regional devolution of power. The continuing importance of the Russian 
Federation as a key country of origin of asylum seekers in the EU certainly reflects these events. 
The next pivotal date in the CEAS is 2009,48 when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, thus providing legal 
status for the Charter equal to the other EU treaties. Article 18 of the Charter provides a right to asylum, 
something not seen in the EU since the modification of a number of national constitutions to comply with the 
1990 Schengen Implementing Convention.49 By this point, the Member States that had joined in 2004 had 
transposed the CEAS, and the first five years of its operation, including the end of all the transitional periods, 
were over. While Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2009, data is included separately from 
these two countries as their integration into the CEAS was taking place during that year.   
Table 3. Asylum applications and recognition rates in the European Union in 2009 
 2009 
 
 
Country  Cases submitted during the 
year 
Percentage (%) recognised 
(refugees and other) 
Austria 15,821 26.1 
Belgium 22,277 16.9 
Cyprus 6,914 16 
Czech Republic 1,832 20.8 
Denmark 4,562 37.4 
Estonia 36 9.5 
Finland 5,910 77.8 
France 42,118 14.3 
Germany 27,649 (not including repeat 
applications) 
42.9 
Greece 28,023 2.2 
Hungary 4,672 22.4 
Ireland 5,260 5.9 
Italy 17,603 43.5 
Latvia 52 40.7 
Lithuania 211 29.2 
Luxembourg 477 (excluding judicial review) 30.5 
Malta 3,216 32.8 
Netherlands 14,905 48.3 
Poland 10,587 38.2 
Portugal 139 52.0 
                                                   
48 UNHCR (2010), “UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2009”, Geneva, October. Available from: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4ce532ff9.html> 
49 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks 
at their common borders, 19 June 1990 [2000] OJ L239/19. 
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Slovakia 822 25.2 
Slovenia 183 18.9 
Spain 3,007 7.6 
Sweden 37,897 24.1 
UK 46,025 29.5 
Total 300,198 28.5 
 
Table 3.1. Asylum applications and recognition rates in Bulgaria and Romania in 2009 
 2009 
 
 
Country Cases submitted during the 
year 
Percentage (%) recognised 
(refugee and other) 
Bulgaria 853 41.3 
Romania 835 10.6 
Total 1,688 25.95 
Source: Authors’ own compilation, based on UNHCR (2010), “UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2009”. 
 
In 2009, the ten main countries of origin of asylum seekers to the EU of the 27 Member States, according to 
FRONTEX in its July 2011 Risk Analysis,50 were: 
- Afghanistan 
- Serbia 
- Iraq 
- Russian Federation 
- Iran 
- Somalia 
- Eritrea 
- Pakistan 
- Tunisia 
- Not specified 
It is particularly striking how sharp the drop in overall numbers of asylum seekers in 2008-2009 was in an EU 
of 25 Member States in comparison with 2003-2004 in an EU of 15 Member States: over 138,000. Once again 
distribution across the Member States was rather diverse. In France the top five countries of origin were the 
Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, Sri Lanka and the DRC. In Poland the top five were the Russian 
Federation, Belarus, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and India. In Sweden the top five were Iraq, Somalia, Serbia, stateless 
people, and Eritrea, while in the UK they were Afghanistan, Iran, Zimbabwe, China and Iraq.  
International political tensions in 2008-2009 included the US and Allied exercise investment of military power 
in Iraq in an attempt to diminish political violence. Afghanistan continued to be in substantial disarray. The 
Sri Lankan military launched an offence against the Tamil Tigers and declared victory on 18 May 2009. The 
Russian operation in Chechnya was officially ended on 15 April 2009, but in August of the preceding year 
there were very substantial military tensions between Russia and Georgia over Abkhazia. The Somali civil war 
                                                   
50 FRONTEX (2011), “Annual Risk Analysis 2011”, Warsaw, April. Available from: 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Attachments_News/ara_2011_for_public_release.pdf>. 
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took a new turn as the Al Shabaab group gathered strength and authority over increasingly large parts of the 
country. 
In 2014 there were 28 Member States (Croatia had joined on 1 July 2013). According to EUROSTAT data on 
first applications for 201351 and UNHCR data on recognition rates 2012,52 the picture was the following: 
Table 4. Asylum applications and recognition rates in the European Union in 2014 
 2014 
 
 
Country Cases submitted during the year Percentage (%) recognised 
(refugee and others) 
Austria 17,413 (data gathered from 
UNHCR) 
34.8 
Belgium 11,965 23.4 
Bulgaria 6,980 28.9 
Croatia 1,045 16.8 
Cyprus 1,335 (no data for 2 months of 
this year) 
7.9 
Czech Republic 490 39.1 
Denmark 7,170 46.0 
Estonia 95 22.8 
Finland 2,985 54.1 
France 58,925 9.4 
Germany 109,375 31.9 (not including repeat 
applications) 
Greece 7,860 0.9 
Hungary 18,945 (data for first 3 months of 
this year are missing) 
48.0 
Ireland 910 8.7 
Italy 26,920 38.1 
Latvia 185 24.8 
Lithuania 250 13.5 
Luxembourg 990 2.4 
Malta 2,205 90.7 
Netherlands 14,375 41.0 
Poland 13,645 (data for December are not 
available) 
12.1 
Portugal 500 96.3 
                                                   
51 EUROSTAT (2014), Asylum Applicants and First Instance Decisions on Asylum Applications: 2013, KS-QA-14-
003-EN-N, Brussels. 
52 UNHCR (2013), “UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2012”, Geneva, 10 December. Available from: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/52a7213b9.html>. Note that EUROSTAT does not produce data in this form. 
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Romania 1,405 11.7 
Slovakia 290 40.4 
Slovenia 240 16.9 
Spain 4,285 20.0 
Sweden 54,255 49.1 
UK 28,950 37.0 
Total 393,988 30.95 
Source: EUROSTAT (2014), Asylum Applicants and First Instance Decisions on Asylum Applications: 2013. 
 
Notwithstanding the much larger EU of 2013-2014 with 28 Member States, the total number of asylum 
applications remained substantially lower than the number of applications to the EU 15 in 2004 – about 40,000 
fewer. According to EUROSTAT, the countries of origin of asylum seekers in the EU in the fourth quarter of 
2013, by Member State where the applications were made, continued to vary substantially. The EU top five 
countries of origin were Syria, Serbia, Afghanistan, Eritrea and the Russian Federation. For France the top five 
were the DRC, Albania, Bangladesh, the Russian Federation and Kosovo. For Germany they were Serbia, 
Syria, Macedonia, Eritrea and Afghanistan. In the Netherlands the top five were Syria, Somalia, Eritrea, Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Sweden had Syria, stateless people, Eritrea, Somalia and Afghanistan as its top five.  
The political situation in 2013-2014 was marked in particular by an ongoing civil war in Syria, intensifyied 
bloodshed in Iraq and Afghanistan, international intervention in Mali and Central African Republic, and a coup 
in Egypt followed by a crackdown on former members of the governing party. 
This snapshot of the numbers of people seeking asylum in the EU and recognition rates is striking, as is the 
very limited regard for situations and the use of violence in some of the main countries of origin of asylum 
seekers over the relevant period. First, and perhaps most astonishing, is the fact that although the EU grew by 
more than one-third in population and territorial terms between 1999 and 2014 with the arrival of 13 new 
Member States, the numbers of asylum seekers requesting international protection has dropped, most 
dramatically since 2004. This is indicative of a net reduction in available asylum space and supports calls for 
the EU to make more efforts to assist refugees around the world. It also has resulted in the comparative share 
of asylum seekers in the EU to drop substantially in comparison with other parts of the world. According to 
UNHCR’s most recent data on global asylum trends, 10.1 million refugees (86% of the world’s refugee 
population) are hosted by developing countries.53 
2.4 Dublin I, II and III: the outcomes of asylum seeker transfers 
The Dublin I,54 II55 and III56 systems are not responsibility-sharing mechanisms, as they do not take into 
account questions of overall numbers, capacity or other criteria that might be described as homogenising 
outcomes. Rather, the Dublin I, II and III systems are based on three simple principles that are antagonistic to 
responsibility-sharing in the sense of distributing in equal numbers asylum seekers across the EU. The first 
principle is that Member States are responsible for determining where an asylum application must be 
examined; the most frequently used criterion, which is usually decisive (though hierarchically subordinate to 
                                                   
53 UNHCR (2014), “UNHCR Global Trends 2013”, Geneva, 20 June. Available from: <http://unhcr.org/trends2013/>, 
16. 
54 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member 
States of the European Communities (Dublin Convention) [1997] OJ C254/1. 
55 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or stateless person (Dublin II Regulation) [2003] OJ L50/1. 
56 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or stateless person (recast) (Dublin III 
Regulation) [2013] OJ L180/31. 
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other criteria), is the Member State through which first entry into the EU occurred. Second, any negative 
decision on asylum by the responsible Member State is automatically recognised as final for all Member States. 
Third, a positive decision has only limited territorial application in the Member State where the decision was 
made. So looking at, for instance, the recognition rate in Malta in 2013-2014, which surpasses 90%, none of 
the persons recognised in Malta as entitled to international protection are permitted to move (in their capacity 
as recognised refugees) to any other Member State. Thus neither at the first reception stage nor at the 
recognition stage can it be said that Dublin is a responsibility-sharing mechanism. If anything, it may be 
considered a disciplining measure – Member States that allow people to irregularly cross their borders will be 
responsible for determining their asylum claims, should they make them. Nonetheless, in any discussion about 
first reception of asylum seekers in the Union and their distribution among the Member States, it is imperative 
to look at the outcomes of Dublin I, II and III because they give a clear indication of the interest of Member 
States in moving people around the EU.  
This section is based on the available EURODAC data from the annual reports of EURODAC, beginning with 
2004. The EURODAC database of fingerprints of people who have applied for asylum or have been 
apprehended irregularly crossing the external borders of the EU is available for checking fingerprints of 
persons whom Member States suspect should be the asylum responsibility of another Member State. The 
information found in EURODAC reports relates to the number of asylum seekers who apply for asylum in a 
second Member State and also whether they have actually been sent back to that second state.  
The first EURODAC annual report was published on 5 May 2004.57 Category 1 data concern people who have 
applied for asylum and whose fingerprints have been sent to the EURODAC database (which ought to include 
all people who have applied for asylum). Category 2 data comprise fingerprints of persons apprehended 
irregularly crossing the external frontier of the EU in the event that they seek asylum in another Member State. 
Category 3 data relate to aliens found irregularly present in a Member State and whose fingerprints are checked 
against the EURODAC database. If they match fingerprints already in the database, there is what the system 
calls a ‘hit’.  
The first report on the system covers the period 15 January 2003 to 15 January 2004. The figures include 
Iceland and Norway and 14 Member States (Denmark was excluded for legislative reasons at that time). Over 
this period there were a total of 271,573 fingreprint checks. Of that figure 246,902 were fingerprints of asylum 
seekers. This was the year in which there were 439,467 new asylum applications, meaning less than two-thirds 
of those new applications were the subject of a EURODAC search. Of those checks, 14,960 revealed a ‘hit’: 
the asylum seeker had already applied for asylum in another Member State and then had moved and applied 
again. Looking only at the data on hits between Member States (and not at the data on persons who applied 
more than once in the same Member State), only three Member States have a hit rate of over 2,000 – Germany 
(2,820), the UK (2,734) and Sweden (2,636). Among the Member States responsible for taking back asylum 
seekers, the top five are: Austria (3,533), Germany (2,147), Italy (1,911) Sweden (1,505) and the Netherlands 
(1,113).  
The first evaluation of the Dublin system carried out by the Commission covers 2005.58 In that year, Austria 
had 805 incoming transfers and 589 outgoing ones. Germany had 2,716 incoming transfers and 2,748 outgoing 
transfers. Italy had 419 incoming and 47 outgoing transfers while the Netherlands had 862 incoming and 982 
outgoing. No data was available for Sweden, but the UK had 366 incoming and 1,824 outgoing transfers. What 
is most noticeable about these figures is how low they are in comparison with the numbers of asylum 
applications received in any of these countries in 2003-2004, though the numbers are more consistent with the 
‘hit’ rates. The ‘hit’ rates for category 2 and category 3 data against category 1 are remarkably low – a total of 
673 for category 2 and 1,181 for category 3. These figures are so low as not to merit further analysis. 
On 25 September 2009 the Commission issued its annual report on the operation of EURODAC in 2008.59 The 
data covers 27 Member States, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Denmark is included in these figures. The 
                                                   
57 European Commission (2004), First Annual Report to the Council and the European Parliament on the Activities of 
the EURODAC Central Unit, SEC(2004) 557, 5 May, Brussels. 
58 European Commission (2007), Report on the Evaluation of the Dublin System, COM(2007) 299, 6 June, Brussels; 
European Commission (2007), Staff Working Document Accompanying the Report on the Evaluation of the Dublin 
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total number of hits of category 1 to category 1 was 33,456 (where an asylum seeker had already made an 
asylum application in another Member State or participating state).60 This is about 2.5 times the 2004 figure. 
The five top countries ‘hit’ (which had first submitted the fingerprints of the asylum seeker to EURODAC and 
against which another country checked fingerprints) were: Poland (4,373), Sweden (3,877), Germany (3,635), 
Italy (3310) and Austria (2,682). The top five sender countries with ‘hits’ from other Member States were: 
France (4,637), Norway (3051), Austria (2,969), Sweden (2,968) and Belgium (2,679).61 The Commission 
carried out its review of the Dublin system in 2007 in anticipation of the recasting of the regulation, including 
a detailed analysis of findings. After the proposal for a recast was tabled,62 there has been little further data 
available on actual return of asylum seekers from one Member State to another on the basis of EURODAC 
hits (or otherwise). Data from 2003-2005 used in the Commission’s 2009 report on EURODAC indicate that 
of all asylum applications over the period, Dublin transfers accounted for 4.05% for incoming transfers and 
4.28 % for outgoing transfers. This data was analysed for the European Parliament in the Reflection Note of 
2009.63 
EU-LISA, the EU’s Agency for Large Scale IT Systems, which is now responsible for EURODAC, issued the 
2013 Annual Report in July 2014.64 The data includes the EU 28 and the 3 non-EU states. Category 1 hits to 
category 1 data totalled 124,942 (excluding hits where the same Member State sends the fingerprints and is 
the one that first registered them in EURODAC). This is a substantial rise in use of the system. The top five 
‘hit’ countries were: Italy (14,225), Poland (11,377), Sweden (11,101), Greece (10,973) and Hungary (10,296). 
The top five sending countries with a hit following were: Germany (41,617), Sweden (12,782), France 
(10,606), Switzerland (8,910) and Italy (8,387). The information included in the Commission’s 5th Annual 
Report on Immigration and Asylum (for 2013) and its accompanying Staff Working Document on Dublin 
returns is rather limited.65 It notes simply that Croatia had received some 372 requests to take back from other 
Member States and that Hungary had an augmented case load resulting from the Dublin procedure. Spain had 
also received an increased number of take back requests.  
EASO’s Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2013, however, contains 
information that could speak somewhat to the efficiency of the Dublin mechanism. EASO mentions that, out 
of an annual average of 35,000 outgoing requests during the period 2008-2012, only about 8,500 (25% of 
outgoing requests) actually resulted in transfers.66 Accordingly:  
“[A]lthough the proportion of outgoing requests was on average about 12% of the number of 
registered asylum applicants, Dublin transfers were made in the case of only about 3% of those 
making an asylum claim in the EU”.67 
The picture that emerges from the operation of the EURODAC and Dublin I, II and III systems is not 
particularly illuminating. One has the impression that much effort and expenditure goes into maintaining a 
database of fingerprints that reveals increases in secondary movement of asylum seekers but not on a 
particularly dramatic scale; and a fairly desultory number of actual transfers of asylum seekers back from one 
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Member State to another. In relation to the overall numbers of asylum claims, this activity is quite minor. 
Further, the top sending and receiving countries under the system are, in a number of prominent cases, the 
same. So, while the EURODAC data produces hits ‘against’ and ‘for’ a state (taking ‘for’ as meaning that the 
state can send the asylum seeker somewhere else and ‘against’ meaning that the state is required to receive an 
asylum seeker from another country), the end result to the overall number of asylum seekers for which the 
state is responsible does not change much. For individual asylum seekers, by contrast, the human cost may be 
enormous.68 
2.5 Using data 
In the preparation of this study, questionnaires were sent out to policy-makers within national asylum 
institutions and within the EU institutions and UNHCR. Among other subjects, questions were asked 
concerning the extent to which authorities consider and use such data in their day-to-day work. According to 
the answers received, national asylum authorities tend to make regular use of EUROSTAT, UNHCR, EASO 
and FRONTEX data when preparing their positions on the CEAS, while particular emphasis is placed on the 
use of EASO and EUROSTAT data generated for that purpose. 
More specifically, one Member State has relied on EASO- and UNHCR-generated data to prepare its positions 
for the “Meeting of Southern and South-Eastern European countries about the Common European Asylum 
System and Burden-Sharing” in Athens on 15 May 2014, as well as for meetings with the European 
Commission relating to funding. Another Member State confirmed it has specifically used EASO’s annual 
report to prepare its AMIF multiannual programme. Another respondent detailed that EUROSTAT and 
UNHCR data was brought forward in several Council meetings on asylum at both Working Party and 
Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) level. Furthermore, data is systematically relied upon in 
the context of bilateral information exchange between partners, according to one respondent Member State. 
Respondent asylum authorities have unanimously agreed that the improvements in data collection and 
presentation, marked particularly by EUROSTAT, have been helpful in facilitating regular use of asylum data 
by Member States. As EASO officials explained in interviews, the Support Office has been able to make a 
number of improvements in EUROSTAT’s definition system for asylum statistics: Dublin transfers are no 
longer registered as rejection decisions, and follow-up is carried out on family reunification data in order for 
EUROSTAT to change its definitions and guidelines for Member States. Accordingly, EASO expects more 
accurate and reliable EUROSTAT data on Dublin as of 2014. 
Questions regarding the exact use of annual EURODAC reports, however, has attracted different responses 
from Member States. As one Member State suggested, these reports are not used as frequently. Two Member 
States found that these reports are relied upon by asylum authorities for the supervision of the database and 
the implementation of Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 (EURODAC Regulation), while another stated that it only 
uses EURODAC reports for reference purposes. 
On the other hand, the way in which policy-makers use available asylum data may often create difficulties as 
regards evidence-led policy-making in the CEAS. According to a UNHCR official, policy-makers within 
national authorities, EU institutions and UNHCR often rely on statistics without going into detail as to what a 
particular set of data may mean. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter has been to set the scene clearly and on the basis of all publicly available data on 
the demand for first reception by people seeking international protection in the EU. The analysis compared 
four points in time: 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 – all key moments in the creation of the CEAS. It has been 
found that, while there have been variations among the number of asylum seekers coming to the EU and 
differences in the countries of origin of asylum seekers who seek asylum in one Member State or another, the 
overall numbers have not changed dramatically over time, thereby indicating a net reduction in first reception 
capacity across the EU-28. Every now and then there are dramatic spikes, such as in France in 2004, or 
dramatic drops, such as in Germany in 2009, but these are rare. In some countries there have been steady 
increases or decreases, e.g. Sweden in the first case and Greece in the second. What is much more worrying is 
the very substantial differences in recognition rates among the Member States. Of course, this is in part 
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explained by the fact that countries of origin of asylum seekers also differ substantially across the EU. Yet, 
even where the top ten countries of origin are the same or similar, the recognition rates are alarmingly diverse. 
The application of the Dublin I, II or III system for allocating responsibility for asylum seekers appears to have 
had only a minor impact on Member States’ first reception obligations. Yet, the human costs for the people 
who are transferred is enormous; the trauma this system causes has been well documented.69 The current 
situation is not consistent with the EU Charter’s commitment to respect the human dignity of everyone to 
whom EU law applies.  
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3. Current and Proposed Joint Approaches to Allocation, Access to Procedures, 
First-Line Reception and Processing 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The Dublin system, governing allocation of responsibility for claims in the EU at present, relies heavily 
on coercion, and is characterised by many problems in practice. These are linked to a great extent to 
divergent standards and non-compliance with EU obligations in reception and procedures in some Member 
States. 
 Joint processing proposals have ranged from the provision of support teams to Member States to a fully-
fledged EU processing system. EASO has developed pilot projects relating to different steps of the asylum 
process that provide an important basis for assessing the potential for expanded joint activities in the future. 
 Multi-actor arrangements, involving partnership between government, international and non-
governmental organisations, can bring to bear valuable experience in first-line reception. Previous projects 
and current UNHCR proposals contain elements for strengthened initial reception and processing 
arrangements that merit close consideration.  
 Some proposals from European Parliament, NGO and academic quarters for a ‘European distribution key’, 
along the lines of Germany’s internal distribution model, advocate for use of responsibility-allocation 
criteria related to national authorities’ capacity and other factors. 
 Mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions could provide an important way forward, in line with the 
Treaty obligation to establish a uniform status of asylum, valid throughout the Union. 
 
This chapter aims to examine the existing legal framework, selected aspects of practice, and proposals 
developed to date for alternative approaches to first-line reception of asylum seekers on the one hand, and 
allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers and provision of protection on the other. In reflecting on 
possible ways to address immediate challenges facing the Member States in relation to asylum, it is important 
to take account of proposals made to date in studies commissioned by EU institutions, discussions in and 
between institutions and Member States, as well as ideas developed by academics and international 
organisations that have attracted interest at EU level. Some of these have not been taken forward to date, due 
to various reasons, which include an already charged EU policy and legal agenda on asylum, political and 
institutional caution, the need for further development of the ideas and legislative amendments and the political 
support to make them possible. However, some of these may merit further examination, development or use 
in the future. This chapter will examine their potential, in light of the current situation and expected further 
evolution of the CEAS, and of ongoing debates about fair sharing of responsibility for asylum.  
3.1 Access to procedures, responsibility for asylum claims and asylum seekers’ 
basic entitlements: current EU framework and practice 
The TFEU foresees establishment of a “common procedure” and “uniform status of asylum, valid throughout 
the Union” as well as a “uniform status of subsidiary protection”.70 To date, however, current legislation (as 
amended by recent recasts) has established common standards aimed at ensuring harmonised approaches to 
asylum procedures, as well as reception and qualification for protection, at national level. Processing 
(including initial screening) of asylum seekers is conducted under national law in national territory, and while 
the legislation of Member States should reflect common EU standards, there remain significant differences in 
practice.71 There is not, as yet, a fully common procedure across the Union, and experts agree that further steps 
can and should be taken to achieve this, through closer approximation of national practices, as well as enhanced 
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practical cooperation and other initiatives at EU level. The Strategic Guidelines on the future Justice and Home 
Affairs agenda, agreed by the European Council in June 2014, have affirmed this, stating that “[t]he full 
transposition and effective implementation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is an absolute 
priority. This should result in high common standards and stronger cooperation, creating a level playing field 
where asylum seekers are given the same procedural guarantees and protection throughout the Union”.72 
The recast APD, adopted in June 2013, contains amendments designed to facilitate access to procedures for 
those who express the wish to request asylum,73 as well as specific rules for people who may be in need of 
special procedural guarantees and unaccompanied minors.74 The need for such strengthened rules and 
safeguards emerges clearly from past reports on state practice documenting significant challenges, delays and 
obstacles to accessing fair procedures in some Member States.75 The recast APD also contains new rules 
relating to unfounded and manifestly unfounded claims,76 inadmissible claims77 and accelerated procedures.78 
While the grounds for acceleration of claims have been reduced somewhat, there remains wide scope for 
Member States to apply accelerated procedures, with reduced safeguards in practice, in a number of cases. 
Allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers, where more than one Member State may be concerned, is 
regulated by the Dublin Regulation and implemented in conjunction with the EURODAC database, which is 
governed by the EURODAC Regulation and contains the fingerprints of people who have claimed asylum or 
have been detected entering or staying irregularly in the EU. The Dublin criteria for allocation of responsibility 
do not include or take account of relative levels of capacity on the part of national governments, as it was not 
conceived as a burden-sharing mechanism.79 Questions could thus arise about its consistency with Treaty 
provisions requiring that EU asylum measures and implementation be in accordance with the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility among the Member States.80 
Reception conditions for those awaiting outcomes on their asylum applications are regulated by the recast 
RCD. While standards have improved progressively in a number of Member States over the years,81 there 
remain widely documented recent cases where EU standards are not met.82 In 2011, the ECtHR found in MSS 
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v Belgium and Greece that conditions in Greece violated Article 3 ECHR, and reiterated its conclusion three 
years later in FH v Greece.83 It is noteworthy that some of the major documented shortcomings in reception 
standards, and resultant violations of asylum seekers’ rights, have occurred in Member States at the Union’s 
external frontiers.  
The CJEU has clarified that in Dublin cases, the Member State in which the asylum seeker is located is 
responsible for providing reception facilities and entitlements, until the point at which a person is transferred 
to another responsible Dublin state.84 Pending this ruling, the situation was unclear and some asylum seekers 
were deprived of their entitlements while responsibility was debated.85 This has also subsequently been 
clarified in the recast RCD, along with other amendments confirming that Member States must provide the 
full range of reception rights to asylum seekers in detention, as part of new rules providing for exhaustive, 
defined legal grounds for detention, judicial oversight and new binding minimum conditions for detention. 
3.2 First-line reception – identification, registration and referral 
In many Member States, border authorities are likely to be the first point of contact for asylum seekers 
arriving at Member States’ frontiers. Once an asylum seeker has been identified as a person seeking or 
potentially in need of protection,86 and has indicated his or her intention to request international protection, he 
or she should be referred to competent asylum authorities responsible for registering claims. The APD foresees 
considerable scope for Member States to apply border procedures to claimants, including where the grounds 
for applying accelerated procedures apply.87 
Amendments to the Asylum Procedures Directive, providing for clarified and strengthened obligations to 
provide information and ensure access to the procedure, should also ensure that asylum seekers are accurately 
distinguished from those not requesting or in need of international protection. This is however a process that 
may be fraught in the pressured circumstances prevailing at a land, sea or air border, with limited time for 
authorities to respond and significant numbers of people seeking to move through into the territory of the 
Member States. Those claiming asylum may be categorised thereafter in the course of the procedure, based on 
whether they are considered to have an inadmissible, unfounded or manifestly unfounded claim, and whether 
they should or can be placed in accelerated procedures, among others.  
Some national practice highlights the potential, as well as the limitations, on current rules and arrangements 
for screening of newly arrived asylum seekers. This study, which cannot provide a comprehensive overview, 
will recount selected aspects of some collective approaches used to date.88  
In Italy, between 2006-2010, a project known as “Praesidium: Strengthening of reception capacity in respect 
of migration flows” was established and implemented, involving the Italian Ministry of Interior (MOI), 
UNHCR, IOM and the Italian Red Cross working in partnership. It was funded for the first three years by the 
European Commission, and solely by the Italian MOI in 2010; in its fourth year, Save the Children Italy also 
joined as a project partner. Initially implemented on Lampedusa, and subsequently rolled out to Calabria and 
other locations on the Italian coast and mainland, the project aimed to ensure provision of information, legal 
counselling and other basic facilities to new arrivals by sea in Italy, and sought to identify the appropriate 
channels in each case for reception and for access to the appropriate legal or administrative procedure. UNHCR 
provided those seeking or in need of protection information and support in connection with the asylum 
procedure, as well as identification and particular assistance to vulnerable people in the asylum process, and 
monitoring of reception conditions and effective access to procedures. IOM played a key role in regards to 
information, advice and services to migrants, in addition to providing support in relation to voluntary return 
where possible. The Italian Red Cross sought to identify and provide support to people with medical needs 
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and vulnerable people in general. Save the Children focussed on unaccompanied minor arrivals, in the asylum 
procedure and otherwise, to ensure their adequate treatment and that their particular needs were met.  
Several positive aspects of the Praesidium project were identified in a UNHCR evaluation, which described it 
as an “innovative” model for responding to a mixed migration situation, notably because of the strength of the 
partnership between government, international and non-governmental organisations, and the division of 
competences based on the respective actors’ mandates and expertise.89 However, it was noted that the success 
of the model depended for its utility and impact on the policy context in which it operated (one which in 2009 
shifted suddenly and sharply towards deterrence and pushbacks of migrants and asylum seekers in Libya, 
leading to a dramatic drop in arrivals and dwindling demand for the multi-partner model). It also concluded 
that more emphasis should have been placed on ensuring greater sustainability from the outset in the design of 
the arrangement and its support systems, and on aiming for more effective coordination and alignment of goals 
and strategies between the partners.  
Civil society actors have highlighted the importance of adequate funding to ensure, in addition to general 
sustainability, that such arrangements can respond to large-scale arrivals, which are frequently the norm at sea 
borders. 
In 2014, Praesidium continues to operate in a significantly scaled-down way, with the authorities in the leading 
operational role and other organisations engaged chiefly in monitoring and providing support in various 
ways.90 
In other regions of the world, screening and other processes involving asylum seekers have been carried out at 
sea, on board vessels responsible for interception at or near maritime borders. On-board asylum seeker 
screening arrangements have been used by the United States at various points in the past, including for over 
ten years from 1981 as part of maritime interception operations for people in small boats seeking to reach the 
US from Haiti. Under this practice, any Haitian vessel that appeared to be carrying migrants or asylum seekers 
was boarded and passengers transferred to US Coast Guard cutters, where they were interviewed by 
representatives of the US State Department and the Immigration and Nationalisation Service with the aid of 
an interpreter. The ostensible aim of the interview was to determine if the person could substantiate a well-
founded fear of persecution. However, out of some 25,000 people intercepted and handled in this way in over 
ten years, only 28 were transferred to the US for processing. The rest were returned to Haiti – notwithstanding 
well-documented evidence of human rights abuses by successive Haitian governments during that time.91 
Many critics have objected to the practice of conducting screening at sea, based on the unsuitability of 
shipboard facilities, in most cases, including their incapacity to serve effectively as venues where access to 
information, rest and medical care can be guaranteed in appropriate conditions, or to enable an asylum seeker 
to submit and pursue his or her claim effectively, including access to information about the procedure and its 
consequences, legal advice and counselling.92 Other difficult conditions associated with the US model have 
included overcrowding, sickness and fatigue, exacerbating the challenges to efficient screening.93 When 
numbers of those intercepted at sea en route to the US rose sharply after a coup that overthrew President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, the US government changed its policy – after a brief attempt at housing asylum seekers on 
the decks of the Coast Guard cutters – and began to transfer them to a tent camp that was rapidly established 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Screening was also carried out in that facility, under unsatisfactory conditions, for 
a number of months, during which a far higher proportion (32%) were found to have a claim that merited a 
substantive examination. However, when the numbers rose rapidly in mid-1992, the US decided to close the 
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Guantanamo camps and authorised the Coast Guard to forcibly repatriate all Haitians intercepted at sea, in 
apparent disregard of the principle of non-refoulement and other basic standards.  
Although the US has continued to conduct screening on board ships on a periodic basis over the years, and 
UNHCR took part in monitoring at some key points, the method has never gained the formal endorsement of 
UNHCR nor been recognised by experts as a viable approach. By contrast, the most recent example of the use 
of this method by Australia, in July 2014, attracted vociferous criticism from the UN Refugee Agency. The 
“enhanced screening procedures” used at sea in that case were not judged to provide sufficient safeguards 
to ensure a fair and accurate decision. The fact that those ‘screened out’ under such procedures were 
subsequently returned to their country of origin, Sri Lanka, was seen to create a very serious risk of 
refoulement.94 
In the European context, where the extraterritorial application of the non-refoulement principle has been 
clearly established, along with a legal obligation for states to facilitate access to territory and procedures where 
an asylum claim can be examined fairly and protection provided,95 there would appear to be many reasons why 
RSD cannot effectively be conducted on board ships, and any first screening on board could create an inherent 
risk of refoulement. Questions of how one could ensure effective remedies, special procedural guarantees for 
those in need thereof, legal aid and other requirements are extremely difficult to address, notably given that 
coast guard vessels patrolling the Mediterranean are customarily far smaller than the US vessels used in the 
Haitian displacement context. Given existing sensitivities in Europe and with neighbouring countries, and 
differences of view around responsibility for search and rescue, as well as disembarkation following search 
and rescue or interception, this would appear to create a significant risk of tension among Member States and 
real potential for violation of asylum seekers’ rights.  
In 2014, following the tragic loss of life in the sea near Lampedusa in late 2013, and in the context of 
discussions on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean, UNHCR has developed a proposal for an “EU 
solidarity package for rescue at sea” which “aims to support Member States (MS) to address some of the 
challenges they face with the continuing high numbers of persons in need of international protection who arrive 
by sea to the EU” in mixed flows. Among other things, the proposed “EU Solidarity Package” would focus on 
strengthening asylum and reception systems in concerned Member States, including admission, registration 
and Dublin procedures; and measures designed to identify persons with links to other Member States, including 
family and cultural ties, and promote their transfer to those states “to reduce the ‘burden’ of the MS under 
pressure”. It also seeks to encourage more engagement in joint processing, and promote the voluntary 
assumption of responsibility by other Member States for special groups of ‘manifestly founded’ asylum 
seekers, or relocation of persons granted international protection. As such, it seeks to provide support at the 
point of arrival and first-line reception; for the processing of claims, including through joint or supported 
processing; and encourage responsibility-sharing in relation to solutions.  
The UNHCR proposals build on the obligations in the acquis in relation to first-line reception, adopting a 
proactive and interactive multi-actor approach, foreseeing support from UNHCR, EASO, IOM, other Member 
States and NGOs to assist the receiving Member State with initial steps. These include screening for medical 
and other special needs; provision of information, counselling and legal advice where appropriate; 
identification and fingerprinting, as well as registration of basic bio-data, and information relevant to family 
and other links in other Member States. Thereafter, it seeks to promote a ‘fairer’ means of allocating 
responsibility for claims – not by departing from Dublin as such, but by calling for a modified and individual 
rights-oriented implementation thereof. It is foreseen that identification of the responsible state under Dublin 
could be undertaken with help from a support team of other Member States’ experts, coordinated by EASO; 
and that additional efforts should be used to apply, on a prioritised basis, criteria relating to family members 
and dependency. The more extensive use of the humanitarian and discretionary clauses is encouraged, in 
accordance with recent pronouncements by the CJEU96 – potentially in connection with particular groups, such 
as Syrians and Eritreans. The objective is apparently to prioritise the processing of claims of, and sharing of 
responsibility for, groups which in the vast majority of cases need protection. This would involve a different 
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approach to the implementation of Dublin than that most commonly used to date,97 in full compliance with 
fundamental rights and international protection standards.  
Further joint efforts are foreseen in the proposal in relation to substantive claim processing (with help from 
joint processing teams drawn from other Member States’ experts); and redistributing responsibility for those 
granted protection. UNHCR refers specifically to relocation within the EU of people in need of protection; 
resettlement to third countries; and sponsored private humanitarian admission – which could also provide 
protection for relatives in third countries who may be vulnerable and in need of assistance to gain access to 
and protection in the EU. Reunification of refugees and subsidiary protection holders is also encouraged within 
the EU, and suggests facilitated or expedited processes with support from UNHCR, IOM, NGOs and others.98 
As of the time of writing, discussions among concerned Member States, EU bodies and UNHCR was taking 
place on the possibility of such a joint approach in the context of sea arrivals. 
3.3 Joint processing models 
The European Council called in The Hague Programme of 2004 for a study on the “appropriateness, 
possibilities and difficulties, as well as the legal and practical applications, of joint processing of asylum 
claims within the Union”.99 This call was repeated in the Stockholm Programme in 2009,100 after the European 
Commission in its 2008 Policy Plan on Asylum101 proposed to “examine how joint processing might alleviate 
the pressure on specific overburdened Member States.” In February 2013, the Commission published its 
“Study on the feasibility and legal and practical implications of establishing a mechanism for the joint 
processing of asylum applications on the territory of the EU”,102 which observed that joint processing was 
“envisioned as a possible solidarity mechanism to help Member States cope with some of the challenges they 
may be faced with in asylum matters.” The study involved research and extensive consultation with Member 
States, EU bodies and other stakeholders, based on which it proposed four possible models for joint processing. 
Three of these essentially envisaged the provision of support from joint teams to national processes in Member 
States affected by ‘particular pressures’, operating in the framework of the national asylum law and institutions 
of the concerned Member State.  
These three options were developed around the Early Warning mechanism in Article 33 of the subsequently 
adopted recast Dublin Regulation. Option A foresaw the provision of support from joint teams to a Member 
State during the ‘crisis management’ phase of the early warning system, and subject to the Dublin rules and 
criteria on allocation of responsibility. Option B proposed a departure from Dublin in that states taking part in 
the arrangement would determine a quota of refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries that they would 
be prepared to take, and these would be relocated to the volunteering state’s territory after joint processing in 
the Member State ‘under pressure’. EU support for returns and removals of those not in need of protection was 
also envisaged at this point. Option C was similar to option A, except that support to the affected Member 
State from joint teams – which would become an institutionalised “joint processing pool”  coordinated by 
EASO, in which participation would be mandatory for each Member State – would be applied already in the 
“crisis prevention” phase of the early warning system. Responsibility for RSD would however be determined 
by Dublin, and obligations to provide protection for those identified as needing it would remain with the 
responsible state.  
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Option D, in dramatic contrast to the other three, foresaw a full-scale EU system for RSD in relation to some 
or all asylum claims, conducted by an EU entity with legal power to take binding decisions on claims and 
distribute those found to be in need of protection in accordance with an agreed distribution key. It was 
acknowledged in the study that Option D was not politically feasible at the time of its writing, but that testing 
its feasibility and implications was seen as very useful as a contribution to reflection and debate.  
While the study was the subject of discussion and cautious interest in non-governmental and academic circles, 
its proposals were overshadowed in subsequent months by the legislative process, as Member States negotiated 
intensively in the Council and with the Parliament to try to reach agreement on the texts. Events in late 2013 
underlined the pressing need to explore further means of assisting states responding to arrivals at the external 
borders after the tragic deaths at sea of hundreds of people near Lampedusa in October 2013. The Commission 
proposed that EASO set up a first project on “supported processing of asylum applications [allowing] a quicker 
and more efficient processing of asylum applications, relieving the asylum system of the responsible Member 
State without shifting responsibility for the examination of the asylum application and in full respect of the 
nationally applicable legal framework”. 103 
The European Asylum Support Office, in addition to its ongoing support activities for Member States,104 
proposed in spring 2014 a series of limited pilot projects testing aspects of joint processing, defined for the 
pilots’ purposes as “an arrangement under which the processing of asylum applications is conducted jointly 
by experts of two or more Member States, under the coordination of EASO, in support of a requesting Member 
State”. The joint actions were foreseen as extending up to, but not including, the conduct of personal 
interviews, thus covering first-line reception, registration of identity data, fingerprints, identification of 
specific needs and assessment of responsibility under Dublin. This limited scope sought to avoid political, 
legal, linguistic and financial questions in relation to further joint action on analysis of cases, and/or making 
recommendations or taking legally binding decisions. Member States were asked to volunteer to take part, and 
as of mid-2014, eight pilot actions had been launched – focussing on areas including gathering information 
relevant to Dublin responsibility; identifying people with medical needs; unaccompanied minors and others.105 
At the time of writing, no official reports or independent evaluation have been published regarding their 
outcomes. However, initial impressions from stakeholders suggested that the pilots have had a positive impact, 
including through enabling Member States to share expertise and good practice, and to understand the situation 
and challenges in different states. While Member States see clear scope to continue and develop collaboration 
in this way, they also perceive some potential obstacles,106 and will need to determine to what extent and in 
which contexts they wish to develop further joint action. Any proposals to further expand and develop joint 
processing will be required to respect the relevant legal standards, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Experience and discussion to date have thus shown that while there is a general commitment at political level, 
as well as a binding legal obligation in the Treaties, to implement asylum measures and policies in line with 
principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, there is nevertheless some hesitation to take far-
reaching joint action in support of Member States that face significant numbers of arrivals. At present, systems 
for admitting, registering claims and RSD are firmly situated within national law and structures, based on EU 
common standards, and subject to Dublin rules on allocation of responsibility. EASO support and assistance 
from officials of other EU Member States have been provided through technical advice and assistance that 
does not involve direct participation in the asylum process, with positive results.  
While joint processing has been identified as a potential additional way – beyond sharing financial and other 
resources – to provide support and demonstrate solidarity, Member States remain cautious, apparently due to 
a concern that moves toward such arrangements, and to conferring authority on a person or entity which is not 
a part of their own national structures, could undermine in some way national control over processes, or parts 
of processes, that can lead to granting the right to enter and remain in their territory. As such, they could be 
seen as constituting a potential encroachment on Member States’ sovereignty. However, given that the Treaty 
foresees an eventual move in the future to a “common procedure” and “uniform status”, there is arguably 
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already a clear legal basis, if not an obligation, to consider joint processing arrangements and explore their 
further potential. Such examination and exploration can help ensure that EU Member States are more 
effectively able to ensure access to procedures and protection for those in need.  
3.4 Allocation of responsibility for asylum claim processing or solutions 
Responsibility for determining asylum claims made in the EU – and, thereafter, for provision of protection for 
those found to need protection in a responsible state – is determined, under present law and practice, by the 
Dublin system, subject to voluntary actions Member States might take in particular instances. However, some 
initiatives and ideas have been put forward which propose or explore other possible approaches to allocation 
of responsibility for either asylum seekers or people granted protection.  
a. Redistribution of responsibility for asylum seekers 
The legal basis for allocation of responsibility for asylum claims among EU Member States and others taking 
part in the Regulation – Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland – is the Dublin system.  
The many problems associated with the implementation of Dublin have been extensively documented over 
recent years.107 Its impact in undermining trust between asylum seekers and the authorities should not be 
underestimated. Asylum seekers who find themselves in detention or in substandard reception centres often 
wish to move on to other Member States to seek protection, typically to where they have family or other 
connections. The pejorative term ‘asylum shopping’ implies that the motives behind an asylum seeker’s 
decision to apply for international protection in a country other than that of first arrival are the product of an 
inherently rational economic choice. The term is often used to suggest that the asylum seeker is motivated to 
apply in a Member State offering higher material reception conditions and welfare support.108 Yet there is a 
wide array of legitimate reasons for which a person may prefer a specific country: the existence of support 
communities and diasporas, extended family or language affinity are indicative examples.109 Empirical studies 
highlight that asylum seekers’ choice of destination is determined primarily by the presence of family members 
and friends rather than labour market conditions and admission policies.110 As Thielemann observes, there is 
“little evidence for the claim that there is widespread and systematic ‘asylum shopping’ to exploit differences 
in host countries’ welfare provisions”.111 
On the other hand, increasingly restrictive policies do not always have the desired deterrent effects. Asylum 
seekers and other migrants tend to resort to alternative routes offered by smugglers and other illicit actors.112 
The system has a number of other perverse and unintended consequences, and as a means of controlling asylum 
seekers’ behaviour in secondary movements, it fails to achieve its goal. Its persistent use by Member States in 
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many cases where it carries high costs and administrative burdens suggests a punitive motivation, beyond the 
explicit aims of the Regulation. Rather than simplifying the distribution of asylum seekers in the Union, 
evidence seems to suggest that Dublin in many cases incentivises secondary movement.113 Firstly, bearing in 
mind that the criterion of irregular entry and stay forms the prevalent ground for determining the responsible 
country, expert evidence indicates that many applicants are more inclined to enter a first Member State 
undetected and to move irregularly to a second Member State before lodging an asylum claim and being 
fingerprinted in EURODAC, rather than applying in the state of first arrival.114 Secondly, the rule of mutual 
recognition of negative but not positive asylum decisions leaves an applicant with limited options: following 
the decision of the first country of asylum, he or she can either be rejected throughout the entire Union or be 
confined within the boundaries of the Member State that granted him or her protection. Particularly where 
conditions for recognised protection beneficiaries in some Member States are inadequate and fail to meet the 
asylum acquis standards, many asylum seekers are thus inclined to irregularly enter a second Member State 
and make a subsequent asylum claim there before the first Member State decides on their case.115 As the 
findings of the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) suggest, the majority of asylum seekers subject to Dublin 
procedures have in fact irregularly moved across various European countries.116 
Experience to date on legal challenges against Dublin transfers reveals a problematic tendency to attempt to 
insulate decisions from legal challenge, and persist in carrying out returns, in spite of mounting evidence that 
asylum seekers’ resistance to transfer is well-founded. In many cases, asylum seekers have sought protection 
against transfers in domestic and European courts, often making Rule 39 applications to the ECtHR. This long-
standing experience suggests that a different approach to fairness of transfers is urgently required. The strategy 
of attempting to shield transfers from scrutiny by using statutory bars on access to courts, accelerated and 
truncated procedures for Dublin returns, and limiting legal aid are inconsistent with law. Moreover, they lead 
in practice to further legal challenges, greater costs and delay in the asylum process. 
While the basic principles of Dublin have been reaffirmed in the 2013 recast, some Member States would see 
the need for changes to the system.117 The scope and areas for such further adjustment should be explored in 
the European Commission’s forthcoming report on the application of the Regulation to the Parliament and 
Council, which Article 46 requires by 21 July 2016 and which should also propose ‘the necessary amendments’ 
to the Regulation. 
It should be noted that the ECtHR only halts Dublin deportations when there are substantial grounds to believe 
there is a real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. The situation in the Member State concerned 
may be harsh, unpleasant, unsuitable, and yet not meet this threshold. Persisting with Dublin removals despite 
evidence of breaches of EU minimum standards which may not reach the threshold of Article 3 ECHR/Article 
4 EUCFR is highly problematic: such transfers undermine EU legal commitments and authorities ordering 
them knowingly expose asylum seekers to treatment contrary to EU law. 
Ideas around redistributing responsibilities and ‘burdens’ or costs for asylum seekers have been in 
circulation for a number of years, based on objective factors, differing from those referred to in the Dublin 
Regulation, which in some cases take into account the capacity of states to receive, host and process asylum 
seekers, as well as to protect those found to be refugees. The concept was articulated by eminent refugee 
lawyer Atle Grahl-Madsen in 1965, who argued that states should negotiate a predetermined quota-based 
system (based on GNP and population) for distributing responsibility in ways that ensured states would not be 
overburdened.118 Since then, variations of this concept have been formulated in relation to Europe and the 
international refugee protection system but have not been adopted in practice.  
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In the EU context, in 2010, the European Parliament commissioned a study entitled “What system of burden-
sharing between Member States for the reception of asylum seekers?”119 This analysis, which appears to 
be the most comprehensive recent public effort to date to quantify the costs of reception, procedures, detention, 
Dublin and returns, also examined relative capacities and proposed several policy options for redistributing 
such costs among Member States. The study concluded that overall asylum spending by national governments 
was relatively low (“less than what UK citizens spend on pets and pet food” in 2007)120 but noted significant 
differences in the way in which asylum-related costs are recorded and published between states; in the elements 
that are included in cost calculations associated with asylum; and in the standard and scope of service provision 
and other factors that made it difficult to make comprehensive and comparable assessments of sums involved. 
The study concluded with recommendations to undertake various actions that could address the imbalances 
and challenges in some Member States, which essentially included (voluntary) redistribution of asylum 
seekers; waivers of Dublin for Member States “under pressure”;121 greater EU financial support and 
compensation and strengthened capacity-building (including for Member States with low numbers of asylum 
seekers and limited economies of scale). According to the recommendations, redistribution arrangements for 
asylum seekers could have regard to relative, rather than absolute, numbers of asylum seekers, as well as GDP 
and population size, subject to cost/benefit analysis.  
A monitoring framework was also foreseen for oversight of the impact of responsibility-sharing arrangements 
and other aspects of operation of the CEAS, operated by the EASO – an idea which has essentially been taken 
up in the EASO’s information-gathering mandate under its Regulation and the Early Warning Mechanism in 
Article 33 of the Dublin Regulation. The study also suggested that “the costs and benefits of allowing asylum 
seekers free movement within the EU could be explored”, which would be a significant departure from the 
legal framework and preferred policy positions of Member States in 2010 and today.  
Over recent years, several detailed proposals have been developed and discussed around the idea of new 
distribution criteria for asylum seekers, beyond the Dublin framework. Among these, the concept of a 
‘European distribution key’ has attracted interest and support among some Member States.122 The distribution 
key idea for asylum seekers in Europe was developed and discussed in a seminar hosted by ALDE MEPs123 
prior to the Triantafyllides report of 2012, which was subsequently cited in the LIBE Committee’s resolution 
on enhanced intra-EU solidarity for asylum. Inspired by Germany’s Königsteiner Schlüssel, which involves a 
system used to allocate responsibility among the Bundesländer for the reception of asylum seekers, the seminar 
sought to test the feasibility and desirability of such a concept EU-wide. Perspectives from different political 
groups in the Parliament, from the Commission, EASO, national authorities, academia, NGOs and 
international organisations were sought and cautious interest expressed in exploring the idea further. A 
subsequent publication124 sets out those different contributions, and annexes detailed tables listing the potential 
approaches to different distribution criteria, and the results that it would have in numerical terms, compared to 
the existing patterns of arrival and presence in Member States. However, the idea of distribution arrangements 
based on criteria including GDP and population size was taken up only in relation to protection beneficiaries 
– thus failing to address the question of how to redress the perceived imbalances and strains on national asylum 
decision-making systems by existing distribution patterns and Dublin.  
In March 2013, a consortium of NGOs issued a Memorandum on “Allocation of refugees in the EU: for an 
equitable, solidarity-based system of sharing responsibility”.125 With negotiations reaching their 
conclusion on the recast asylum instruments, including Dublin, as well as the new budgetary framework, this 
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proposal sought to inject a new perspective into the debate, proposing that a new criterion be introduced that 
would fundamentally change the Dublin system: that of ‘free choice’ of Member State by the asylum seeker. 
According to the proposal, this element would replace the existing Dublin criterion relating to the first state 
through which the asylum seeker had irregularly entered the EU.126 The first state of entry of the asylum seeker, 
under this proposal, would be required to register his or her arrival and provide a document confirming the 
date, place of entry and other basic data, which the asylum seeker would be expected to present to the 
authorities of the state in which he or she chose to seek protection. In order to redress any imbalances that this 
approach might create between Member States and their respective asylum seeker caseloads, the Memorandum 
foresees that a compensation fund would be established “based on solidarity and fairness” to assist receiving 
states. It was argued that costs would be less than under the current system, given asylum seekers could rely 
on support from family members in the countries in which they had chosen to claim asylum. It also 
acknowledges that Dublin’s low transfer rate means that the majority of claims are de facto dealt with in the 
Member State in which the applicant applies.127 
In November 2013, a Policy Brief was issued by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs 
(also known as its German acronym ‘SWP’) proposing a “multi-factor model” for a quota under a new 
distribution arrangement for asylum seekers.128 The model took into account the economic strength of the 
different Member States, population, size of territory and unemployment rate, each of which could be weighted 
differently. The model purported to be capable of “calculating a fair reception quota” for each Member State, 
based on objective, publicly available official data.129 
The SWP brief proposed in brief terms two possible approaches to implementation of such a quota if it were 
politically accepted and ultimately agreed to in the Council. These involved, firstly, the actual, physical 
redistribution or relocation of asylum seekers in excess of a Member State’s quota to another Member State 
hosting less than its allocated tally. This approach was seen as potentially enabling asylum seekers to pursue 
their asylum claim in the state of their preference (if the quota and national governments concerned agreed on 
transfer in that person’s particular case). Secondly, the possibility could be foreseen of permitting Member 
States to pay compensation, in amounts defined by their respective quotas, to cover the costs of reception and 
processing in Member States which hosted asylum seekers in excess of their allocated number. This, it was 
proposed, could also give Member States the option of retaining the Dublin system as a means for allocating 
asylum seekers in physical terms, while ensuring a fairer distribution of costs through a ‘solidarity’ fund to 
which Member States should contribute in direct relation to their quota proportions.130 
The above proposals, put forward as an alternative basis for allocating responsibility based on criteria linked 
to size, economic strength, population and other factors, have the advantage of taking into account Member 
States’ respective capacities. This dimension was not prioritised when the Dublin system was developed, in 
the Regulation’s predecessor instruments adopted in the early years of the development of the Schengen 
systems, at a time when some of the disparities that pose challenges to fair sharing of responsibility between 
states for asylum were less or figured less prominently in political debates. They nevertheless raise important 
questions and challenges of their own. Reaching agreement among governments on the precise criteria and 
their weighting under such a formula would pose a challenge, as each Member State is likely to be inclined to 
favour a formula that would result in a lower number for itself. The organisational aspects of such an 
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arrangement would also need to be developed, including how one would administer the reallocation of 
individuals through a central EU entity that would determine who goes where, and addressing potentially 
complex questions regarding cost, control and accountability. The distribution key and quota models put 
forward by SWP do not refer explicitly to asylum seeker choice, creating the danger that if they were applied 
without regard to the wishes of asylum seekers, their application subsequently could be subverted in practice 
by asylum seekers who choose to move on from a state to which they have been allocated, essentially defeating 
the purpose of the system and encountering some of the same obstacles to effective implementation of Dublin.  
The ‘free choice’ model proposed by a consortium of NGOs avoids this pitfall. However, it also raises 
questions that could potentially undermine its feasibility. Among these, it is possible that ‘free choice’ might 
result in greater imbalances and less equitable sharing than seen at present, as a small number of Member 
States might prove to be the most frequently chosen destinations. Some Member States express the fear that 
increasing the scope for free movement of asylum seekers, or refugees, would essentially draw most or all 
asylum seekers to the states with the highest living standards and social assistance.131 However, the current 
system already results in extensive secondary movement to those states, notwithstanding its high costs and 
extensive administration. Ascertaining and seeking to address the asylum seeker’s preference would be 
consistent with law and practical realities and address the coercive effects of the system as it stands. 
Outside the EU, James Hathaway and Alexander Neve published a proposal in 1997 based on a collective 
project aimed at rethinking key parts of the refugee protection system.132 Their idea suggested that international 
‘cooperation frameworks’ could be put in place under which states in the ‘global north’ should be prepared to 
contribute financially to the costs of supporting refugees in lower-cost countries. It was suggested that 
industrialised countries would be more prepared to do so if they were able to spend less on reception, 
processing and entitlements to refugees in their own, high-cost economies. In a different model, Schuck argued 
for a system of tradeable refugee ‘quotas’, under which there could be a ‘marketplace’ for refugees that would 
encourage states to trade places in their respective allocations, and obtain the most economically efficient 
outcome.133 However, these approaches have been contested by, among others, Anker, Fitzpatrick and 
Shacknove,134 who argued that the foreseen economic benefits would be unlikely to materialise.135 Moreover, 
under such a framework, once refugees were formally made the responsibility of states in the ‘global south’, 
northern states would not feel sufficiently ‘implicated’ to ensure that the essential funds were provided, with 
the result that the protection and assistance underpinning the entire cooperation framework concept may not 
be guaranteed. 
In more recent years, the notion of ‘tradeable refugee quotas’ has re-emerged in academic discussions in 
Europe. Moraga and Rapoport approached the idea from the perspective of economics, arguing that a market 
could be created for asylum seekers or refugees in the same way markets operate for goods that are in demand 
or for those that are undesirable (e.g. the waste products trade).136 The model they envisaged would generate 
a ‘price’ for Member States to accept and take responsibility for such people, and based on which Member 
States could negotiate to accept more than the fixed quota allocated to them in exchange for financial support 
equivalent to the ‘price’ of those people accepted. Kusomanen137 defended the idea against objections to the 
perceived commodification of the people concerned, as well as the viability of the concept, in light of real 
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world constraints and drivers vis-à-vis the movement of asylum seekers and of political realities surrounding 
the asylum debate. Eiko Thielemann in 2014 has also argued for the idea to be considered further but 
acknowledges the many questions that would have to be answered in order for such ideas to be developed and 
progress towards realistic consideration and application – questions to which there seems currently to be no 
ready replies, nor do states appear interested in engaging.138 
b. Allocation of responsibility for people granted international protection 
In relation to people granted international protection (refugee status or subsidiary protection), the EU 
has undertaken two ERF-funded projects in 2011-2012, known as EUREMA I and II (“European Union 
Relocation from Malta”). These involved the relocation of people found by Malta to be in need of protection 
to other Member States, based on offers from those Member States, and with the consent of the persons 
concerned. The project was launched after calls from Malta for support from other Member States to deal with 
the pressures of integrating significant numbers of people needing protection, exacerbated by Malta’s limited 
geographical and population size, among other factors, and in the wake of increased arrival numbers by sea. 
The Council endorsed the idea in conclusions adopted in 2009,139 and a total of some 500 people were 
transferred to other Member States in 2011-2012, based on referrals from UNHCR and with assistance from 
IOM. However, there were a number of challenges documented in relation to the project, including some 
people who were relocated and subsequently asked to return to Malta. While this was perceived as ingratitude 
by some Member States, a fact-finding report on the projects also documented failures to provide the full range 
of entitlements that had been promised, in relation to support, accommodation and access to schooling for 
children, among other things, as well as the difficulty of settling a small number of transferees in a new 
community with a limited or no diaspora population from the countries or regions of origin of those transferred. 
Some Member States reported legal difficulties due to the lack of a legislative basis for admitting people 
recognised in another Member State, in the absence of mutual recognition rules or an RSD made under their 
own systems. Implied in debate on these issues was a measure of evident concern that the standards of RSD 
in Malta may not be comparable to those of the would-be receiving Member State. The net ‘burden-sharing’ 
impact of the project was also questioned, as the number of asylum seekers transferred to Malta under Dublin 
in 2010 alone was 560 – more than all of those transferred out of Malta under EUREMA in the course of its 
two phases. When the Commission subsequently put forward the idea of establishing a permanent relocation 
scheme,140 it was received positively by the European Parliament,141 but Member States did not respond with 
interest, and the scheme has subsequently not been included in any formal Commission proposal. 
The European Parliament in 2012 adopted a resolution in favour of the “use of an EU Distribution Key for 
the relocation of beneficiaries of international protection, based on appropriate indicators relating to Member 
States’ reception and integration capacities, such as Member States’ GDP, population and surface area and 
beneficiaries’ best interest and integration prospects”. The Parliament noted that this ‘EU distribution key’ 
could be part of the response for Member States facing “specific and disproportionate pressures on their 
national asylum systems or during emergency situations”, and acknowledged that introduction of such a system 
would be “without prejudice to each Member State’s obligation to implement and apply the existing EU asylum 
acquis.”142 The idea of such a key had previously been discussed in the Parliament, but as a possible approach 
to the redistribution of asylum seekers (see above, section 3.4) rather than people found to be in need of 
protection. It would appear that the shift, in putting forward the European distribution key idea in discussions 
on relocation of people already granted protection, was based on significant perceived or actual national 
opposition to an arrangement that would significantly depart from Dublin, in a period when the negotiations 
on the recasts were in a sensitive and difficult phase. Nevertheless, the risk of a clash with the essential 
principles of Dublin remains, given that Dublin implies that not only RSD, but also longer-term responsibility 
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for providing protection, will be that of the Dublin responsible state. The proposal for the distribution key for 
protection beneficiaries, while attracting significant interest in the context of the wider discussions around 
relocation, has not been further developed or specifically proposed for the CEAS agenda to date. 
In September 2014, Austria put forward a proposal for a distribution arrangement for refugees to be resettled 
from third countries, based on the ‘distribution key’ notion used in Germany for asylum seekers and elaborated 
by the SWP (see above, section 3.4(a)). While this proposal was still under consideration at the time of writing, 
and would relate to refugees identified outside the EU rather than those granted status in EU Member States’ 
RSD processes, it confirms that there is interest among Member States in exploring further the distribution key 
notion for people in need of protection.143 
Free movement is a fundamental principle of the EU legal order. As legally present third-country nationals 
with a particularly strong form of status derived from international law, refugees should enjoy free movement 
rights beyond those available at present, bearing in mind that other categories of third-country nationals, such 
as EU Blue Card holders, have extensive entitlements in this area. Enhanced free movement of people 
granted protection in the EU is a potential means of adjusting the distribution of responsibility for refugees 
and subsidiary protection beneficiaries in the EU. While enhanced free movement rights for asylum seekers 
are not likely to be politically feasible – unless the ‘free choice’ model mentioned above (3.4) were to be taken 
up – discussions in 2014 have raised the possibility of enhanced rights for refugees, in the form of discussions 
on possible steps towards mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions. Under the existing law, people with 
refugee or subsidiary protection status have the right to long-term residence after five years, which takes into 
account half of the time during which they awaited an outcome in an asylum procedure.144 Among other things, 
this entails the right, subject to conditions including an independent means of support and/or employment, to 
move and take up residence in another Member State. However, there have been a number of challenges 
observed in relation to implementation of long-term residence for other third-country nationals, highlighting 
the need for further work at national level to achieve the aims of this measure.145 
In this regard, it should be recalled also that Member States carry an obligation under the Refugee Convention 
to seek to facilitate the naturalisation of refugees. Article 34 CSR provides that Member States shall “make 
every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and reduce costs associated therewith”. Yet national 
approaches to granting citizenship to recognised refugees vary widely and in some states can take many years. 
Naturalisation would evidently be another means by which refugees could secure the means to exercise free 
movement rights, and lead to some redistribution of refugee populations in line with market opportunities and 
other factors.  
Echoing an earlier call in the Stockholm Programme,146 in March 2014, the European Commission proposed 
“new rules on mutual recognition of asylum decisions across the Member States and a framework for 
transfer of protection should be developed in line with the Treaty objective of creating a uniform status valid 
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throughout the EU”.147 This proposal, which has been supported subsequently by the Italian EU Presidency 
and several other Member States, with notable exceptions,148 is in need of further elaboration and discussion 
in order to clarify the terms on which it could be acceptable to most or all Member States. Some Member 
States have expressed reservations about mutual recognition, if such recognition would carry with it the right 
to take up residence in other Member States immediately following a grant of protected status, on an 
unconditional basis.149 If this were the case, it is argued that such an arrangement could result in de facto 
redistribution of recognised refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries, but in ways that could place 
uneven pressures on some states, most notably those with high levels of social assistance. The need to ensure 
that asylum procedures and decision-making practice is more harmonised has also been emphasised in the 
context of mutual recognition.  
Thus mutual recognition (or a shorter period before the right to long-term residence is secured) would 
potentially enhance free movement of protection holders and contribute to the achievement of goals expressed 
in the Treaties and reflecting free movement principles which underlie the EU’s development. While it would 
appear to need further development as an idea and discussion with the Member States in order to create the 
conditions for its adoption, it merits careful consideration. 
3.5 Conclusions 
The APD, RCD and Dublin Regulation establish the current legal framework for access, reception and 
allocation of responsibility among Member States for asylum seekers as part of the asylum acquis instruments 
required by Article 78 TFEU. Challenges in their implementation have prompted reflection and efforts to 
identify more effective ways to respond to asylum seeker arrivals at EU Member States’ borders, including in 
situations of large-scale arrivals or where Member States otherwise face challenges to their capacity. 
In 2014, in addition to its various forms of support provided to Member States, EASO’s joint processing pilot 
projects have elicited positive responses from participating states. Although limited in scale and pending 
evaluation, these pilots may provide the basis for exploring further constructive joint initiatives in the area of 
first-line reception and claim registration, among other steps. 
Tragedies at sea and arrivals at southern Member States, including notably in the context of the Mare Nostrum 
operation, have highlighted the importance of more effective approaches to first-line reception. Joint, multi-
actor actions in this field should be developed and undertaken as a means to ensure that obligations towards 
asylum seekers, under EU and international law, are fulfilled. 
Initiatives such as the Praesidium project have highlighted the potential value of multi-actor, proactive and 
interactive approaches, involving state authorities acting with EU support, working together with civil society 
and international organisations. 
While Dublin remains the current framework for allocating responsibility for asylum claims where more than 
one Member State is involved, other approaches have been sought and considered. ‘Free choice’ models have 
been proposed by civil society but are not endorsed by Member States. Ideas around a ‘distribution key’ for 
the EU, put forward by the European Parliament, NGO and academic representatives, by contrast, are of 
interest to some states. Criteria for distribution under such a system would be needed which would have general 
support, and avoid the use of coercion. 
Mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions and transfer of protection have also attracted considerable 
interest. An appropriate model and process for establishing mutual recognition, addressing relevant concerns 
about quality and potential pressures, could ensure greater free movement for recognised refugees, and 
represent progress towards the Treaty objective of a uniform status of asylum, valid throughout the Union. 
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4. Legal Constraints on First-Line Reception, RSD, Joint Processing Schemes 
and Distribution Mechanisms  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 All asylum decisions, including those on identification, referral, reception conditions, special needs, 
distribution, and RSD, are subject to the requirements of fairness, good administration, and effective 
remedies recognised in Articles 41 and 47 EUCFR. 
 Legal responsibility accrues to the Member States and/or the EU on account of actions or omissions that 
entail a violation of international protection obligations. Therefore, any joint processing schemes or 
distribution mechanism that may be adopted should clearly delimit the tasks and duties of each cooperating 
party. 
 The prompt identification and swift referral of asylum seekers to the competent asylum authorities 
constitutes a key priority of the CEAS. On account of the declaratory nature of RSD, it must be borne in 
mind that the mere expression of their wish to apply for international protection makes them applicants, 
without any formalities being necessary. 
 The efficient management of migration flows must not curtail the effectiveness of fundamental rights. 
Rather, Member States are duty-bound to organise their administrations in such a way as to satisfy the 
requirements of their fundamental rights obligations.  
 Access to RSD should be unobstructed, both in law and in practice, and proactively facilitated by properly 
trained and competent personnel and suitable facilities, including translation and legal assistance. Any 
conceivable limitations must meet the requirements of proportionality and be assessed against asylum 
seekers’ right to gain effective access to RSD. 
 First-line reception must be assured from the moment the asylum application is lodged, in such a way and 
providing sufficient funds to guarantee a dignified standard of living and meet any special needs of the 
applicant. In particular, the rights to liberty, family unity, and non-refoulement must be ensured throughout 
RSD, with detention constituting a measure of last resort and enforced Dublin transfers an exceptional 
coercive mechanism, subject to full consideration of humanitarian and other grounds pre-empting removal.   
 Procedures at first instance are subject to good administration and effective remedy guarantees, so as not 
to vitiate RSD or pre-empt the outcome of appeals. Examinations at this stage must be rigorous and 
independent, including a personal interview. Any obstacles regarding time limits, accelerated procedures, 
safety or other presumptions, and evidentiary rules, must preserve the effectiveness of procedural 
guarantees and not render their exercise pointless or exceedingly difficult.  
 Negative decisions are subject to effective remedies and judicial protection, allowing a competent 
authority to deal with the substance of the relevant complaint and to grant appropriate relief. Both access 
to, and the exercise of, appeal rights must be unobstructed and proactively facilitated, especially via 
linguistic and legal assistance. Considering the irreversible damage that may occur, remedies must be 
endowed with automatic suspensive effect, in accordance with Article 13 ECHR and 47 EUCFR. 
 
There is a series of legal constraints to be complied with for the EU and the Member States to meet their 
existing obligations under international and EU law, regardless of which options of ‘joint’ or ‘supported’ 
processing and distribution were to be pursued from those identified in Chapter 3. 
Non-refoulement is a key guarantee, applicable whenever states exercise jurisdiction.150 To ensure that it is 
respected, processes must identify risks and protection needs of those involved.151 The obligation to establish 
fair and effective remedies is recognised under domestic, EU, and international law. Depending on the nature 
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of the process and decision in question, all three sources of legal obligation may be concurrently applicable. 
In addition, the treatment of asylum seekers on arrival is also regulated by the three orders of law. Under EU 
law, the RCD applies as soon as the asylum application is made.152 This is reflective of the generally accepted 
principle that refugee status is declaratory.153 Under that principle, refugees are refugees as soon as they meet 
the requirements of the CSR and are thus entitled to a number of guarantees according to different levels of 
attachment to the host state, including through their physical presence on the territory.154 
This chapter clarifies the content of these standards, to what sorts of decisions and at what stage in the process 
they apply, and how they apply together and interact.  
It should be decided which legal framework will apply to joint processing initiatives within the realm of the 
rule of law, whether it is the current CEAS acquis or a dedicated instrument yet to be adopted. Both the Dublin 
III Regulation and all recast Directives apply within the entirety of the territorial confines of the Member States 
(including on the territorial sea).155 Accordingly, at least until the introduction of more specific arrangements, 
current EU asylum rules are applicable. Moreover, in light of the doctrine of acquired rights, the binding 
character of the EUCFR, and the principle of non-discrimination, it is arguable that future arrangements may 
not be lawful if they entail a lowering of present levels of human rights protection. The relationship between 
joint processing mechanisms and CEAS instruments will have to be worked out, bearing in mind that Member 
States will, in any event, retain their international obligations under human rights and refugee law. 
4.1 Decisions and applicable standards 
What? There are several distinct legal processes and decisions envisaged in this study: identification (of asylum 
seekers within mixed flows); referral (to competent authorities); reception conditions interview (to identify 
specific needs and entitlements of vulnerable persons); RSD; appeal before a court or tribunal; and distribution 
(whether ex ante – if joint processing initiatives are pursued within the remit of Dublin arrangements – or ex 
post – if joint processing is followed in parallel, implying transfers from the joint processing scheme to the 
final asylum country within the EU). All these decisions have legal consequences, and although they are for 
the most part preliminary to the actual final determination of the asylum claim, the legal consequences mean 
that the decisions are in themselves subject to the requirements of fairness and effective remedies. Both the 
relevant EU and international legal obligations will be set out below, so as to elucidate the current legal 
constraints applicable to these decisions.  
Who decides? This study examines options for joint processing initiatives and distribution of asylum 
applications. The chosen option determines which authority reviews the application. Thus the authority could 
be a national or multinational team, EU officials, the UNHCR, or a combination thereof. The type and degree 
of responsibility for rendering decisions depends on the precise nature of the legal authority that makes them.  
The default position in EU law is that of decentralised administration, whereby national officials apply EU 
standards, retaining sole responsibility for their actions or omissions.156 In those cases, domestic, EU, and 
international standards of fairness are applicable. In contrast, if a wholly centralised EU authority takes a 
decision on behalf of the EU itself under EU law, domestic law would no longer bind the decision-maker. 
However, EU standards of fairness would remain applicable,157 and international rules would indirectly 
apply.158 Any responsibility that may be incurred for violations thereof would normally pertain to the EU 
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alone.159 
In the event that an intermediate mechanism is chosen, with national officials supported by officials from other 
Member States or from an EU institution or body such as EASO – without the latter taking the relevant decision 
– legal responsibility for that decision, in principle, remains with the host Member State subject to national, 
EU, and international norms.160 Indeed, in the absence of specific arrangements transferring authority or 
otherwise allowing partner states or organisations to take decisions on their own behalf,161 any violations of 
international obligations could be attributed to the host Member State. This, however, does not entirely exclude 
the responsibility of assisting officials from other Member States, who, by their acts or omissions, may have 
aided the perpetration of the violation in question.162 Moreover, according to the principle of “independent 
responsibility”,163 “[w]here several States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the 
responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act”.164 In turn, acts of EU officials that may 
have contributed to the violation would be imputable to the EU itself and entail its responsibility under 
international law.165 Thus it is essential, before embarking on joint processing schemes, to clearly delimit the 
tasks and responsibilities of each cooperating party, following the prescriptions of the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility and the Responsibility of International Organisations.166 
Where? The examination of asylum claims involves taking legal decisions on which procedures to apply. 
Regardless of where this process takes place, it entails the exercise of legal authority. Domestic standards often 
apply to decisions of the public authorities irrespective of where those decisions are taken. Under international 
human rights law (IHRL), the key concept of ‘jurisdiction’ is used to clarify that human rights standards only 
apply where states exercise ‘effective control’ over persons or territory. In practice, this means that when legal 
decisions are made extra-territorially they remain subject to states’ international human rights obligations, as 
a result of the ‘effective control’ paradigm.167 In contrast, if authorities are 'implementing' EU law, irrespective 
of where that exercise of public authority takes place, EU standards of fair procedures and effective remedies 
will always be applicable, regardless of whether the ‘effective control’ threshold under IHRL is considered to 
be met.168 This means that EU obligations are potentially wider than those under IHRL. 
All of the joint processing options identified in Chapter 3 would take place on the territory of EU Member 
States. In this situation, there is no question that the decisions are within their ‘jurisdiction’ (in the sense the 
term is used in IHRL). If EU law is applied, EU standards of fairness and effective remedies, as enshrined in 
general principles and the EUCFR, apply as well, even where EU legislation does not make express provision 
thereto.169 
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4.2 Identification and referral 
Upon arrival in EU territory, the priority must be to identify any asylum seekers amongst mixed flows wishing 
to apply for international protection. To this end, it should be born in mind that a request made in any manner 
whatsoever by a third-country national “who can be understood to seek refugee status or subsidiary protection” 
is sufficient for identification purposes,170 and it is in fact the mere expression of their wish to apply for asylum 
that makes them asylum applicants,171 with no further formalities being necessary to that effect. This is in line 
with the declaratory character of refugee status, given that refugees are such ab initio, independently of RSD.172 
Applications must then be registered without delay.173 The recast APD has codified the obligation to “ensure 
that a person who has made an application for international protection has an effective opportunity to lodge it 
as soon as possible”.174 Thus the act of making an asylum application (by any means) is not coterminous with 
(formally) lodging it. Although the lodging of an application may be subject to some formalities, such as filling 
a form or submitting it in person, these should not be excessive or unreasonable. On the contrary, they should 
be adapted to the particular situation of the applicant (whether particularly vulnerable or with special needs) 
and the specific circumstances of the case (on account of whether the encounter with state authorities happens 
at the border, on land, or in the territorial sea). Access to determination procedures must in every case be 
unobstructed, both in law and in fact.175 
An additional requirement ensuing from this obligation is that of ensuring that state authorities likely to make 
first contact with asylum seekers receive specific training on how to deal with applications for international 
protection176 and are given clear and unequivocal instructions to refer applicants to the competent authorities 
immediately.177 They should, in particular, be able to provide applicants with all the necessary information as 
to where and how their applications may be lodged,178 as well as relevant details concerning reception 
conditions,179 Dublin decisions,180 and any measure restricting their right to liberty.181 
To facilitate communication and render the information understandable to those concerned in good time and 
form, it is essential that professional translation services are available.182 It is therefore questionable whether 
limitations on the obligation to provide timely information in understandable form inscribed in Article 8 of the 
recast APD, which may be confined to asylum seekers held in detention or present at the border, is justified. 
As pointed out in the introduction to this study, considering that there are no means of legal access to the 
territory of the Member States for the purposes of seeking asylum, it should be expected that asylum seekers 
make their way into the EU irregularly as a rule.183 On account of the ‘non-penalisation principle’ enshrined 
in Article 31 RSC, combined with that of non-discrimination established in Article 3 of the same instrument, 
it is unclear why refugees encountered elsewhere in the territory of the Member State concerned should not 
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equally be provided with the necessary details to enable them to lodge an application or that these be provided 
only ‘on request’.184 It is also unclear how access to the necessary information may have any impact on security 
or public order, as it appears to be assumed.185 
The efficient management of migration flows or border-crossing points must not curtail the effectiveness of 
fundamental rights.186 Rather,187 Member States are duty-bound to organise their asylum systems and their 
administrations at large in a way such as to enable them to satisfy the requirements of their fundamental rights 
obligations.188 Any conceivable limitations have to pursue a legitimate aim, be strictly necessary, and meet the 
requirements of proportionality.189 Above all, they shall be assessed against the background of asylum seekers’ 
right “to gain effective access to the procedure for determining refugee status”,190 which must remain a 
“practical and effective” entitlement.191 
4.3 First-line reception 
Key fundamental rights, including the principle of non-refoulement, the right to family unity, and the needs 
and entitlements of particularly vulnerable groups must be adequately catered for, in conformity with current 
legal standards. 
Once refugees (who, again, are only declared as such by RSD) have applied for international protection, they 
must be provided treatment and facilities in accordance with the RCD without delay.192 Article 1 EUCFR 
explicitly requires the respect and protection of human dignity, “preclude[ing] the asylum seeker from being 
deprived – even for a temporary period of time after the making of the application for asylum… – of the 
protection of the minimum standards laid down by that directive”.193 In particular, material reception 
conditions, comprising housing, food, clothing, and a daily expenses allowance194 must be provided in such a 
way and amount as to ensure a dignified standard of living, adequate for the health of applicants, and capable 
of guaranteeing their subsistence.195 Excessive demand or the saturation of reception facilities do not constitute 
“a justification for any derogation from meeting those standards”.196 Member States have indeed an obligation 
to establish and maintain their reception capacity, in accordance with their positive fundamental rights 
obligations, irrespective of the number of applications. 
In this respect, national authorities must have regard “to the preservation of the interests of persons having 
specific needs”.197 In particular, reception arrangements “must be sufficient to preserve family unity and the 
best interests of the child”,198 which constitute a primary consideration.199 The recast RCD provides for a 
general obligation of Member States to take into account the specific vulnerabilities of applicants with special 
needs, including minors, elderly persons, pregnant women, and victims of torture, trafficking, and other forms 
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of violence.200 A comprehensive assessment must be carried out as soon as possible, so as to account for their 
special requirements,201 including any necessary health care and assistance.202 Considering the importance of 
the interests at stake, the applicant him- or herself should be able to make submissions on his or her own 
behalf.203 Thus a personal interview by competent personnel204 constitutes an unavoidable requirement to 
ensure accuracy in the identification of special needs.205 On the other hand, vulnerability assessments should 
not become an additional source of complexity, unduly delaying access to RSD. 
That same evaluation should serve to specify whether any “special procedural guarantees” are required to 
ensure effective access to the asylum procedure206 – the introduction of a separate, parallel process to that 
contemplated in Article 22 of the recast RCD should be avoided, not only for reasons of procedural economy, 
but also to pre-empt contradictory outcomes. The necessity of gender-sensitive,207 minor-friendly,208 or other 
special arrangements should be determined at this stage.209 Errors in the determination of the needs of the 
applicant, albeit not explicitly contemplated in the recast instruments, remain subject to judicial review and 
effective remedy standards under Article 47 EUCFR. 
In any event, special needs evaluations should be undertaken against the background principle that all asylum 
seekers belong to a “particularly vulnerable group” in need of special protection, as discussed in Chapter 1.210 
With this consideration in mind, it is crucial that their plight is not unnecessarily compounded. Therefore, 
coercive and punitive measures, including detention, shall constitute the exception and not the general rule.211 
An asylum seeker must not be held in detention “for the sole reason that he or she is an applicant [of 
international protection]”.212 The exhaustive grounds for detention as well as the conditions and guarantees 
contemplated in the recast RCD must be thoroughly complied with, providing in particular for speedy judicial 
review.213 So as to ensure the mental and physical well-being of applicants and respect for their fundamental 
right to liberty, detention must be “a measure of last resort”, adopted only in exceptional circumstances relating 
to strong reasons in the individual situation, in accordance with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality,214 when alternatives to detention cannot be applied effectively in the particular case.215 
Reporting duties and other options must be considered first. And situations of de facto deprivation of liberty, 
through detention at the border or in transit zones, or via assigned residence, must be avoided and submitted 
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to the same type and degree of scrutiny. All measures entailing a restriction on free movement remain subject 
to appeal rights and effective remedies.216 
Throughout the duration of the asylum procedure, asylum seekers are entitled to remain in the Member State 
concerned217 for the purposes of the procedure and to determine their right to international protection.218 The 
limitation introduced in Article 9(1) of the recast APD, circumscribing this entitlement to the period “until the 
determining authority has made a decision…at first instance” may lead to a violation of the principle of non-
refoulement. As elaborated below, the Strasbourg Court has mandated that appeals against decisions entailing 
the expulsion of the applicant be endowed with “automatic suspensive effect”, which translates into an 
obligation to extend asylum seekers’ right to remain until such time as it has been determined by a final judicial 
decision that removal is safe.219 
Under the Dublin system, a number of additional guarantees must be taken into account to respect 
fundamental rights, enhance fairness, and minimise coercion. Any transfers should bear in mind the particular 
needs and entitlements of asylum seekers generally and of those with specific vulnerabilities especially. Within 
this group, unaccompanied minors with no family members in another Member State, as a rule, “should not 
be transferred to another Member State”.220 The primary objective shall be to ensure prompt access to 
determination procedures, without unnecessarily prolonging the Dublin phase.221 By virtue of Article 24(2) of 
the Charter, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in all decisions concerning them, 
including those regarding Dublin transfers.222 
Nothing prevents the extension of this reasoning, linking vulnerability to exoneration from removal, to other 
cases. In other words, ‘Dublin without coercion’ can and should be implemented under the current legal 
structures. In particular, there may be instances in which persons may be unfit to travel due to illness, 
pregnancy, or trauma, whereby enforced transfer may in itself constitute a breach of the non-refoulement 
guarantee.223 
Humanitarian considerations also play a role in the correct application of Dublin discretionary clauses. 
According to the CJEU, these should be interpreted broadly, so as to preserve their effectiveness and the overall 
objectives of maintaining family unity and allowing prompt access to RSD.224 Therefore, where there is a 
situation of dependence of the asylum seeker on a relative, or vice versa,225 provided that family ties existed 
already in the country of origin,226 Member States are “normally obliged to keep [or bring] those persons 
together”.227 Such an obligation may only be derogated from on account of ‘exceptional’ circumstances.228 
In cases where these considerations are of no application, Dublin transfers remain subject to non-refoulement 
prescriptions. When there are substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker may face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm upon arrival in the Member State responsible under Dublin rules, the transfer cannot 
take place.229 Whether the risk stems from ‘systemic flaws’ in the asylum procedure or the reception conditions 
of that Member State or whether it has a different origin is not decisive, contrary to what the CJEU’s recent 
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case law appears to imply.230 According to Article 52(3) EUCFR, in so far as the Charter contains rights that 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, their meaning and scope shall, in principle, be ‘the same’. 
Following the Charter Explanations, the rationale is “to ensure the necessary consistency between the Charter 
and the ECHR”, which means, in particular, that “the level of protection afforded by the Charter may never be 
lower than that guaranteed by the ECHR”.231 Hence, Article 4 EUCFR must be deemed to afford at least the 
same kind and degree of protection against refoulement as does Article 3 ECHR. And, in any event, Dublin 
transfer decisions remain subject to appeal and effective remedy guarantees.232 
4.4 Fair procedures (at first instance) 
To guarantee the effectiveness and legality of first instance procedures, including via joint processing 
initiatives, they must be endowed with adequate procedural guarantees. Identification and referral are key steps 
in ensuring access to asylum procedures, but there are additional safeguards that are required as well. 
According to the Strasbourg Court, the delivery of “insufficient information for asylum seekers about the 
procedures to be followed, [the absence of a] reliable system of communication between the authorities and 
the asylum seekers, shortage of interpreters and lack of training of the staff responsible for conducting the 
individual interviews, [as well as] lack of legal aid” must be considered “shortcomings in access to the asylum 
procedure” that state parties have to avoid.233 States must offer a “real and adequate opportunity” to individual 
applicants to advance their claims.234 Legal assistance and interpretation are thus essential, already at first 
instance, to ensure the appropriate conduct of proceedings.235 
Asylum proceedings require “independent and rigorous scrutiny” of all factors relevant to the case.236 The 
competent body “must be able to examine the substance of the complaint and afford proper reparation”,237 
including by direct examination of the applicant at a personal interview.238 Decisions must be served in 
writing, following a legal procedure previously established by law, specifying the underlying reasons alongside 
the means and conditions to mount an appeal.239 
Where the competent body is not a court, several conditions must be met to ensure its impartiality, such as 
“whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, 
whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent”.240 
Time limits and similar restrictions on access to RSD “should not be so short, or applied so inflexibly, as to 
deny the applicant…a realistic opportunity to prove his or her claim”.241 Despite the fact that excessive duration 
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may render RSD inadequate242 and possibly run counter to the right to good administration,243 expediency 
should not be at the expense of a full and complete examination.244 Therefore, although prioritised or 
accelerated procedures are not prohibited per se, the effectiveness of procedural guarantees requires the 
provision of sufficient time for applicants to defend their applications.245 The automatic acceleration of certain 
types of claim, such as those submitted at the border or in transit zones, or considered a priori inadmissible or 
unfounded, without regard to the particulars of the case must be avoided. Nor can acceleration entail a 
reduction of basic guarantees or lead to a cursory examination.246 In particular, pursuant to the principle of 
non-penalisation of refugees contained in Article 31 CSR and on account of the absence of legal channels to 
enter the EU and seek asylum,247 no negative inference should be deduced from the lack of identity or travel 
documents, so as to automatically lead to accelerated or abridged RSD. 
Evidentiary rules must also respect the effectiveness of procedural safeguards. The assessment of any risks 
of refoulement must be undertaken ex nunc, without attaching excessive importance to whether evidence is 
submitted outside time limits. New elements that may influence the decision on the case have to be taken into 
consideration.248 While it is ‘in principle’ for the applicant to adduce evidence on refoulement or persecution 
risks,249 national authorities are not allowed to remain passive in this respect. General information on the 
prevailing situation in the country of envisaged return constitutes ‘prima facie evidence’ that states cannot 
disregard.250 The level of proof required should equally be non-excessive. As discussed in the Introduction to 
this study, asylum seekers often come irregularly using false documents or without documentation. Asking the 
applicant to produce ‘concrete evidence’ is disproportionate, as it increases the burden of proof “to such an 
extent as to hinder the examination on the merits”. Applicants must therefore simply establish the ‘arguable 
nature’ of their claims.251 Then it is for the state to dispel any doubts as to their veracity.252 
Presumptions of safety must be subject to rebuttal.253 Consequently, to apply safe third-country measures,254 
states “must make sure that the intermediary country’s asylum procedure affords sufficient guarantees to avoid 
an asylum seeker being removed, directly or indirectly, to his country of origin without any evaluation of [the 
relevant] risks”.255 Detention and living conditions as well as standards of treatment in the third country 
concerned are also relevant.256 And the applicant “should not be expected to bear the entire burden of proof” 
in this context either.257 State parties must ‘verify’ the purported safety of the third country themselves.258 
Where information about the circumstances in the country of return is widely diffused, it may be presumed 
that they already “know or ought to know” about it.259 In those circumstances “it cannot be held against the 
applicant that he did not inform…of the reasons why he did not wish to be transferred” to the third country 
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concerned.260 As a result, if the presumption of safety is unwarranted, the transfer must be suspended ex officio, 
on the determining authority’s own motion. 
Accordingly, admissibility procedures and rules categorising claims as unfounded or manifestly unfounded 
applications on the basis of general assumptions on safety may unduly bar access to RSD procedures.261 
Considering the irreparable nature of the damage that can be caused to the applicant in case of mistaken 
decisions, the obligation to ensure a full and comprehensive examination of the merits of an ‘arguable claim’ 
cannot be dispensed with.262 Only repeat applications may justify a departure from this rule, in case the first 
application were subjected to close and rigorous scrutiny and no new elements have arisen since.263 Otherwise, 
automatic dismissals or summary examinations are incompatible with basic procedural guarantees at first 
instance, recognised under EU and international legal standards. 
4.5 Effective remedies 
The right to effective judicial protection constitutes a general principle of EU law.264 Effective remedies must 
be available to those whose applications have been rejected at first instance or have otherwise received a 
negative decision.265 How the effectiveness of remedies is to be guaranteed in the context of joint processing 
or distribution schemes needs to be considered, as the rules contained in Articles 13 ECHR and 47 EUCFR 
remain applicable.  
The purpose of effective remedy guarantees is to ensure the availability of a legal means to enforce 
fundamental rights, allowing a competent authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant complaint 
and to grant appropriate relief.266 That authority does not “necessarily have to be a judicial authority; but if it 
is not, its powers and the guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it 
is effective”.267 In particular, the scope of review must indeed be such as to allow it “both to deal with the 
substance of the relevant…complaint and to grant appropriate relief”.268 
Taking account of the ‘irreversible nature of the damage’ that may result if the risk of refoulement or 
persecution materialises, an effective remedy “imperatively requires close scrutiny…as well as a particularly 
prompt response”,269 including a full and ex nunc assessment of facts and law.270 
Like first instance guarantees, to be effective, remedies must also be legally and materially accessible.271 
Therefore, time limits and other restrictions must not render the exercise of appeal rights ‘impossible or 
excessively difficult’.272 What is more, the state is required to take active steps to make them accessible in 
practice, especially “where asylum seekers are concerned”. In particular, when the applicant lacks the means 
to pay a lawyer, free legal aid and representation as well as linguistic assistance must be provided.273 As 
will be discussed in Chapter 5, this is in stark contrast with the serious shortcomings of the legal aid regime 
codified in the recast APD. 
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As a corollary, effectiveness “requires that the remedy may prevent the execution of measures whose effects 
are potentially irreversible”.274 It would render the remedy pointless, if such measures were executed before 
the competent authorities had examined their compatibility with the rights to asylum and to non-refoulement.275 
Therefore, effective remedy guarantees require access to appeals “with automatic suspensive effect”,276 
provided for as such in law, without administrative or other practical arrangements being sufficient to that 
effect.277 Considering the possibility of erroneous refusals, suspension ‘on request’ or even ex officio on a case-
by-case basis, as contemplated in the provisions of the recast APD and the Dublin III Regulation, is not 
enough.278 
 
  
                                                   
274 Conka v Belgium, para 79. 
275 EUCFR, Articles 18 and 19. 
276 Gebremedhin v France, para 66; MSS v Belgium and Greece, para 393. 
277 IM v France, paras 132, 134-135; AC v Spain, para 95. 
278 AC v Spain, para 94. Cf. APD, Article 46(5)-(8) and Dublin III Regulation, Article 27(3)-(4). 
48  GUILD, COSTELLO, GARLICK, MORENO-LAX & MOUZOURAKIS 
 
5. Designing Fair Procedures and Ensuring Effective Remedies: a Proactive, 
Interactive Approach  
KEY FINDINGS 
 A proactive, interactive approach to asylum procedures requires fairness to be assured from the outset, to 
ensure trust between asylum seekers and host states. 
 Taking into account that all asylum seekers are legally vulnerable, assessing specific vulnerabilities should 
not add further procedural complexity. Rather, we urge a preliminary vulnerability assessment, taking into 
account all possible sources of vulnerability, and moving swiftly on to substantive RSD. 
 In the absence of safe legal access to Europe, it is crucial that punitive approaches to irregular entry are 
avoided, in accordance with Article 31 CSR. Irregular entry should not affect the assessment of the asylum 
claim. 
 Detention of asylum seekers should be a last resort, only to be contemplated upon specific strong reasons 
in the individual case and where alternatives to detention are not available. 
 Front-loading holistic advice and legal support is crucial to establishing trust and quality first-instance 
decisions, thereby reducing appeals and judicial reviews. General legal information is no substitute for 
legal representation. 
 Manifestly well-founded procedures are beneficial both to asylum seekers and host communities. We urge 
reform of the Temporary Protection Directive and recognise the potential of further examining group 
determination procedures. 
 Good institutional design requires a multi-actor approach to foster accountability and expertise. 
 Joint processing arrangements could help improve the asylum system if they alleviate coercion and 
complexity. All depends on the detail and institutional context. 
 Coercion in the allocation of responsibility is likely to exacerbate ‘burden’ rather than distribute it fairly.  
 
This chapter builds on the analysis of the legal constraints outlined in the preceding chapter, and will set out 
some practical methods to ensure that first reception, joint processing, and distribution processes and 
decisions are fair and subject to effective remedies. 
Before turning to the specificities of the forms of joint processing and distribution, the general principles and 
concerns set out in Chapter 1 are recalled. In particular, ways are sought to avoid the costs of coercion and 
complexity and to design institutions that work cooperatively as far as practicable with asylum seekers, 
facilitating swift determination of their claims. 
Much of this chapter focuses on avoiding the perverse procedural practices that have come to be normalised 
across Europe and even spread to other regions.279 Asylum procedures in Europe have become excessively 
coercive and complex, to the detriment of both asylum seekers and states. Rather than an exceptional 
mechanism, the Dublin system builds in coercive transfer to countries presumed safe in the face of strong 
evidence to the contrary. Before examining new mechanisms for joint processing and distribution, the current 
shortcomings should be clearly identified. As this study stated at the outset, there is no point in adding extra 
layers of complexity in the name of efficiency or burden-sharing. 
The notion of effective judicial protection and an effective remedy before a court or tribunal is inherently ex 
post: Once a decision is taken, it is envisaged that the right to challenge that decision is available as an 
important way to ensure the legality and fairness of that decision. However, the work of ensuring fairness must 
be built into processes from the outset; an ex ante approach to fairness is crucial from an institutional design 
point of view. Effective remedies against bad decisions are important and an unavoidable element of fairness, 
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but they are not enough. The law also requires public authorities to ensure fairness at first instance;280 
something which can also reduce or avert the need for legal challenges, to the benefit both of the state and 
applicants. 
This chapter accordingly develops a proactive, interactive approach to fairness and effective remedies, in 
keeping with the overlapping domestic, EU and international standards that are applicable. By a proactive 
approach we mean an approach to fairness and effective remedies that aims to ensure fairness from the 
beginning of the process and integrate fairness in all aspects of the procedures. Rather than seeking to limit or 
constrain access to effective remedies, it aims to ensure fairness from the outset, and therefore minimise the 
need for court challenges against bad decisions. By an interactive approach, we mean one that takes into 
account the crucial trust-building role of first encounters between asylum seekers and public officials, and the 
importance of minimising coercion. It is important not only that procedures be fair, but that they are perceived 
to be fair by asylum seekers. 
RSD, the core of the QD and APD (including in their recast versions), depends on effective communication 
between the authorities and the asylum seeker, so first contact must help ensure trust and understanding. 
Building trust not only into intra-EU Member State relations, but crucially also into the interaction between 
states and asylum seekers, is key to the success of the CEAS. Many asylum seekers arrive after traumatic 
experiences in their home countries and undergoing perilous journeys. Their first encounters with the 
authorities are crucial to their own well-being and also to maintain their cooperative disposition relative to the 
asylum process. Any procedures must bear in mind that many will be traumatised and wary on arrival.  
5.1 Principles of institutional design 
This study is premised on the importance of minimising coercion and complexity in asylum procedures; and 
acknowledging that the population of asylum seekers comprises many vulnerable irregular entrants to the EU. 
a. Assessing all asylum seekers’ vulnerability 
As discussed in the Introduction to this study, the APD and RCD contain different notions of vulnerability, the 
determination of which has various potential legal consequences. Often, these different situations of 
vulnerability are based on past experiences. But how are asylum seekers to prove their past experiences? The 
recast APD envisages that those asylum seekers with special needs should be identified, and then should not 
be subjected to accelerated procedures, for instance. Yet, assessing vulnerability based on past experiences 
adds an extra layer of procedural complexity, potentially also undermining efficiency. 
APD contains some striking improvements, not least in streamlining the process for both refugee status and 
subsidiary protection, a move most Member States had made in any event. And the leeway for special 
procedures has been in some respects reduced. However, the new ‘special needs’ notion is ill-defined, and 
some of the provisions on unaccompanied minors, although immensely detailed, are also opaque and complex. 
There is a perversity in acknowledging that some asylum seekers are more vulnerable than others in terms of 
their ability to navigate procedures and addressing it by introducing greater procedural complexity.   
Instead, we urge a preliminary vulnerability assessment, which takes into account all possible sources of 
vulnerability and moves swiftly on to the substantive asylum determination.   
b. Ensuring non-punitive approaches to irregular entry 
The fact that asylum seekers are often irregular entrants has three principal implications in practice: They are 
often subject to punitive measures as irregular entrants; they may have been harmed or traumatised along their 
journeys; and they may be misinformed about asylum and asylum procedures. These features each may hamper 
access to asylum. If they are detained for irregular entry, they may be unable to make a prompt asylum claim 
or access suitable advice and support. If they have been harmed or traumatised along their way, they may 
continue to be vulnerable on arrival, facing communicative problems and lacking trust in the authorities. If 
they lack appropriate information or advice, their first contacts with the asylum authorities are likely to be 
unproductive and may not allow them to provide all the information necessary to inform assessment of their 
status. 
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As long as safe, legal access to asylum in Europe is lacking, it is crucial that punitive approaches to irregular 
entry are avoided.281 Under Article 31 CSR, states commit not to penalise asylum seekers for illegal entry, 
provided they make their claims without delay. In spite of clearer rules in the recast RCD, which only permit 
detention on six exhaustive grounds (determining the applicant’s identity, risk of absconding, deciding on the 
applicant’s right to enter the country, preventing the applicant from frustrating the enforcement of a return 
decision, national security grounds, and applying the Dublin Regulation) and as a last resort if alternative 
measures cannot be applied,282 many EU Member States continue to detain irregular entrants on arrival. The 
recast APD contains important rules which aim to ensure that those in detention can claim asylum, but those 
rules are yet to enter into force in many Member States, and in any event will be difficult to implement in 
practice.283 Once in detention, sources of information and support are invariably fewer, and vulnerable 
migrants in particular may lack the communicative abilities or access to the authorities to claim asylum.       
An appropriate application of Article 31 CSR would limit or prevent imposition of ‘penalties’ on asylum 
seekers for irregular entry, while adherence to the RCD and 2012 UNHCR detention guidelines would require 
states to use alternatives to detention where possible.284 Both these moves in turn would enhance access to 
asylum. Accordingly, detention of asylum seekers on arrival should be used only as a last resort. There is 
generally no good reason for it. Only where there are specific strong reasons in the individual case, and 
alternatives to detention will not be effective, should detention even be contemplated for asylum seekers with 
pending claims. Alternatives must be put in place. 
A further consequence of irregular entrance is within the RSD process itself. States often treat lack of 
appropriate documentation as a basis for drawing negative inferences or imposing accelerated procedures.285 
When age or nationality are contested (as is often the case in asylum processes), lack of documentation is 
usually at issue. As discussed previously, refugees often lack documentation as they may not have had any in 
their country of origin or may have been advised by smugglers to destroy their papers. In any event, it impedes 
effective RSD to treat lack of documentation as dispositive. Article 4(5) QD acknowledges that documentary 
proof should not be demanded in all cases and Article 31 RSC that refugees should not, as a rule, be penalised 
for irregular entry. 
c. Avoiding unnecessary complexity and delay 
i. Front-loading advice, support and administrative resources 
In order to conduct effective asylum determinations, streamlined procedures will be key and should move 
relatively swiftly to determination of the substantive asylum claims. In order for that to be possible, asylum 
seekers, often after traumatic experiences and journeys, require advice and support. 
The rationales for front-loading advice and support are several. Clearly, it is more efficient to ensure 
recognition of claims at the outset, rather than have those with protection needs wait in legal uncertainty and 
incur the costs associated with lengthy processes. It is unfair to them and also disadvantageous for host 
communities. Integration would be facilitated by earlier recognition. Needless to say, front-loading should also 
be less costly for the state in terms of administrative resources. If the state is also concerned to remove those 
whose claims are rejected, then a more reliable, well-understood and fair first instance procedure would also 
be preferable, in that it would foster greater trust between asylum seekers and the state, particularly if it is 
facilitated by legal and other relevant forms of advice.    
Asylum seekers often arrive ill-informed about their rights and the legal process they face. A small study 
comparing the experiences of asylum seekers and refugees in Toronto and Geneva found striking differences 
in terms of their knowledge and understanding of the RSD process, largely due to different sources of 
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information, advice and support.286 Early access to legal information, advice and representation was the norm 
in Toronto. As well as their own lawyers, the interviewees lived in shelters that provided extensive holistic 
support, with regular information sessions on topics including but not confined to legal rights and obligations. 
In contrast, in Geneva, legal representation was rare, and usually lawyers were only contacted at the appeal 
stage, if at all. Social workers tended to feed partial information to asylum seekers and long delays were 
common. These factors led to strikingly different experiences of the asylum system, notwithstanding the 
similar aggregate recognition rates for refugees in Canada and Switzerland. 
ii. Front-loading legal support 
Front-loading legal information, advice and representation (collectively referred to as legal support) at the 
outset is a crucial aspect, necessary to ensure that asylum seekers explain their claims properly, and understand 
the reasons for decisions affecting them. It also helps ensure better first instance decisions, thereby reducing 
appeals and judicial reviews. 
Front-loading legal support should be seen as a component of a fair asylum procedure rather than an isolated 
requirement. Early legal support encourages asylum seekers to develop trust in the asylum system and view 
the procedure as a collaborative rather than adversarial process.287 Trust is fundamental to ensuring the asylum 
seeker’s cooperation with the asylum authorities and could reduce the risk of absconding. In that light, through 
the use of early legal support, Member States could avoid coercive measures such as detention. 
Moreover, the provision of early legal support contributes to sounder decisions during the procedure, thereby 
reducing costly and lengthy appeals. The Solihull Front-loading Decision-making Pilot conducted in 2007-
2008 by UNHCR in the context of its Quality Initiative Project could be seen as a vivid illustration of the value 
of front-loading in the asylum process. UNHCR’s findings identified improved quality in the procedural 
aspects of decision-making as a result of early provision of legal advice; namely, more evidence was made 
available to decision-makers by applicants before the first instance decision.288 
Legal representation, however, differs considerably from legal information. However detailed and precise, 
information about the asylum process does not amount to the assistance provided by a qualified legal advisor 
enabling the asylum seeker to support his or her case throughout the different stages of the application. 
Accordingly, it is regrettable that the Recast APD opts for “legal and procedural information free of charge”,289 
rather than, as the Commission had proposed, free legal representation.290 However, this does not rule out 
innovative methods to deliver cost-effective legal representation at the outset of the asylum procedure via legal 
NGOs and other qualified organisations.  
The availability of legal aid has direct impact on front-loading legal advice. A study on the provision of legal 
advice in the UK, Ireland and Estonia, conducted by Anderson and Conlan, concluded that restrictions on legal 
aid have adversely affected the provision of appropriate early legal advice.291 
iii. Manifestly well-founded procedures 
Manifestly well-founded procedures are beneficial to all. If asylum seekers have strong protection claims, 
recognising these swiftly is beneficial not only to the asylum seekers, but also to host communities.  
The recast APD allows acceleration of claims when they appear based on strong grounds at the outset.292 With 
asylum seekers from countries such as Syria and Eritrea, a manifestly well-founded approach would seem 
warranted to ensure that decisions are made swiftly. Unfortunately, the APD also allows the deadline for 
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deciding on claims to be postponed (Article 31), subject to the overall time limit of 21 months, “where the 
determining authority cannot reasonably be expected to decide” during the prescribed time limits under Article 
31(3), “due to an uncertain situation in the country of origin which is expected to be temporary”. If read too 
broadly, this could introduce further delay into asylum procedures.   
It also further reduces the likelihood of triggering the Temporary Protection Directive,293 a measure with many 
important features and with the capacity to enhance access to protection in the EU.  
iv. The Temporary Protection Directive 
The Temporary Protection Directive provides for a special protection mechanism which confers a status that 
is a “‘middle ground’ between that of an asylum seeker and a Convention refugee”.294 Beneficiaries are entitled 
to housing, social welfare, medical care and access to education, as well as access to the labour market under 
certain conditions.295 While persons covered by the Directive remain entitled to apply for asylum, the power 
of Member States to withdraw temporary protection while the asylum claim is examined may act as a 
disincentive to apply.296 
However, the Directive’s mechanism is only triggered by “a mass influx of displaced persons from third 
countries”, which is established by a Council Decision adopted by qualified majority based on a Commission 
proposal.297 
The Temporary Protection Directive also aims to “promote a balance of effort between Member States in 
receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving such persons”.298 The Directive rests on the principle of 
double voluntariness, thereby requiring the consent of both the recipient state and the individuals concerned 
before temporary protection beneficiaries may be relocated from one Member State to another.299 
The failure to invoke the Temporary Protection Directive to date suggests some changes to its trigger 
mechanism are required. However, we strongly urge that it be reformed rather than replaced. The alternative 
is reflected in some states’ current reactions to Syrian asylum seekers: while some are recognised as refugees, 
others receive ad hoc forms of national temporary protection or even have delayed making asylum 
determinations altogether. 
v. Other forms of group determination 
Manifestly well-founded procedures and the Temporary Protection mechanism share the tendency to identify 
refugees on a group basis, potentially based on their origins. In this connection, further examination should be 
given to other forms of group determination, which would be more efficient and fair when protection needs 
are clear.300 
d. Accountability and expertise: a multi-actor approach 
A further important principle of good institutional design is to ensure appropriate accountability and expertise. 
A multi-actor approach, where overall tasks and responsibilities are agreed and well-defined beforehand, is 
the best way to do this.  
In particular, effective identification of asylum seekers, as well as categories of people with specific needs and 
vulnerabilities, is a key priority. Those seeking protection, bearing in mind their inherent vulnerability, should 
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be identified as soon as possible and referred to appropriate facilities and processes. In addition to competent 
Member State authorities, a range of other actors can and should be involved in first-line reception and 
identification, including civil society, semi-governmental and international organisations, in line with their 
particular mandates, experience and areas of expertise. These can potentially ensure that the specific needs of 
people such as unaccompanied children, those who have experienced torture or trauma, victims of sexual or 
gender-based violence and others can gain access to relevant facilities and participate effectively in relevant 
procedures.  
Furthermore, a multi-actor approach will also help enhance accountability and transparency. To ensure that 
joint processing schemes are fair and transparent, and function appropriately and according to the rule of law, 
accountability channels should be contemplated. Monitoring by Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the EU 
Ombudsman, the Council of Europe (CoE) Commissioner for Human Rights, or the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT) should be unobstructed. In addition, dedicated monitoring regimes could be 
devised, entrusting NGOs and/or UNHCR with the main responsibility for running them. Reporting duties to 
the EASO and the EU institutions, including the European Parliament, should also be introduced. 
One such model for first-line reception arrangements for those arriving at sea borders, proposed by UNHCR 
in September 2014,301 merits further consideration from Member States and EU institutions. 
5.2 Joint processing  
‘Joint’ or ‘supported’ processing arrangements could help improve asylum systems, if they help alleviate 
unnecessary coercion and complexity, and assist in better decision-making and enhance reception capacity. 
All depends on the detail and institutional context. In particular, while moving officials may seem like a good 
way to enhance processing capacity, the benefits of joint processing seem more related to allowing officials to 
interact and learn from each other and see systems in different states operate. While this is beneficial as a 
learning experience for officials, and it may plug short-term gaps in reception and processing capacity in 
particular states, it is no substitute for the host state’s adequately investing in its own system.  
Notably, in the responses to our surveys, several respondents detailed the benefits of joint processing in terms 
of (1) improving the quality of asylum procedures by prioritising applications that are likely to be well-
founded, and (2) supporting Member States that cannot sustain large numbers of applicants. In its survey 
response, EASO identified benefits to Member States: exchanging best practices, contributing to a common 
understanding ultimately leading to mutual trust. 
As piloted by the EASO in a series of projects in 2014, it appears that some informal moves towards joint 
processing may help provide additional resources, personnel and expertise to assist Member States in 
addressing particular aspects of the asylum process. Carried out with the aim of promoting and ensuring high 
standards of practice, such activities could help achieve the objective of enhanced access to fair procedures 
and other entitlements. Effective monitoring systems could assist in ensuring that such activities are in line 
with relevant standards and in bringing added value.  
Targeted support for Member States’ capacity may be needed in certain situations, where arrivals create 
particular strain or ongoing gaps or weaknesses may need to be addressed. The range of tools available from 
the EASO, including permanent, special and emergency support, should be fully utilised by Member States, 
with the encouragement of other Member States and institutions where necessary. Early Warning and 
Preparedness arrangements, under Article 33 of the Dublin Regulation and under the EASO Regulation,302 
should be employed as necessary tools for ensuring that problems do not develop into situations of crisis or 
systemic deficiency in which asylum seekers’ rights are violated.  
To provide for more far-reaching ‘joint processing’ arrangements, going beyond the pre-interview stage in the 
asylum process to any substantive legal step, amendments would be required to existing EU and national 
legislation. It is unclear what the benefits of further centralisation of decision-making would be for refugees. 
Moving towards a uniform status for refugees would be beneficial, but mutual recognition of positive asylum 
determinations would have the same aim for them. Minimising the protection lottery across the EU is desirable, 
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but not convergence for its own sake. Again, depending on the form and aims of these moves, they could be 
beneficial. 
5.3 Distribution mechanisms 
At the beginning of this study, we set out an ethical and pragmatic commitment to minimise coercion in any 
allocation mechanism. This will not amount to a system of ‘free choice’ for asylum seekers but rather one 
where, as part of the preliminary process, alongside an assessment of vulnerability, options for where they can 
have their claim formally examined may be considered. At the outset, we propose a ‘Dublin without coercion’ 
model, where the family and humanitarian clauses of Dublin are used more appropriately and liberally, 
following the CJEU’s guidance in K and MA. The Dublin interview, currently legally required, provides the 
opportunity to give effect to allocation without coercion. 
The workability of distribution mechanisms depends largely on the background context. Dublin does not work, 
as recognition rates and reception conditions vary vastly across the EU, and asylum seekers often have 
established preferences as to where they wish to claim asylum. Accordingly, only the unlucky few are 
transferred against their will, but the suffering inflicted is often disproportionate, as condemned in MSS and 
NS & ME by the European courts. 
Current distribution mechanisms in the EU have long-lasting consequences for the asylum seeker. Not only 
does the allocated country determine the likelihood of the asylum claim being recognised or not, but even if 
recognised there is at present no positive mutual recognition of asylum decisions.303 Unless the refugee meets 
the requirements of the Long-Term Residents Directive, the allocation of responsibility for the asylum claim 
determines not only the chances of recognition as a refugee but also where he or she will be effectively required 
to live indefinitely. Under these circumstances, any allocation system will come under significant strain if it is 
at all coercive, as asylum seekers resist its imposition. 
Accordingly, much of this study aims to urge to enhance reception and processing capacity. If reception and 
processing capacity across the EU were improved, some ‘secondary movements’ could be minimised. 
The distribution criteria discussed in Chapter 3 serve to impart an understanding of how the asylum ‘burden’ 
is distributed across the EU. These measurements are useful and important in demonstrating which states host 
most asylum seekers relative to their reception capacity (however this is calculated). However, even if it is 
discovered that some states are doing more than their fair share, we do not move from this conclusion to one 
where asylum seekers are redistributed coercively. Transferring asylum seekers is in itself a costly process, 
likely to exacerbate the ‘burden’ rather than distribute it fairly. The options of sharing resources, financial and 
bureaucratic, are therefore usually preferable. 
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6. Possible Solutions: Giving Meaning to Solidarity and Fair Responsibility 
Sharing  
KEY FINDINGS 
 Ensuring greater compliance with EU and international legal standards in the reception and treatment of 
asylum seekers and RSD is an essential requirement for ensuring access to protection for those who are 
entitled to it in the EU. 
 Proactive and interactive approaches to first-line reception and RSD must be developed and strengthened, 
involving actors including civil society and international organisations, as well as national authorities and 
EU bodies, to ensure that rights are respected and high-quality RSD decisions can be made. 
 Focussing on arrangements for redistribution of asylum seekers, particularly involving coercion, creates 
the risk of diverting resources and attention from the central task of improving the operation of national 
systems, and the risk of developing new ideas that might also fail to prevent secondary movement or ensure 
respect for acquis standards. 
 The Dublin system should be reconfigured and applied in a way that avoids the use of coercion and enables 
the preferences of asylum seekers to be taken into account. Member States must maintain capacity to 
respond on a flexible basis to foreseeable asylum seeker caseloads, but the possibility for voluntary transfer 
of asylum seekers to other states where demand is overwhelming should exist. 
 Joint processing arrangements can provide a means to enhance the operation of national asylum systems, 
and the potential for further cooperation should be closely examined where it can enhance efficiency and 
compliance with legal standards. 
 Mutual recognition is a step towards establishing a uniform status of asylum, as required by the Treaties. 
This idea, along with effective implementation of existing legal arrangements that can facilitate free 
movement of refugees, should be pursued.  
 
Any discussion of new or alternative approaches and reinforced access to fair and effective asylum procedures 
should start from the need to ensure more effective observance of the legal standards in the EU acquis for 
reception, access and provision of international protection. The current EU norms, recently affirmed and 
strengthened through a number of new procedural and substantive guarantees in the recast process, are not 
respected in full in all Member States. Systemic deficiencies in reception and asylum processes, as well as 
failure to fulfil asylum seekers’ and protection beneficiaries’ rights in a number of areas, are among the main 
reasons why those seeking or in need of protection move on to other Member States. This is acknowledged in 
judgments of European and Member State courts in many cases relating to Dublin,304 as well as policy 
discussions at EU level. 
In this context, focussing predominantly on changes to rules and arrangements for allocating responsibility for 
claims could divert attention from the overwhelming challenge: namely, ensuring compliance with and respect 
for the rights of asylum seekers to adequate reception and procedural standards, and of refugees and subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries to the entitlements that their protected status entails. While this is a complex, 
politically sensitive, costly and multifaceted task, it would solve many or all of the current problems around 
the implementation of Dublin, secondary movement, solidarity among states and violations of individuals’ 
rights. Thus while this study seeks to make recommendations for more effective ways of ensuring that 
responsibility among states is allocated and fulfilled, it emphasises first and foremost the central importance 
of providing sufficient, high-quality reception standards and procedures for determining protection needs. This 
must be a key priority for European states and for the EU in order to ensure the ongoing viability of the CEAS 
and national asylum systems and the availability of international protection in the Union as required by 
European, national and international law. 
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6.1 Access to asylum systems: Institutional design and principles  
In order to ensure swift access to effective first-line reception and asylum claim determination arrangements, 
the following are identified as important elements: 
 Rather than creating additional exceptional and specialised procedures for particular categories of 
arrivals, national systems and the CEAS should strive for more consistent and effective observation 
of basic safeguards and defined standards for reception, identification and access to asylum 
procedures, through a proactive and interactive approach. The experience of implementation of 
existing asylum laws shows that introducing further complexity, processes or channels is not likely to 
result in swifter procedures at higher standards. Thus the emphasis should rest on achieving access to 
efficient and high-quality mainstream reception and procedures. 
 Resources and priority should focus on ensuring that all Member States are equipped, encouraged, 
supported and, where necessary, compelled to fulfil their obligations to provide adequate reception 
conditions and fair and effective claim determinations. A proactive and interactive approach should 
be encouraged to ensure high-quality, accurate decisions as swiftly as practicable at first instance, 
without expediency curtailing the effectiveness of rights and basic procedural guarantees. To this end, 
among other measures, national asylum authorities are encouraged to invest in institutional capacity, 
training (based on and potentially extending beyond their acquis obligations) and quality assurance 
activities. Practical cooperation, including as facilitated by EASO, should also aim at ensuring 
excellence in asylum decision-making, and EU financial support should also target relevant areas of 
need at national level. 
 Targeted support of Member States’ capacity may be needed in certain situations, where arrivals create 
particular strain or ongoing gaps or weaknesses may need to be addressed. The range of tools available 
from the EASO, including permanent, special and emergency support, should be fully utilised by 
Member States, with the encouragement of other Member States and institutions where necessary. 
Early Warning and Preparedness arrangements, under Article 33 of the Dublin Regulation and under 
the EASO Regulation, should be employed as necessary to ensure that problems do not develop into 
situations of crisis or systemic deficiency in which asylum seekers’ rights are violated.  
 Elements identified in redistribution arrangements that have been proposed to date could potentially 
be considered in assessing the need for appropriate measures to address capacity problems. These 
include territorial size, population, economic strength, reception capacity and others, including as 
related to the level of development of the asylum and reception systems – while also ensuring that 
Member States have strong incentives to invest in and operate well-functioning systems. Such 
concepts should not and cannot take the place of committed national efforts to consistently strengthen 
the operation of their systems, including through proactive and interactive approaches and bringing to 
bear the skills of multiple actors where feasible. 
 ‘Joint’ or ‘supported’ processing arrangements, including as piloted in relation to specific aspects of 
the asylum process by the EASO in a series of projects in 2014, would appear to have potentially 
important capacity to provide additional resources, personnel and expertise to assist Member States in 
addressing particular elements in the process. Carried out with the aim of promoting and ensuring high 
standards of practice, such activities could help achieve the objective of enhanced access to fair 
procedures and other entitlements. Effective monitoring systems are also important to ensure that such 
activities are in line with relevant standards and bringing added value. Joint arrangements should also 
encompass cooperation on reception, including sharing of expertise and good practice, but also 
potentially material resources where necessary and appropriate. A multi-actor approach, involving 
civil society and international actors as well as state officials and EU bodies, can further ensure 
transparency and the availability of a broad range of skills to address needs.  
 Further development of joint processing arrangements may have value in a number of contexts 
including, but not limited to, emergency or particular pressure situations. Close consideration should 
be given to taking forward such cooperation in ways that will not necessarily require changes to 
legislation in the short term. The question of whether legislative change may bring added value may 
nevertheless warrant reassessment in the future if such arrangements continue to bring benefits, and 
more far-reaching joint action on a European level would be desirable. These may also in the longer 
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term contribute to efforts to establish a common procedure as well as a uniform status of asylum, as 
required by Article 78 TFEU. 
 Effective identification of asylum seekers, as well as categories of people with specific needs and 
vulnerabilities, is a priority. Those seeking protection, bearing in mind their inherent vulnerability, 
should be identified as soon as possible and referred to appropriate facilities and processes. In addition 
to competent Member State authorities, a range of other actors can and should be involved in first-line 
reception and identification, including civil society, semi-governmental and international 
organisations, in line with their particular mandates, experience and areas of expertise. These can 
potentially ensure that the specific needs of people such as unaccompanied children, those who have 
experienced torture or trauma, victims of sexual or gender-based violence and others can gain access 
to relevant facilities and participate effectively in relevant procedures. One such model for first-line 
reception arrangements for those arriving at sea borders, proposed by the UNHCR in September 2014, 
merits detailed consideration from Member States and EU institutions. However, any such system 
must avoid the use of coercion. 
EU funding support for Member States’ asylum systems and initiatives must be strategically used and target 
areas of real need, including in relation to strengthening first-line reception and identification arrangements to 
ensure that obligations are met and legal standards of treatment and protection are fulfilled. EU funding should 
not be a substitute for investment of national resources; but where required, its use should be designed to 
ensure maximum positive impact. New provisions in the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund should be 
applied effectively to ensure greater flexibility, stakeholder involvement and responsible and sustainable use 
of EU funds. To this end, effective monitoring arrangements are critical. The European Parliament is 
encouraged to take an active role in monitoring and ensuring accountability for the use of EU funding. 
6.2 Allocation of responsibility: Dublin without coercion 
The allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers among Member States under the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) is currently governed by the Dublin system. While Dublin has been referred to as a 
‘cornerstone’ of the CEAS,305 the serious problems associated with its implementation in practice are widely 
documented.306 Utilising criteria for distribution that do not relate to the capacity of Member States to receive 
asylum seekers, and have limited connection to factors of concern to asylum seekers,307 the system in many 
cases does not produce outcomes that are fair or sustainable for states or asylum applicants. Its human costs 
are well-known and the available evidence appears to indicate that its high costs are disproportionate to the 
low numbers of actual transfers that Member States are able to effect in practice.308 
The complexity and delays involved in Dublin processes mean that the system fails to achieve its expressed 
aims of identifying the Member State responsible for an asylum claim in a timely manner.309 Persistent high 
numbers of applicants moving between Member States or claiming protection in more than one Member State 
also demonstrates its failure to achieve the implicit aim of preventing secondary movement, sometimes 
characterised pejoratively and simplistically as ‘asylum shopping’.  
Among the reasons for failure to achieve these goals is the fact that current implementation of the system is 
heavily reliant on coercion. Coercion is accorded central importance because of the absence of internal borders 
within the EU, which creates the possibility of physical movement by asylum seekers between Member 
States.310 Detention is thus employed on a widespread and in some cases nearly systematic basis, to increase 
                                                   
305 Dublin III Regulation, Recital 7; Stockholm Programme, section  6.2. 
306 ECRE (n. 13); JRS (n. 13). 
307 While the Dublin Regulation requires responsibility to be allocated based on family connections as a priority 
(Articles 8, 9 and 10), in practice these criteria are used in the minority of cases. By contrast, the criterion relating to the 
first state of irregular entry or stay (Article 13) is the most frequently-applied basis for allocating responsibility. See 
also above, Chapter 3.  
308 See above, Chapter 2. 
309 Dublin Regulation, Recitals 4, 5. 
310 Groups of people staying without shelter close to the French city of Calais, seeking to reach the UK, illustrates 
powerfully the phenomenon of movements within the EU of asylum seekers and other people who have entered the EU 
irregularly, and are not willing to remain in other countries that Dublin would designate for them. See H. Muir (2014), 
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the prospects of successful transfer of asylum seekers to the states Dublin designates as responsible for their 
claims, because the great majority of transfers (or attempted transfers) are contrary to the asylum seeker’s will.  
Coercion in the distribution of asylum seekers effectively leads to violation of fundamental rights and creates 
unacceptable hardship. If reception conditions are inadequate, then people are forced, as a result of the 
operation of the system itself, to move, as the only alternative to enduring unacceptable conditions, including 
in some cases inadequate sustenance, no shelter, and exposure to the risk of violence, exploitation and other 
grave risks. 
The Dublin system is built on an implicit presumption that asylum seekers will be able to enjoy access to 
similar standards of treatment and rights in all participating states, but this goal, which is also the objective of 
the CEAS as a whole, is yet to be achieved in practice. The lack of trust that asylum seekers have for the system 
– and for the likelihood that it will ensure them of access to similar standards of treatment and rights in all 
participating states – means that secondary movements persist, contrary to Dublin’s implicit aim of preventing 
what is characterised negatively and simplistically as ‘asylum shopping’. In many cases, Member States are 
unwilling or unable to comply with its provisions.311 
The 2013 recast of the Dublin Regulation sought to address some of the gaps and problematic aspects of the 
Regulation’s implementation, including through strengthened procedural safeguards and shorter deadlines to 
reduce delays, among other things. However, to ensure more effective and sustainable allocation of 
responsibility and respect for rights in practice, there remains a need to reconfigure the system to remove, or 
at least significantly reduce, its coercive and punitive elements. This could be achieved through a number of 
steps: 
 More sustainable and fairer allocation of responsibility in line with fundamental rights could be 
achieved to a significant extent through strengthened implementation of the recast Regulation, in line 
with its objectives,312 as well as of other asylum acquis instruments, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and other obligations under international and European human rights law. As propounded by the CJEU 
in MA and K, wider use of Dublin’s family-related responsibility criteria, as well as provisions on 
dependent persons and discretionary grounds (including as related to humanitarian elements, family 
or cultural considerations), requiring states to keep or bring together relatives and other people with 
relationships and other meaningful links to a particular Member State, could all contribute to greater 
cooperation on the part of asylum seekers.  
 Member States are required, under the RCD, to provide reception conditions in line with the legally 
defined standards and of sufficient capacity.313 It must be possible for Member States to provide for 
regular levels of demand on an ongoing basis, and to build in flexibility and contingency or standby 
arrangements to adapt to fluctuations in numbers, given the inherently shifting and unpredictable 
nature of asylum flows. As noted in Chapter 2, while the numbers of asylum seekers increase and 
decrease from year to year, particularly at national level, the longer-term numbers are generally stable. 
Where there is a genuine situation of pressure that is clearly beyond the capacity of the Member States 
to respond, there should be scope in the system for Member States to make arrangements to provide 
support and agree among themselves to provide for the needs of individual or specific groups of 
asylum seekers. This might be of particular importance where a hosting Member State does not have 
the facilities to meet the specific reception needs of an asylum seeker, such as specialised medical 
treatment or counselling. Done on a consensual basis between the Member States and with the asylum 
seeker, the costs and delays of such arrangements should be limited. While this should be available as 
an exceptional arrangement to address a particular gap, Member States should in principle seek to 
ensure that they have flexible adequate capacity to address all foreseeable needs.  
                                                   
“The Migrant Crisis in Calais Shows the EU’s Failure to See the Big Picture”, The Guardian, 5 September. Available 
from: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/05/migrant-crisis-calais-eu-europe?CMP=twt_gu>. 
311 In 2014, many asylum seekers entering through Italy declined to be fingerprinted, and Italian officials did not have 
the legal or practical means to compel them to provide them involuntarily. See Italian Refugee Council (2014), AIDA 
Country Report: Italy, April. Available from: <http://www.asylumineurope.org/files/report-
download/aida_nationalreport_italy_second_update_final_0.pdf>, 26-27. 
312 See Dublin Regulation, Preamble, Recitals 4, 5, 13, 14. 
313 RCD, Articles 17(1)-(3); see also Articles 12, 14 and 18.  
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 Furthermore, states must take account of the preferences of asylum seekers when determining 
responsibility for asylum claims. The recast Dublin Regulation’s requirement for a personal interview 
which relates to Dublin affords an opportunity for Member States to take note of a particular asylum 
seeker’s objective to have his or her claim assessed in a particular state, and his or her reasons, and 
explore the matter with the concerned other Member State, on account of their respective obligations 
under the Dublin III Regulation itself and other relevant fundamental rights and refugee law standards.  
 In 2015, the European Commission is expected to conduct a review of the Dublin Regulation.314 At 
that time, remaining gaps should be addressed to ensure that rights are respected, and to encourage 
Member States to maintain adequate, sufficient reception capacity, and make available, where needed, 
additional places or support where it may be required. 
 Member States must not allow the inadequacies of their reception and RSD systems to become a factor 
which forces asylum seekers to move elsewhere in the Union to gain access to a fair and effective 
asylum process.  The question of sharing responsibility for asylum seekers must first of all be 
determined on the basis of a level playing field where genuinely CEAS compliant first-line reception 
is available to all asylum seekers no matter where they make their first application for asylum.  
 All Member States are required to operate a system meeting EU standards with sufficient flexbility to 
meet the needs of asylum seekers, including the average and reasonably foreseeable numbers, with 
flexibility to deal with high levels of demand in periods of pressure. If a Member State, in accordance 
with the statistical evidence on average asylum applications in that Member State, experiences a 
particularly high level of demand, then a system to facilitate the voluntary and non-coercive movement 
of asylum seekers who wish to do so, in full knowledge of the relevant reception conditions, should 
be available.  
 Following a grant of international protection, there may be circumstances in which the holder has an 
interest in taking up residence in another Member State. The 2011 amendment to the Long Term 
Residents’ Directive ensured that people who are granted protection may receive long-term residence 
after five years (including half of the time during which their claim was under consideration), with 
associated greater rights as regards mobility in the Union. In addition, states are also encouraged to 
consider other grounds on which a refugee or subsidiary protection holder may seek to reside in 
another Member State, such as family reunification, study or employment. While a legal basis for 
mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions is not yet explicitly included in the acquis framework, 
at the time of writing, the idea is under discussion among Member States and institutions.315 
Stakeholders are encouraged to consider closely the possibilities as this may also contribute to the 
means for achieving a more sustainable, equitable distribution of responsibility for protection in line 
with the rights of people in need of protection. 
  
                                                   
314 European Commission (n. 140), 7. 
315 European Commission (n. 3). 
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7. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This examination of the CEAS regarding first-line reception, processing (joint and otherwise) and distribution 
of asylum seekers in the European Union has revealed a number of clear findings and challenges. The obvious 
conclusions are perhaps the simplest to enumerate though are not among the easiest to reconcile with the 
various political demands of some actors. 
The first conclusion that must be drawn from the statistical data on asylum in the European Union is that, far 
from welcoming refugees in accordance with the size, wealth (notwithstanding the 2008-2013 recession) and 
capacities of the Member States, from 1999 to 2014 the EU received a diminishing number of asylum seekers. 
An EU of 15 Member States received more asylum seekers (and had higher recognition rates for persons in 
need of international protection) than an EU of 28 Member States in 2013. While there have been some changes 
in the main countries of origin of asylum seekers, the asylum demands in respect of the major origin countries 
of asylum seekers in the EU must be viewed in light of our knowledge of world events in the countries of 
origin. Discourse on ‘mixed flows’ has obscured the fact that many of those who claim asylum are from 
refugee-producing countries. At the moment the situation of those fleeing Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan is 
particularly devastating. That these countries are among the main countries of origin of asylum seekers in the 
EU cannot surprise anyone. That Eritrea and Somalia will most probably still be major sources of asylum 
seekers in the EU should equally be unsurprising. 
Secondly, the major crisis of the CEAS in recent years has to do with reception conditions. The incapacity or 
unwillingness of some Member States to utilise the European Refugee Fund to put in place adequate reception 
facilities or the failure to deliver reception conditions on the ground, irrespective of whether ERF funds were 
allocated and received, is the most visible of failures regarding reception. Decisions of both the CJEU and the 
ECtHR on reception conditions in some Member States, in particular NS/ME and MSS v Belgium and Greece, 
have unequivocally documented these failures. There have been considered opinions of the UNHCR on 
reception conditions in various Member States and reports produced by the most reputable international human 
rights non-governmental organisations on the failure of reception conditions in a number of Member States. 
At the same time, the CEAS remains underpinned by pervasive shortcomings in RSD, which have been equally 
criticised by the ECtHR. Failures in providing fair procedures are linked to institutional obstacles to asylum 
seekers’ effective access to the process and excessively complex procedures, which undermine trust between 
protection seekers and the asylum system. 
Thirdly, discussions around distribution of asylum seekers across the EU and the inequalities of demands on 
Member States for first-line reception of asylum seekers could serve as a distraction from the fundamental 
need for the creation and maintenance of both qualitatively acceptable and quantitatively appropriate reception 
conditions. When asylum seekers, who as a result of EU law almost inevitably arrive irregularly in the EU, 
come to some Member States, they are not offered the reception conditions that the CEAS promises them. If 
such reception conditions were made available both in quality and quantity across the EU, then secondary 
movements of asylum seekers would likely be much reduced. 
Fourthly, the Dublin I, II and III system for responsibility-sharing of asylum seekers can be applied in a way 
consistent with reasonable and human rights-sensitive reception of asylum seekers in the EU. A key 
shortcoming of the Dublin system is the use of coercion, which often creates perverse incentives for irregular 
movement and for avoiding the asylum process altogether. ‘Dublin without coercion’, that is, using Dublin to 
allocate responsibility in light of asylum seekers’ preferences after a cooperative assessment, reflects an 
appropriate reading of the Dublin III reform, in line with CJEU and ECtHR pronouncements and the applicable 
international protection obligations at EU and international level. The Dublin system results in the movement 
of about 3% of asylum seekers in the EU from one Member State to another. The use of coercion in the Dublin 
system has led to an inexorable increase in costly and ineffective detention of asylum seekers in a manner that 
defies the logic on the ground. Why some asylum seekers are detained for months while others in practically 
identical situations are not is fundamentally incompatible with the principle of rule of law. Arbitrary and 
unforeseeable detention of asylum seekers coupled with a high degree of coercion, and in far too many cases 
violence, is the inevitable outcome of a Dublin system based on the use of coercion to achieve extremely low 
numbers of outcomes, which however entail the unacceptable, if not degrading or inhuman, treatment of those 
concerned.  
Fifthly, it is the very rationale of the internal market conceived of as an area of free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital, coupled with the Schengen system of no border controls among participating 
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Member States, that is inimical to the Dublin coercive system. Coercion could be avoided through an 
application of the Dublin Regulation that is based on the EUCFR and takes account of asylum seekers’ choices. 
In light of the above conclusions, the following recommendations are made: 
1. More ‘Dublin without coercion’ offers more sustainable and fair allocation of responsibility in 
line with fundamental rights. This could be achieved to a significant extent through more 
principled implementation of the recast Dublin Regulation, in line with its objectives, as well as 
of other asylum acquis instruments, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and other obligations under 
international and European human rights and refugee law. Wider use of Dublin’s family-related 
responsibility criteria and provisions on dependent persons and discretionary grounds (including 
as related to humanitarian elements, family or cultural considerations), requiring Member States 
to keep or bring together relatives and other people with relationships and other meaningful links 
to a particular country, could contribute to this and lead to greater cooperation on the part of 
asylum seekers. The European Parliament should require the Commission to closely monitor 
Member State practices in this regard and promote the application of Dublin rules in line with 
fundamental rights. 
 
2. Member States are required, under the RCD, to provide reception conditions in line with the legally 
defined standards and of sufficient capacity. It must be possible for Member States to provide for 
regular levels of demand on an ongoing basis, and to build in flexibility and contingency or standby 
arrangements to adapt to fluctuations in numbers, given the inherently shifting and unpredictable 
nature of asylum flows. As noted in Chapter 2, while the number of asylum seekers increases and 
decreases from year to year, particularly at national level, longer-term figures are generally stable. 
Where there is a genuine situation of pressure, which is clearly beyond the capacity of the Member 
States to handle, there should be scope in the system for Member States to make arrangements to 
support each other and agree among themselves to provide for the needs of individual or specific 
groups of asylum seekers. The European Parliament should require the Commission to reinforce 
its efforts to ensure that Member States have in place at all times first-line reception arrangements 
of both quantity and quality as required by the Directive to receive and provide for asylum seekers. 
 
3. Furthermore, Member States must take account of the rights, needs and preferences of asylum 
seekers when determining responsibility for asylum claims. The recast Dublin Regulation’s 
requirement for a personal interview affords an opportunity for Member States to take note of a 
particular asylum seeker’s preference to have his or her claim assessed in a particular Member 
State, together with his or her reasons, and explore the matter with the other Member State(s) 
concerned. The European Parliament, in cooperation with relevant actors, including EASO, the 
Commission, and the UNHCR, should be informed and be able to follow up on the application of 
Dublin rules in line with the MA and K rulings. 
 
4. In 2015, the European Commission is expected to conduct a review of the Dublin Regulation. 
‘Dublin without coercion’ offers a better way to implement the Dublin system right now. Deep 
reform would be appropriate at that stage, to ensure that fundamental rights are respected, and to 
prohibit excessive. The European Parliament should be an active player in this process, requiring 
the Commission to provide all necessary data to that effect.  
 
5. The key to fair and equitable distribution of asylum seekers across the EU is getting right the 
institutional design of the CEAS at both EU and national level. Such an institutional design must 
be based on the front-loading of the system, a proactive, interactive approach to fairness, and the 
establishment across the EU of successful asylum reception and RSD. The institutions must be 
flexible and robust to deal with variations in demand, and must be multi-actor; state authorities 
must work harmoniously with civil society actors, non-governmental organisations, etc., to ensure 
that asylum seekers have confidence in the asylum system and in particular the first-line reception 
conditions available to them. The European Parliament, in cooperation with the Commission and 
EASO, should promote multi-actor dialogues to foster cooperation at the different levels of 
government and administration of the CEAS. 
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6. Coercion against asylum seekers must be excluded from any distribution system if that system is 
to be fair and equitable. It is the use of coercion and institutions of coercion against them, as 
asylum seekers often correctly perceive it, which has contaminated the RSD systems of far too 
many Member States. This coercion undermines trust, which not only creates disaffection and 
despair, but also undermines effective RSD. The European Parliament should request that the 
Commission and Member States examine as a matter of urgency the justifications and specific 
application of coercion to asylum seekers in the EU, so as to provide for alternatives in line with 
the Charter of fundamental rights and international protection standards. 
 
7. The swift determination of asylum claims requires proper and effective first-line reception and a 
multi-actor institutional framework. Where asylum applications are hastily refused on the basis of 
inadequate information, that refusal will often be difficult to correct. In far too many cases appeals 
and review cannot correct poor first instance decisions. One of the most significant reasons state 
authorities take poor decisions at first instance is because first-line reception is inadequate or 
unavailable, so asylum seekers are unable to navigate the process. The frequency of subsequent 
applications, in turn, is to a large extent due to the failure of authorities to enable asylum seekers 
to properly engage with the asylum process from the outset, as condemned by courts of highest 
instance, including the ECtHR and the CJEU. This is not a fair and just procedure and contrasts 
fundamentally with basic principles of good administration. The European Parliament should 
demand that the CEAS requirements of good administration and a fair procedure be carried out 
fully and comply with the RCD and the EUCFR.  
 
8. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has pointed out that asylum seekers, by legal 
definition, are vulnerable. They are not entitled to work, to reside, except in a temporary capacity, 
or to engage in the normal activities of people living in a state. They live in conditions of 
uncertainty and anxiety. This vulnerability creates positive obligations for the EU and the Member 
States and must not be instrumentalised by national policies to demonise asylum seekers and their 
claims to international protection. The European Parliament should require the Commission to 
investigate ways to mitigate the vulnerability of asylum seekers through a proper and complete 
implementation of the CEAS requirements, in accordance with the recast RCD and APD. 
 
9. Resources and priority should focus on ensuring that all Member States are equipped, encouraged, 
supported and, where necessary, compelled to fulfil their obligations to provide adequate reception 
conditions and fair and effective claim determinations. A proactive and interactive approach 
should be encouraged to ensure high-quality, accurate decisions as swiftly as practicable at first 
instance. To this end, among other measures, national asylum authorities are encouraged to invest 
in institutional capacity, training (based on and potentially extending beyond their acquis 
obligations) and quality assurance activities. Practical cooperation, including as facilitated by 
EASO, should also aim at ensuring excellence in asylum decision-making, and EU financial 
support should also target relevant areas of need at national level. The European Parliament 
should, via targeted dialogues with Member States, EASO and other relevant actors, and through 
its budgetary powers if necessary, make sure that sufficient resources are invested by the EU and 
the Member States to ensure the CEAS is effective and complies with fundamental rights and 
refugee law standards. 
 
10. Targeted support to Member States’ capacity may be needed in certain situations, where arrivals 
create particular strain, or where ongoing gaps or weaknesses may need to be addressed. The range 
of tools available from the EASO, including permanent, special and emergency support, should 
be fully utilised by Member States, with the encouragement of other Member States and 
institutions where necessary. Early Warning and Preparedness arrangements, under Article 33 of 
the Dublin Regulation and under the EASO Regulation, should be employed as necessary to ensure 
that problems do not develop into situations of crisis or systemic deficiency in which asylum 
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seekers’ rights are violated. For this purpose, the European Parliament should actively engage in 
any Early Warning and Preparedness arrangements that may be adopted in cooperation with the 
Commission, EASO, and other relevant actors.  
 
11. Elements identified in redistribution arrangements that have been proposed to date could 
potentially be considered in assessing the need for appropriate measures to address capacity 
problems. These include territorial size, population, economic strength, reception capacity and 
others, including as related to the level of development of the asylum and reception systems – 
while also ensuring that Member States have strong incentives to invest in and operate well-
functioning systems. Such concepts should and cannot take the place of committed national efforts 
to consistently strengthen the operation of their systems, including through proactive and 
interactive approaches and bringing to bear the skills of multiple actors where appropriate. The 
European Parliament, in cooperation with the Commission, EASO, the UNHCR and other 
stakeholders, should monitor evolution in the development and maintenance by Member States of 
their reception systems in line with the relevant EU and international standards and foster mutual 
support via appropriate solidarity tools of those facing particular pressures. The European 
Parliament may also propose the introduction of structural changes or mechanisms to redistribute 
responsibility in accordance with specific difficulties and capacities of the Member States 
concerned. 
 
12. Multi-actor involvement in first-line reception includes not only state actors but also non-
governmental organisations, supranational actors and civil society actors. In order to limit 
secondary movement of asylum seekers and to ensure that there is a full and comprehensive 
examination of every asylum application made in the EU, the confidence not only of the national 
authorities but also, critically, of the asylum seekers must be earned. Far too many national asylum 
bodies are associated with or nested in ministries responsible for police and criminal justice. Far 
too often, authorities responsible for dealing with asylum seekers have powers of arrest and 
coercion. This is not conducive to earning the trust of asylum seekers. The European Parliament 
should request that the Commission examine and report on the involvement of Member State 
coercive institutions in asylum procedures at national level in order to seek to diminish this role 
and attendant practices. 
 
13. To avoid further complexity and coercion, in case joint processing schemes are introduced and 
further pursued, we invite those concerned to follow a progressive approach, starting with the 
simplest form of ‘supported’ processing initiatives and building on them as and when they have 
proven to be effective in delivering fairness and enhancing compliance with pre-existing first-line 
reception and RSD obligations. The European Parliament should support this understanding and 
engage in a dialogue with the Commission, EASO, and related actors, to promote it. 
 
14. The new AMIF, for the seven years from 2014 through 2020, will spend a total of EUR 3.137 
billion on asylum, migration and integration of third-country nationals in the EU. It should be 
recalled that the ERF provided generous funding to many Member States, including those with the 
worst record of reception conditions (EUR 630 million over the period 2008-2013), but with 
results that were not always tangible. The European Parliament should request the Court of 
Auditors to examine the use of ERF funds for first-line reception specifically in those Member 
States where the greatest shortcomings have been identified. The European Parliament needs to 
make sure that ERF and AMIF money is effectively spent on required first-line reception 
capacities. The Schengen Evaluation System recently approved by the European Parliament may 
be a model for monitoring which could be considered for this purpose. 
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9 September 2014 Brussels 
Asylum Service, Ministry of 
Public Order & Citizen 
Protection, Greece 
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ANNEX III. Key insights emerging from surveys and interviews 
 
This Annex contains key insights and contributions from Member States, EU institutions and other 
stakeholders on current practices and new approaches to asylum procedures, as they emerged from the 
questionnaires sent out and the interviews conducted in the course of the research carried out for this study.  
While input was invited from a wide range of actors, responses were limited, potentially due to time constraints 
imposed on the study. Sixteen responses were received in response to 22 survey requests. The main elements 
of those responses are summarised below. 
Our respondents include: 
Respondent Questionnaire Interview 
Austria x  
Bulgaria x  
Cyprus x  
France x  
Germany x  
Greece x x 
Malta x  
Netherlands x  
Member of the EP x x 
General Secretariat of the 
Council of the EU (DG D1B – 
Asylum, Immigration) 
x  
EASO x x 
FRA x  
FRONTEX (Fundamental 
Rights Officer) 
x  
UNHCR Bureau for Europe   x 
ECRE x  
Dutch Refugee Council x  
 
1. Current Framework and Proposals on Joint Processing and Distribution 
1.1. Joint processing initiatives 
The benefits of joint processing 
Some respondents (Cyprus, Greece) highlighted the potential benefits of joint processing in terms of (1) 
improving the quality of asylum procedures, including through scope to prioritising applications, such as those 
that are likely to be well-founded; and (2) supporting Member States which are unable to respond effectively 
to large numbers of applicants. 
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In its survey response, EASO identified benefits accruing to Member States: exchange of best practices, 
contribution to a common understanding ultimately leading to increased mutual trust. In interview, EASO 
officials suggested that joint processing initiatives could, given the requisite interest and conditions, develop 
into a “moving asylum system” assisting Member States facing pressures. Emphasis was placed on tackling 
‘asylum shopping’ and ‘manifestly unfounded’ claims in that context.316 
Other respondents have been more cautious regarding the benefits of joint processing. For an MEP, “if 
procedures are not qualitatively improved, there is no point in having joint processing merely to have solidarity 
on paper”.317 Greece also shared the view that piecemeal joint processing could do little in response to a large 
crisis in one Member State.318 
Malta approached the issue from a different perspective, suggesting that joint processing in itself would be of 
little practical value, if not accompanied by a distribution mechanism. 
 
*** 
Despite initial scepticism towards the Commission’s February 2013 study on joint processing, EASO found 
that Member States in 2014 were more receptive to the idea of joint processing pilots on specific aspects of 
the asylum procedure, presented in the Commission’s Communication on the Task Force Mediterranean.319 
As EASO explained, reluctance toward joint processing initiatives is not due to lack of interest in solidarity. 
However, Member States tend to have different expectations of joint processing, which raises a number of 
legal and practical issues.  
For that reason, EASO officials explained to us that the idea was to “break down the whole process and identify 
specific steps in the asylum process without any grand design”.320 
FRA agreed that pilot projects afforded an opportunity to examine and explore solutions to legal and practical 
difficulties, with a view to moving towards more far-reaching EU joint processing in the long run. FRONTEX 
also indicated support for the idea of an EASO-coordinated initiative, run with focal points from all Member 
States. 
In its response, EASO detailed the development of a ‘bottom up’ approach to joint processing initiatives 
following a proposal tabled at the meeting of the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum 
(SCIFA) on 6 May 2014, which was positively received by the Council. Eight pilot projects had been launched 
and the results were under consideration by EASO and the Member States as of mid-September 2014, relating 
to the following subjects and involving the countries listed below: 
- Unaccompanied minors: Cyprus hosting experts from Sweden 
- Country of origin information (COI): Hungary hosting experts from Austria 
- Dublin determination: Italy hosting experts from the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden 
- Registration and case management: Sweden hosting experts from Denmark and vice versa 
- Dublin determination: Germany hosting experts from Austria and vice versa 
- Vulnerability assessment: UK hosting experts from Norway, Slovenia and vice versa 
As of September 2014, two projects are currently under preparation: 
- Registration and case management: France hosting experts from Belgium and vice versa 
- Registration and case management: Belgium hosting experts from the Netherlands and vice 
versa. 
It has been noted that these projects have been initiated primarily among countries which traditionally work 
together on asylum. So far, the implementation of the pilots between participating states has revealed 
                                                   
316 Interview with EASO, 9 September 2014. 
317 Interview with a Member of the European Parliament, 9 September 2014 (interviewer’s unofficial translation from 
French). 
318 Interview with the Greek Asylum Service, 11 September 2014 (interviewer’s unofficial translation from Greek). 
319 European Commission (n. 103). 
320 Interview with EASO, 9 September 2014. 
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significant potential of joint processing activities in enhancing mutual trust, according to EASO. EASO 
recognises, however, that such forms of joint processing as have been tested in the pilots reflect to a certain 
extent cooperation that already exists between Member States. 
EASO also indicated its intention to propose a joint processing pilot involving several steps of the asylum 
procedure, including the personal interview, within the current EU legal framework. The need for any 
amendments to national and EU law in order to explore further joint processing models would be considered 
at future stages of the pilots, as and if necessary. 
Two Member States (France, Germany) stated their view that any proposal on a new system for joint 
processing and screening would be premature at this stage. 
Another Member State (Greece) – which did not participate in any of the pilots – considered the pilot projects 
as a “brainstorming activity” on the part of EASO, which largely remains abstract at this stage.321  
According to Greece, any discussion on joint processing should cover the entire chain of international 
protection processes, including reception, Dublin and subsequent steps; rather than breaking down the asylum 
process to different isolated ‘technical’ components. 
 
1.2. Distribution of responsibility and the Dublin system 
 
a. EWM and changes to the Dublin Regulation 
On the issue of the Dublin III Regulation early warning mechanism (EWM), EASO highlighted that the 
mechanism’s very recent coming into force may explain cautious responses at this stage. Three Member States 
(France, Germany, Austria) agreed that the Union needs more time to evaluate the EWM in light of the new 
acquis – given that APD and RCD have not yet been transposed into national law in all Member States, prior 
to the deadline for doing so – before identifying further weaknesses in the Dublin system. 
At the same time, a number of Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece) and civil society organisations 
(ECRE, Dutch Refugee Council) would call for changes to the Dublin Regulation at this stage, addressing the 
following issues:  
- Family unity and the ‘first country of application’ principle should be the only criteria for 
determining the Member State responsible (Cyprus, Greece) 
- Time-limits for Dublin procedures should be shortened (Cyprus) 
- Clearer procedures should be introduced to ensure family unity for UAMs and vulnerable 
persons (Cyprus) 
- A more flexible approach should be in place for returns to countries experiencing pressures 
on their asylum systems (Cyprus), given that it would likely prolong Dublin procedures and 
delay the examination of claims (ECRE) 
- Detention should be excluded or further curtailed to a few hours/days (Dutch Refugee Council, 
ECRE) 
According to EASO, Dublin – as a system that accords central importance to national sovereignty and 
implicitly assumes control of movement across intra-EU borders – is not suited to the realities of the modern 
European Union. 
Bulgaria and Cyprus see realistic prospects of such changes in the short term. On the other hand, France, 
Germany, Austria, Malta and Greece do not believe that the Dublin regime is likely to change in the coming 
years. This view is shared by MEPs and civil society organisations such as ECRE and the Dutch Refugee 
Council. 
As Greek officials explained, the broader political purpose behind Dublin remained unchanged by the recast. 
The use of Dublin by national authorities (and the feasibility of a ‘Dublin without coercion’ model) differs 
between Member States: some Member States implement Dublin ‘by the book’, while others show greater 
                                                   
321 Interview with the Greek Asylum Service, 11 September 2014. 
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flexibility, namely in the application of the family unity criteria.322 In that light, the idea of examining how 
different asylum authorities implement the Dublin Regulation was put forward as a possible research 
question for future studies. 
 
b. Alternative models for distribution of responsibility 
 Distribution key  
There was clear support among several respondents for the idea of a distribution key for responsibility for 
asylum seekers (and beneficiaries of protection, as well as non-returnable persons), based on different 
quantitative and qualitative criteria (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Malta, FRA, one MEP). Those respondents 
consider that such a mechanism should be mandatory. 
One Member State (Austria) referred to a proposal it presented to SCIFA entitled “Save Lives”. The aim of 
the Austrian initiative is to offer legal access to refugees and opt for a distribution scheme for those entering 
across the EU. Such a distribution system should be mandatory for both Member States and asylum seekers. 
Austria was hesitant, however, to see the replacement of the Dublin system with a quota system at this stage. 
For UNHCR, however, a distribution key along the German model would be going too far to have realistic 
prospects as an EU-wide solution. 
France and Germany are opposed to alternative models for allocating responsibility. 
 
 Pooling reception capacity 
The idea of pooling reception capacity has also been positively received by some respondents (Bulgaria, 
Cyprus). EASO considers that this could be practically implemented.  
However, a number of legal and practical issues arise in the view of some respondents. For Malta and 
FRONTEX, this would have little significance unless it translates into distribution of asylum seekers on a basis 
other than Dublin (and also including assumption of responsibility for processing the asylum claim). 
A different formula, suggested by FRONTEX, could have some Member States focussing on reception and 
others on final relocation (echoing to a certain extent elements of the Hathaway and Neve burden-sharing 
model) but would require the EU to provide and allocate funding accordingly. 
The transfer of asylum seekers from one country to another for reception purposes would hinder rapid 
processing (according to Cyprus, ECRE, Dutch Refugee Council), hinder the asylum seeker’s access to legal 
assistance and disrupt family and social ties (ECRE, Dutch Refugee Council), and raise coercion issues 
(France, ECRE, Dutch Refugee Council). 
For Greece, pooling reception capacity (e.g. as part of larger-scale joint processing) would not avoid the current 
problems. Beyond increasing the risk of coercion against asylum seekers, officials found that “the costs of 
reception capacity have not been considered, although this would involve high costs”.323 Austria and Germany 
also agreed that any discussion on pooling reception capacity would be premature at this point. 
ECRE and the Dutch Refugee Council also found that this could have perverse effects by acting as a 
disincentive for certain Member States to invest in creating sufficient reception capacity on their territory. 
FRA found that this would be more easily achieved when and if processing were undertaken at EU level. 
 
c. Mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions 
Several respondents (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Malta, FRA, ECRE, Dutch Refugee Council) are receptive to 
the notion of mutual recognition (which has not been defined in detail in their responses). On the other hand, 
three Member States (France, Austria, Germany) seem opposed to mutual recognition until asylum systems 
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323 Interview with the Greek Asylum Service, 11 September 2014. 
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have effectively been harmonised with regard to procedures and recognition. UNHCR and the Council 
Secretariat also see little prospect for it at this stage. 
Moreover, the increasing granting of humanitarian protection statuses by some Member States may complicate 
the application of mutual recognition EU-wide (France). 
Greece and Malta advocated against any preconditions to free movement of those granted protection. Cyprus 
could accept restrictions such as limitations on work rights, but only as a short-term measure. Malta also 
suggested an obligation not to depend on the host state’s social assistance system (similar to that provided in 
migration instruments). 
For other respondents (France and the Netherlands), however, mutual recognition of asylum decisions does 
not per se amount to a right of free movement; France maintains the position that the only right to free 
movement for protection beneficiaries stems from the amended Long-Term Residents' Directive (Directive 
2003/109/EC, as amended by 2011/51/EU). The Netherlands stated that free movement of refugees should 
remain regulated by the same Directive. 
 
2. Legal Constraints on First-Line Reception, and Joint Reception 
 
2.1. Legal obstacles to joint processing 
According to the responses, legal barriers to further action on joint processing could include: 
- Lack of clear definition of ‘screening’ in the APD (France) 
- Access to national databases (EASO, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece) 
- Differing criteria for the use of accelerated procedures (EASO) 
- Differing mandates and levels of authority among employees/officials (Greece) 
- Legal basis for interviewing applicants (EASO) 
- Language regimes: EASO and Greece understand this as a practical challenge but the 
legislation of at least one Member State provides that the only languages used in the asylum 
process are those defined in the country’s constitution (Cyprus). 
Practical obstacles identified by EASO also include divergence in the organisation of workflows, e.g. in case 
prioritisation. 
Another obstacle, raised by Malta, relates to the scope of target Member States for joint processing schemes. 
Which Member States would qualify as ‘main points of arrival’ and under what criteria? This concern seems 
to be shared by FRONTEX, which pointed out that EASO currently has signed memoranda of understanding 
only with countries situated at the external borders of the Union. 
 
2.2. Target group for joint processing 
Different views were expressed among respondents as to the criteria for targeting persons for joint processing: 
- Asylum seekers whose claims are likely to be well-founded (Bulgaria, Cyprus), e.g. persons 
from a country of origin in crisis. Some analogies could be drawn between this idea and the 
UNHCR’s suggestion to invoke the Dublin humanitarian clause for Syrians and Eritreans in 
its 2014 “Response Package for the Mediterranean”. 
- ECRE acknowledged the benefits of this approach from the viewpoint of efficiency, but raised 
the possibility of contravening the principle of non-discrimination of refugees on the basis of 
nationality (Article 3 CSR), as well as Article 21 EUCFR. 
- Vulnerable applicants who require immediate processing (Cyprus, Greece) and minors 
(Greece), as well as victims of trafficking in human beings, who do not adequately benefit 
from protection under the Anti-Trafficking Directive in all Member States at the moment 
(FRONTEX). 
- People arriving at those EU’s external borders most affected in terms of numbers (FRA). 
80  GUILD, COSTELLO, GARLICK, MORENO-LAX & MOUZOURAKIS 
 
- Mode of arrival (Dutch Refugee Council). This could be seen in line with UNHCR’s 
“Response Package for the Mediterranean”, which focuses on rescue at sea. 
EASO and Malta found that joint processing should not be circumscribed to a specific target group but rather 
be used as a flexible tool for national experts to work together; providing the basis for a ‘moving asylum 
system’ beyond specific emergencies. According to Malta, introducing specific target groups would result in 
an additional procedural step, rendering the asylum process more complex. 
France, on the other hand, would only see prospects of joint processing where a Member State is facing a 
“mass influx” to which it cannot effectively respond. This could suggest parallels with the Temporary 
Protection Directive, which might be a more pertinent instrument on which to rely, according to ECRE. 
 
2.3. Reception conditions 
One Member State (Greece) and FRA considered that dedicated, initial reception centres may need to be built 
in countries experiencing high influx. For the Dutch Refugee Council, reception facilities should be close to 
the place where the actual interview would be carried out. According to other respondents (Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
France,324 FRONTEX325), however, no special reception centres are necessary. 
In terms of administration, FRA was of the view that reception centres should remain regulated by national 
law but largely financed by EU funds. Joint administration of reception centres could also be considered, 
according to one Member State (Cyprus). 
Austria found that reception conditions should be considered as a very last step in the CEAS harmonisation 
process, as they raise sensitive issues. 
 
3. Designing Fair Procedures 
 
3.1. Front-loading legal support 
Respondent national authorities (Greece, France) were not entirely clear as to the exact meaning of the term 
‘screening’ in order to define the applicable legal standards. 
As regards the duty to provide legal aid and assistance, a number of Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Austria) 
found the state duty-bound to provide the conditions for the enjoyment of the right of legal assistance. 
Responses did not clarify, however, whether such assistance is to be provided free of charge to the asylum 
seeker. 
Malta and Germany, on the other hand, stated that there was no duty to provide free legal assistance at the first 
instance stage, neither under EU law nor under national law. 
 
3.2. A multi-actor approach 
Respondents generally agree that NGOs and international organisations would not assume any new role 
beyond their current activities in the context of a multi-actor approach to procedures, especially in relation to 
joint processing initiatives. 
NGOs could provide support such as COI and quality assurance (Bulgaria, Greece, FRA), as well as training 
for staff (Greece). Malta pointed to the possibility of counselling to prepare applicants/beneficiaries for transfer 
to a different Member State, similar to that provided under the EUREMA I and II intra-EU relocation projects. 
Greece also suggested the idea of seconding NGO support staff to asylum authorities in cases of emergency. 
FRONTEX placed emphasis on close involvement of NGOs and international organisations in the 
identification of persons with specific needs, such as victims of trafficking and unaccompanied minors. 
                                                   
324 Note that France only sees joint processing as pertinent in cases of mass influx in a Member State. 
325 FRONTEX noted, however, that Italy’s reception capacity may have to be reassessed. 
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